

RELIGION IN LIFE

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of RELIGION IN LIFE, published quarterly at New York, N. Y., for October 1, 1934.

State of New York)
County of New York) ss.

Before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and county aforesaid, personally appeared Arthur F. Stevens, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is the business manager of the quarterly, RELIGION IN LIFE, and that the following is, to the best of his knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management, etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of March 3, 1933, embodied in section 537, Postal Laws and Regulations, to wit:

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Sworn to and subscribed before me this 25th day of September, 1934. **ARTHUR F. STEVENS, Business Manager.**

[Seal] **EDNA G. JEROME, Notary Public.** (My commission expires March 30, 1936.)

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A Psychologist Advises the Churches

WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN

AT the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, held at Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1926, Professor Edwin D. Starbuck, of the University of Southern California, read a paper on mysticism in which he based certain sweeping conclusions as to the significance of the mystical experience upon the results of a questionnaire addressed to one thousand, one hundred and fifty undergraduate students of that university. When the meeting was thrown open for discussion, Professor Dasgupta, the distinguished professor of philosophy in the University of Calcutta, after expressing his interest in this attempt to bring the experimental methods of science to bear upon a subject of central religious interest, raised the question whether the learned author had sufficiently appreciated the necessity for discrimination in his choice of the subjects for his experiment. "If," he went on, "Professor Starbuck could have persuaded Jesus Christ to answer his questionnaire, one would have felt more hopeful of a significant addition to our knowledge; but," and here the Hindu visitor glanced quizzically at his American colleague, "I doubt if you could have persuaded him to submit to your test."

The writer was reminded of this experience on reading a recent article by Professor James H. Leuba, of Bryn Mawr, entitled "Religious Beliefs of American Scientists."¹ In this article he attempts to apply the questionnaire method to the religious beliefs of a selected group of contemporary American scientists and on the basis of the results thus reached he extends to the American churches certain advice as to their policy for the future.

The thesis to which Professor Leuba's article is devoted is that American scientists are increasingly losing faith in the "God of the churches," that the more earnest they are, the wider their departure from traditional beliefs; and that the more directly their studies bring them into contact with religious issues, the greater the degree of their skepticism.²

¹ *Harpers Magazine*, August, 1934.

² Besides his question on belief in God, Professor Leuba includes also in his questionnaire a question on belief in personal immortality. Here we find, as we should expect, that those who believe in God as Professor Leuba defines belief, believe also in immortality, though curiously enough among those who question there is a larger proportion who keep an open mind. In view of the statements often made concerning the extent to which modern men have ceased to believe in immortality, the number of such believers among the scientists studied by Professor Leuba is a significant and encouraging fact.

The conclusion which he draws from this state of affairs is that if the churches wish to retain their hold upon the coming generation, they will be wise to imitate the example of the scientists and to throw overboard the God whom they have hitherto worshiped.

This is not the first time that Professor Leuba has given this advice. Ten years ago he made a similar study, from which he drew a similar conclusion. Most recently in a volume of some three hundred and thirty-six pages, entitled *God or Man?*³ he has maintained the thesis that belief in God as that belief is fostered by the churches has been a source of "evils which outweigh the good it does,"⁴ and that whatever discredits that belief and throws man back on his own resources is to be welcomed.

In this contention Professor Leuba is entirely sincere. Though the language he uses is the language of science, his interest is not primarily theoretical, but practical. He wants to help people to a fuller and richer life, and he believes that as a psychologist he is better able to do this than most clergymen. Though his study of psychology has led him to question the beliefs of the churches, he recognizes the possibility "that man in some way, somehow, is part of a universe with a purpose, that he co-operates in a universal meaningful life."⁵ Such a conception of the Ultimate he believes would give us all that we need for a satisfying life, namely, the assurance "that life is not a fleeting show destined to disappear without leaving any trace behind, that it is not meaningless, that moral effort is worth while." But any faith which goes beyond this, such as our Christian faith in a righteous and loving God with whom we may have personal communion and from whom we may receive help, he regards as superstition, against which, in the interests of the good life, he must wage unrelenting war.

It is because of this practical purpose that Professor Leuba's discussion deserves respectful consideration. Were this attack upon the religion of the churches simply a mark of religious hostility or indifference, it would need no answer. Since it is seriously meant, it should receive an answer no less serious.

There are two questions to be raised in connection with Professor Leuba's article. One has to do with his diagnosis, the other with his remedy. Is what he has to say about the beliefs of American scientists trustworthy?

³New York, 1933.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 273.

⁵*Religious Education*, April, 1928, p. 298.

Granting that the facts are as he states them, do the conclusions he draws from them follow?

Let us begin with the first of these questions, that which states the thesis he desires to maintain. That thesis, we have seen, is as follows: American scientists are increasingly losing faith in the God of the churches. The more eminent they are, the wider their departure from the traditional beliefs. The more their studies bring them into contact with religious issues, the greater the degree of their skepticism.

Obviously, if we are to test the accuracy of these statements, two further questions must be asked. First, what exactly is the God of the churches? Do those who are qualified to speak for them recognize in the definition Professor Leuba puts into their mouth the God in whom they verily believe?

Secondly, granting that Professor Leuba's summary correctly describes the attitude of contemporary scientists toward the conception of God which he ascribes to the churches, does that summary adequately represent the positive faith which they hold? Had the churches been allowed to substitute for Professor Leuba's definition of God their own, how far would the answer given have been the same?

What, then, is Professor Leuba's definition of the God of the churches? He is the God who answers petitionary prayer in a miraculous way. To quote his own words, "He is one to whom one may pray in expectation of receiving an answer. By 'answer' I mean more than the natural, subjective, psychological effect of prayer."⁶

This definition not only identifies belief in God with a theology which identifies worship with petitionary prayer, but defines answer to prayer in terms which exclude from the means which God uses for his self-communication all those which belong to the natural order, psychological as well as physical.

It may be admitted that there are many Christians who hold such a view of religion and that there are prayers in the ritual of all the churches which, taken literally, seem to involve a magical view of the relation of God to the world, and so open the way to many forms of superstition. We may go further and say that among the forms of contemporary religion which are most in evidence to-day there are some which in their desire to emphasize the fact of God's present activity in his universe fail to take ade-

⁶*Op. cit.*, p. 292.

quate account of the fact that science, no less than religion, may be one of the ways through which God makes his presence known.

But to identify belief in God as held by the churches with the theology which underlies this particular view of petitionary prayer is to fly in the face of plain facts. One might as well try to sum up in a single sentence "the Nature of the scientists" and to ask those who believed in this kind of Nature to return their answer in the form of a categorical "Yes" or "No" as to attempt to compress into twenty-seven words a view of "the God of the churches" that could be adequately dealt with by an answer of this kind.

Who and what is the God of the churches? He is a transcendent being whom eye hath not seen nor ear heard, nor imagination conceived, only to be defined by negatives, yet the most real of all realities. He is the Divine Word, Ultimate Principle of all creation, ever present in his universe by his Spirit, the source of light and life and love. He is moral personality, wise, righteous, loving, yet so far above the limits of our human sense-conditioned personality that the very words by which we describe him lose their meaning and become symbols of the ineffable. He is Father, Son, and Spirit; Unity in Trinity, resolving in himself all mysteries, yet remaining to the mind of man inscrutable. One might go on heaping noun on noun and adjective on adjective without exhausting the words that Christians have used to suggest their thought of God or fully explaining the beliefs which underlie them.

But all these are definitions for the mind alone and leave the essence of the matter out. The God of the churches is something more than a concept for the intellect. He is ideal excellence, the one altogether lovely, the one in whose presence man becomes conscious of his own imperfection and finiteness, and forgetting himself loses all thought of time and sense in the adoration of the eternal. He is the Lord and giver of life, known to the reverent spirit as the source of everything that is best in himself, the unfailing spring of forgiveness, of enlightenment, of love, the one in whom alone the heart of man finds its abiding satisfaction.

Who should know this better than Professor Leuba? A lifelong student of mysticism, he knows that the God whom the mystic worships is not one of whom one asks, but to whom one gives. Face to face with this supreme excellence, the private desires of the individual become petty and insignificant, and one's progress along the path of true piety is marked by

the several stages in their renunciation. Professor Leuba, too, has felt the thrill that comes with the discovery of the divine ideal which gives meaning to the universe. To him, therefore, mystical piety, with its consistent self-discipline and its unreserved surrender to the highest values, cannot but be congenial.

But the mystical ideal is determinative for Catholic piety in all its forms. It is the goal which the Catholic Church holds out to all its worshipers. There is, to be sure, in Catholic teaching an intermediate stage in which religion is conceived primarily as a matter of asking and receiving, but this is never to be regarded as final. It is at most a help, a step from which one mounts to something higher.

In the Protestant ideal man's relation to God is related more closely to his relation to his fellowmen. Here ethical considerations play a larger rôle, both in the conception of God and in the definition of the ideal for man. Prayer, therefore, so far as it takes the form of petition is more concerned with the desire for equipment for service than with that detachment from all earthly concerns which is the final goal of Catholic piety. Yet in Protestant piety no less than in Catholic it is self-surrender rather than self-assertion which gives its character to Christian prayer. Since God is personal, petition is in place. But every petition, to be Christian, must end as the prayer of Jesus ended in the Garden, with the words, "Not my will, but thine be done."

Had Professor Leuba recalled our thoughts to this more exalted conception of Christian prayer he would have rendered a useful and needed service. But he has not been content to do this. He has included all Christian piety in one sweeping condemnation, and in this he has pointed to the scientists as his allies. Let us see how far his claim to their support is justified.

Let us recall the precise form in which that support is asked. It is in the form of a question to which one must answer either "Yes" or "No." That question is whether they believe in a God to whom they may pray in the expectation of receiving an answer, that answer being defined as one which involves more than the "natural, subjective, psychological effect of prayer."

One might remind Professor Leuba that every one of the words he uses is a nest of ambiguities. What exactly do we mean by "natural," by "subjective," by "psychological"? What, when applied to prayer, do we

mean by "answer"? Surely before a "Yes" or "No" is called for there should be some clarification of issues here.

Professor Leuba feels the need of no such clarification. To each he brings his definition, phrased as he has phrased it, and calls for a "Yes" or "No." It is not strange that, confronted with such an alternative, not a few of those asked to submit to the examination should confess themselves in doubt.

Even those who consented to answer were not happy at the position in which they were placed. They realized that if they answered "Yes," they would seem to be committed to a view which put God completely outside his universe and left him no way of entrance but that of miracle in the purely negative and magical sense in which it has been discredited ever since Hume. If, on the other hand, they answered "No," they would have no opportunity of expressing their positive religious faith. They feared that they would be regarded as materialists, if not as atheists, whereas to many of them faith in God is a part of their ultimate philosophy of life. In Professor Leuba's own words: "They are at one with most contemporary philosophers in placing a spiritual power at the root of the universe." Professor Leuba recognizes with regret—a regret which his readers will share—that his manner of conducting his questionnaires gave him no opportunity to determine how many contemporary American scientists hold this profoundly spiritual faith.

It is not those only who believe with Spinoza that true piety must remain purely contemplative or who, like Professor Leuba himself, are convinced that in religion there can be no give and take, who are forced by Professor Leuba's manner of phrasing his questionnaire to give a negative answer. There are many who believe that answer to prayer is not only possible but vital to the highest form of personal religion, who yet believe that such answers come not outside of, but through, the "natural, subjective, psychological" factors which Professor Leuba excludes. The real issue here is not whether, in order to have answer to prayer, one must go behind the natural, the subjective, the psychological, but whether within this territory, which makes up the whole of what we familiarly call human experience, our most significant religious insights come through events and experiences which as we look back upon them remain exceptional, not to say unique, or whether we gain our surest knowledge of God through the more regular and normal methods of his working that are open to all of

us all the time. It is, in a word, the question of the religious significance of the individual in human experience. At this point Christians have differed in every age, and it is not surprising that scientists, so far as they are Christians, should differ also.

So long as we restrict our inquiry to the limited field to which Professor Leuba has confined it, it is not strange that he should find that as he leaves the physical sciences, where natural law presents itself in its most easily recognizable form, and approaches the biological sciences, where uniformity is more difficult to discover, the percentage of his negative answers should rise. Since science is the search for principles everywhere and always valid, it is only to be expected that sociologists and psychologists, whose search for such principles takes them into a region where individual variations play so conspicuous a rôle, should be more than ordinarily suspicious of events claiming to be absolutely new beginnings. The physicist can admit the principle of indeterminate variation in the atom because the ways in which it operates are not such as to invalidate his broader generalizations. The psychologist hesitates to admit a similar arbitrariness in the action of the human will because he has not yet found a way to admit such variation without invalidating the claim of his study to be a true science. But this does not mean that psychologists do not admit that prayer is a reasonable exercise or that it may not produce results not at present possible in any other way.

There is reason, therefore, to suspect that had Professor Leuba's method of stating his question been different the results which he reached by his questionnaire would have differed correspondingly. Had the churches been allowed to tell what God they believed in, the number of scientists who would have been found to agree with them might have been greater than Professor Leuba represents it to be.

But suppose this were not so. Let us admit that Professor Leuba is right, that in spite of the deficiencies of his method he has hit upon a result which in the main corresponds with the facts. What then? Is there anything in this surprising to one who is sincerely religious, anything that ought to prove disturbing to his faith?

To admit this would be to show that one was ignorant of the very nature of religious faith as that faith appears to one who looks upon religion from the inside. To be religious means to become aware of God's presence in the world, not as a matter of inference or of authority, but by a personal

insight which carries with it its own evidence. Why this insight should come to some and not to others no technique available to science can explain to us, any more than it can tell us why out of all of his contemporaries there was only one Shakespeare. Suffice it to say that it is an experience which is not more likely to come to a scientist than to a person in any other walk of life. The apostle Paul saw this long ago, when he reminded the Corinthian Christians that religious faith is not the prerogative of the wise or the learned. In this he was only saying over again what Jesus had said before him: "Except ye be converted and become as little children, ye cannot enter into the Kingdom of Heaven." Only to those of an humble and contrite spirit does God make his presence known. Only those who, when the call comes, hear and obey, win assurance that it is God with whom they have to do.

All vital religion begins as revelation. This is a truth of which Karl Barth has been reminding us. If we are to know God, he must first make himself known to us. When the revelation has come, science can help us to appraise it at its full significance. It can put it in its proper setting and show how, now that it is here, it brings light into places where before all was dark. One thing it cannot do for us. It cannot demonstrate the existence of God, any more than it can demonstrate the existence of the other great realities that make up man's world—nature and man. We believe in them because we find them given. We learn what they are like as we surrender to their influence and let them do for and with us what they were meant to do.

This does not mean that in the forum of reason religious faith cannot give a good account of itself. Considered simply as a scientific hypothesis, there is as much to be said for the Christian view of the world as for any other of the rival philosophies which have contended for the suffrages of the learned. But the unity to which it leads is a unity of faith, and the assurance it brings is possible to those only who are willing to trust where they cannot see.

This being the case, the wonder is not that so few scientists believe in God in the restricted sense in which Professor Leuba has put his question, but that so many do so. It seems to show that Professor Leuba is right when he points out that, taken as a class, scientists are humble and receptive people, with minds open to new truth and hearts responsive to high ideals. It is all the more pity, therefore, that he could not have conducted his

inquiry in such a way as to show in its completeness what these earnest searchers after truth believe themselves to have found in this field which lies so close to the heart of man.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the church will be unwise to follow Professor Leuba's advice, however kindly it is meant. Not by modeling her teaching upon the changing fashions of contemporary science is the church likely to regain her hold upon the young, but by taking her own faith seriously—the faith in a God who is at work in the world, with whom man can have communion, and from whom he may receive comfort, guidance, and strength. Where that faith is living, as it is with multitudes to-day, life is free, purposeful, and happy. Where it is lacking, it is too often a prey to uncertainty and doubt. Where God is known as the author of such a happy, free, and purposeful life, psychology may explain the processes through which it operates as it will. It will not shake the believer's faith that in the last analysis it is God with whom he has to do.

The Ministry of the Word

JOHN S. WHALE

WHAT is the ultimate, irreducible thing which constitutes the Christian ministry; its vital function and *raison d'être*?

I

When we entered a theological school we were preparing in a very real sense to become experts. Whether we realized it or not, we were being trained to become professional exponents of the Christian religion.

Stated so baldly, such a thought fills you with horror perhaps. You will tell me that the apostles were unlearned and ignorant men, and that you rightly dread professionalism. You might go on to remind me of Milton's word that "it is a fond error to think that the university makes a minister of the gospel." And if you wanted to be very personal, you might quote George Fox: "At another time on a First Day morning the Lord opened unto me that being bred at Oxford and Cambridge was not enough to fit and qualify men to be ministers of Christ."

It is because we are in no serious danger of forgetting these deep unchanging truths; because Christ himself will not allow us to forget that the most keen-sighted may nevertheless be utterly blind, and that babes rather than the wise receive the revelation—it is because we are sure about this—that we can and must go on to appropriate the complementary truth, that Christ's ambassadors have to know their job; they have to equip themselves, using, not hiding, their God-given talents. We dare not pretend that God does not require us to serve him with all our mind. On the contrary, the obligation to be intelligent is a moral obligation. It is not a specialized function of learned academic minds but a sacred obligation laid on all Christ's ministers.

The problem confronting religious teachers in every age of relating faith to science, theology to philosophy, the revealed to the rational, contingent truths of history to eternal truths of reason, is our problem and we cannot honorably escape it. You cannot help men to believe—making the gospel commanding to the conscience and convincing to the reason—unless you are prepared to undergo the discipline of sound learning. If we are to have a ministry at all, it has to be an educated ministry. A minister is an

expert in the sense that he gives his life to his office and has to be as much equipped for it as a doctor or an economist or a lawyer is for his office. A minister is allowed of God to be put in trust with the gospel in a special sense; he is set aside for the work, and he cannot do his work unless he keeps the deposit of sacred learning which has come down to him from Origen and Augustine, Aquinas and Dante on the one hand; from Marcion and Luther, Calvin and Kierkegaard, Fox and Schleiermacher on the other. Men fall on degenerate days when it becomes fashionable to decry theology. I admit that the faith is not intellectually apprehended; it is *fiducia* rather than *assensus*; yet it has to be made intellectually tenable. We may mistrust the apprehension of religious experience in intellectual terms, and glibly disown metaphysic; but it is intellectual sloth rather than intellectual acumen to talk as though the great classical central dogmatic tradition of Christ's church were so much old furniture that ought long since to have been put out into the street. I make bold to say that the Christian ministry is one of the learned professions, and that we deny it at our peril. To quote the brusque language of John Knox about ordination: "It is neither the clipping of their crowns nor the greasing of their fingers, neither the laying on of their hands that maketh the true ministers of Jesus Christ. But the spirit of God inwardly first moving the heart to seek to enter into the holy calling for Christ's glory and the profit of the kirk; and thereafter the nomination of the people, the examination of the learned and public admission . . . make men lawful ministers of the Word and the Sacraments."

Let me give point to all this by appealing to history, taking from the past three illustrations of the way in which true religion ever stands in need of sound learning to defend itself and extend itself against three dangers:

- a. Rationalism and skepticism.
- b. Obscurantism and bigotry.
- c. Disintegration through excessive individualism and subjectivism.

(a) Our problem to-day—how to commend the faith to the minds as well as to the hearts of men—was that of Clement and Origen in the second century. In reaction against gnosticism, which threatened to dissolve the concrete historicity of the faith into a mist of theosophical speculation, second-century Christians were shy of thinking and speculating about what they believed. Tertullian makes it pretty clear that the majority of Christians were then as suspicious of philosophy—the thought forms

of the age—as a certain type of modern piety is of science. The cultured Celsus scoffed at Christianity as the perverse and contemptible superstition of artisans and fools, whispering in their proselytizing zeal “Do not examine, only believe”; contending, like a parliament of frogs in a marsh or a synod of worms in a dung-heap, “To us God alone reveals all things and all things are for us only.”

In this savage caricature there is (as in all caricature) an element of truth. It is true that, with the exception of Justin, the majority of second-century Christians shrank with horror from philosophy until the great Alexandrine Origen put the church on the right road, taught it to think out its theology and refused to admit that ignorance could be for ever or for long the nursing mother of devotion. “Orthodox theology of all confessions,” says Harnack, “has never yet stepped beyond the circle first marked out by the mind of Origen.” That is, he was a giant, pioneering the church toward a dogmatic formulation of what she believed. He gave us dogma. And if the modern man makes a wry face at this, I must say that I, for one, do not believe in an undogmatic Christianity. An undogmatic Christianity is a contradiction in terms. And we cannot commend the faith to our day and generation—(God knows it is being attacked!)—unless we understand it not only with the heart but with disciplined and informed minds.

(b) Again, sound learning safeguards religion against the attacks of obscurantism. Pass to the twelfth century. The great Bernard of Clairvaux was notoriously something of an obscurantist. (He was far more than that: he has proved too much for the vigorous and learned Doctor Coulton, that hammer of medieval obscurantism—just as Queen Victoria proved to be too much for Lytton Strachey. Even Coulton does a little hero-worshipping before the greatest figure of the twelfth century, though he hounded its greatest scholar to death. And somehow Bernard’s pathetic bigotry fades into insignificance when compared with his “knowledge of communion with the living Christ, which no age has surpassed.”¹)

But the bigotry is there. It broke Abelard. Bernard’s narrow orthodoxy, his dread of free inquiry, his trembling for the ark of God which led him to say *Fides enim non est æstimatio, sed certitudo*—Faith does not examine, it is certain—all this brought him up against another man, Gilbert de la Porrée—the learned Chancellor of Chartres, a fine scholar, though less of a theologian than a humanist. Gilbert was the one man whom

¹ B. L. Manning.

Bernard unsuccessfully charged with heresy. Why? Partly because Abelard's work and witness were bearing fruit, but also for a more immediate reason. Gilbert stood at bay at the Council of Rheims (1148), a solid phalanx of the Fathers in folio literally behind him, for his clerks followed him thus armed into the council. He was acquitted because he "acquitted himself" well. "Sometime after the trial," says Helen Waddell, "comes a friendly overture from the Saint, suggesting a little informal conference on some points in the writings of Saint Hilary, to which the Chancellor replies that if the Abbot wishes to come to a full understanding of the subject, it would be well for him to submit for a year or two to the ordinary processes of a liberal education."²

Obscurantism can be met effectively only with sound learning.

(c) Again, sound learning safeguards true religion against individual excesses, the dangers of boundless relativism and disintegration in the sphere of traditional Christian belief. This danger of disintegration through excessive individualism and subjectivism was never greater than it is to-day. Our fathers had a systematic theology, comprehensive, thought-out, authoritative, adequate, applicable. But as an able scholar pointed out recently: "For creed, we leave it to every man to define for himself what he means by profession of faith in Jesus Christ; meantime Rome does us all the service of standing where she did and defining her terms." That does not mean that we must look to Rome for our third illustration. It comes, rather, from the only possible quarter, John Calvin's Geneva.

His ardent colleague Guillaume Farel was not unlike many a good Congregationalist or Baptist deacon who laments the years young men spend at college before entering the ministry. Farel did not altogether approve of the first Seminary of the Reformed Church, a group of young men living and learning in Calvin's own house. Farel, a fiery enthusiast, saw only that there was a great lack of ministers in France and elsewhere, and he urged that young men should at once be drafted off to suitable posts. But Calvin was firm, though all that Farel said was true. Calvin is the statesman, the constructive genius of the Reformation. His sense of Churchmanship of Form and of Order, told him that ordinands could not go until they had been trained. They had a hard schooling: money was scarce: at one time in that household they were all nearly starving. Yet one by one those men left Geneva to preach the gospel as set forth in the

²*The Wandering Scholars.*

Institutes, with the result that Calvinism is the only adversary of which Rome has ever been really afraid. These men went out from that early seminary with a conception of religion high in its doctrine, august in its authority, secure and majestic in its foundations, complete in its range, thorough if not terrible in its logic. The Reformed Church had its noble Summa too—in the *Christianae Religionis Institutio* of John Calvin. The colleges and churches of the Reformed Tradition exist to-day because Calvin was a man of precise mind, refusing to let the stream of evangelical religion and churchmanship be lost in the sands of subjectivism.

Samuel Butler marveled that a chicken should be ready for all the uses of life in three weeks, whereas it takes three and twenty years to make a curate! Well, it takes even longer to make a good minister of the gospel, of whatsoever confession: such a man is learning all his life; his college training is never really over, and woe unto him if he forget it.

So much then for my first main point. Our college training, so thorough and exacting, is such as befits professional exponents of the faith, experts in a life-long advocacy of the central, classical Christian tradition.

II

If we are to be experts at one thing more than another, it is the preaching of the Word. We are not called and trained to become experts in what is coming, alas, to be regarded as the administrative or social work of the churches. To suppose that because we are ministers we must therefore be skilled sociologists and emulate the London School of Economics is a lamentable and dangerous delusion. All such activities are vital enough, but for us they are secondary, not primary. We are called and set aside and trained to preach the Word. Preaching is our main business and obligation, the first and permanent charge on our enthusiasm.

A Catholic priest is not necessarily or primarily a preacher. The Order of Preachers is only one of many within Catholicism. But a minister in our Protestant—Puritan—Free Church tradition is called and set apart to carry the glorious gospel of the blessed God, to proclaim his mightiest act of grace in Christ, to preach the word purely and faithfully, to administer the seals—those “visible words” of what God in Christ has done for us men and for our salvation.

If *sacrificium* and *sacerdotium* are the two great correlative ideas in Catholicism, in Protestantism they are *gratia* and *praedicatio*. Newman

once wrote, "The strength of any party lies in its being true to its theory. Consistency is the life of a movement." These words have a wide application: they bear on the polity, the forms of worship, the work and the witness of the Free Churches. We have to be true to our traditional ethos, to the logic of our fundamental conceptions, and this is the Word of God and its proclamation. The Catholic priest holds up Christ in the Mass: we hold up the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ in the preached Word. The Catholic looks at the Mass as a great spectacle: a drama. The Protestant hears the Word—he listens to the Word of God in the words of a man. To quote Luther: *Tota vita et substantia ecclesiae est in verbo Dei*.

The Reformed Church, as the Church of the Word, was and is a preaching church. The place of the officiating priest was and is taken by the *minister verbi*. From the days of Montanism onward Catholicism puts the sacrament of the altar—the Mass—at the center of worship, and relegates preaching to the circumference. Gwatkin exaggerates when he says that as one of the results of the Montanist controversy preaching was thrown into the background for a thousand years. The mediæval church had many famous preachers: not to mention those earlier giants Augustine, Chrysostom, Leo and Gregory, we cannot ignore Franciscans and Dominicans, Gerard Groot (the Wesley of the fourteenth century), Jean Standonck of Paris and Geiler von Kaiserberg in the fifteenth century, who was known as "the clear-toned trombone of Germany." A glance at Doctor Owst's two books on the subject reveals the strength and variety of the preaching tradition in mediæval Christendom. But with the Reformation, and in Calvinism more especially, preaching again became central. "The Reformers," says a recent writer, "lived by the view that what is preached and heard in Christian preaching is no more and no less than God's word."³ *Praedicatio Verbi Dei est Verbum Dei*. The Reformers dared to identify God's word and man's word in human preaching. They reversed the relation of sacrament and sermon. At the center of the service, where the eucharistic transformation took place, they placed the sermon. Where the priest had said "*Hoc est corpus meum*," the minister stood up and said "*Hoc est verbum Dei*." In Catholicism the sermon was merely the preparation for grace: in Protestantism it became the channel or means of grace. Calvin and Luther did not depreciate the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper; but they did exalt preaching, and in their tradition we stand to-day.

³ McConnachie: *The Barthian Theology* (to which this paragraph is closely indebted).

But notice here a vital distinction. The Word that men preached was God's Word, not some private excogitation of their own. A minister of the Word is not set in the church to deliver his own soul. He is set there to preach the glorious gospel of the blessed God. And those who announce in these days that they are going to hear Mr. So-and-So as little understand the genius of Protestant worship as do those who announce that they come to church to worship and not to hear a man talk. According to the high theory and practice of Protestantism the preacher is God's ambassador: he is allowed of God to be put in trust with the gospel. His word, when he preaches the gospel, is a sacramental act. Preaching is really a mystery wherein God's word is spoken and heard.

This, then, is the central activity in Reformation life and worship. "When God's word is not preached," says Luther, in reference to public worship, "better not sing nor read nor even come together." Preaching meant so much to the father of Protestantism that he could dare to say with humility and yet with proud confidence: "I know that on the Last Day God will bear me testimony that I preached aright" (*dass ich recht gepredigt habe*). Too much attention can be given to the rage and bluster of Luther's many polemical writings and dogmatic treatises, his pamphlets "against" this or that. (It is rather pathetic that his last diatribe bears the characteristic title "Against the Asses of Louvain.") But all this is not entirely characteristic. More attention is being given in these days by Scandinavians and Germans and even by Roman Catholics to Luther's positive witness, as a man of prayer, as a hymn-writer, as a preacher.⁴ You feel the beat of his heart when you read "The freedom of the Christian man" or his Homilies (*Postille*). He himself says, "The best book I ever wrote, and which even the Papists like, is my *Postille*." You get at the deepest things in Luther when he is not fighting to defend them but telling men about them in *Table Talk* or Catechism or Sermon, out of a full heart. Luther wanted the gospel to sound and ring in every Christian mouth. He insists that the gospel is not a book—something comprised within the letters of the alphabet—but a *mündliche Predigt und ein lebendig Wort*; that is, something proclaimed through human lips, and therefore a living word. Let me quote the whole characteristic passage, if only to dispel the cheap and easy assumption that Luther cast down the Pope only to put bibliolatry in his place. He says:

⁴ See Luther in *oekumenischer Sicht*.

"You know how, if a man asked what the gospel was, the sophists of the schools replied, 'Oh, it is a Book which teaches good things.' But they know not what these good things are, nor do they understand them. Nay, but Gospel means good news (*ein gute Botschaft*). It means nought else but a preaching and a crying aloud of the grace and compassion of God through the Lord Christ in His death; and it is in actual fact not that which stands in books and is composed of letters of the alphabet, but a Word, from the mouth and alive. It is a voice to be cried and echoed publicly through the wide world so that all men everywhere may hear it."⁵

Yes, the preached gospel, the sermon, became a veritable *cri au peuple* and in more senses than one. If Calvin is not the father of modern democracy he is its sponsor if not its grandparent. Absolutist rulers in the sixteenth century were not over-fond of preaching. Elizabeth, a typical Tudor, was suspicious of it. "It was good," she said, "for the Church to have few preachers: three or four might suffice for a county." Read what the early Puritans thought of that, and recall Latimer's emphasis on the pulpit earlier in the century, and earlier still Wycliffe's avowed object to make people attach more importance to the pulpit than to the Catholic sacraments.

I need waste no words in reminding you that it is in this prophetic tradition that we of the Reformed Tradition stand. Our ministry implies not only that we are to be experts; we have to *preach* "that we do know."

III

Seeing that we have this ministry of the Word, wherein is its emphasis to be? It is agreed on all hands to-day that we have to sound out a positive note; our gospel is not just a little sanctified psychology, it is not a vague emasculated religiosity tricked out with doubtful scraps of Arianism, something that—by the aid of our native wit—we think out and set down on paper on Fridays and Saturdays, for preaching on the Sunday. Our message again is not fundamentally and primarily a social gospel, i.e., the Sermon on the Mount, suitably watered down of course so as not to look too much like socialism, or to seem too drastic a condemnation of the present social order. The gospel is God's good news to man of what he has done for them in the person and work of Christ; drawing nigh to meet them there; making them right with himself; redeeming them from sin. The gospel is the preached fact that God was in Christ reconciling the whole human race to himself, and all that this amazing fact implies. Therefore it is positive and objective; its primary reference is God-ward rather than

⁵ Quoted by Karl Holl: *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, vol. ii.

man-ward. The question that will take a man to the deep core of it is not, "What ought I to do?" but rather, "What has God done?"

What shall we say, then, is the living heart and pulse-beat of this preached Evangel? Or, to put it another way, what is the cardinal difference between Christianity and the ancient religions it supersedes?

Without meaning to do so, Celsus put his finger right on it. Wishing to illustrate his point that Christianity is a hole and corner barbarism, seeking its proselytes among simpletons, slaves and children, he mocks at and abuses its gospel of redemption by representing it as saying: "Let no educated man, no man of prudence and wisdom approach, but if any be ignorant or stupid or silly, let him approach with confidence." Celsus then proceeds to compare this preference for sinners with the invitations of the mystery-religions: "He that is pure and of a good conscience, let him come." Here, of course, Celsus speaks more truly than he knows. He answers the question as to the ultimate differentia between Christianity and other religions. For there are many religions which know no divine welcome to the sinner until he has ceased to be one. They would first make him righteous and then bid him welcome to God. But Christ first welcomes him to God and so makes him penitent, and remakes him. The one demands newness of life; the other imparts it. The one demands human righteousness as the price of divine friendship; the other gives the friendship in order to evoke the righteousness. And this is "the mystery of grace."

This mystery, so paradoxical and so glorious, is the heart of the gospel; the free pardon of God which we could never have discovered, earned or merited in any wise. All our righteousness is of none avail here. What is it but filthy rags? And what have we—with which to place God under an obligation to us, so to speak—that we have not received from God?

Thus it is Paul who of all New Testament writers really understands Jesus. It is Paul's gospel⁶ which draws out and interprets the parable of the prodigal, the parable of the Pharisee and the publican, the parable of the laborers who each received the penny at the day's end. The parable of the prodigal (which is of course mis-named, for both sons were lost, both were alienated from the Father's heart) reminds men that God will not do business with them. He is not a banker, allowing the elder brother

⁶ This familiar modern emphasis in New Testament scholarship is well brought out in Lietzmann's chapter, *Paulus*, in the first volume of his new *Geschichte der alten Kirche*.

to open a deposit account, or the prodigal to have an overdraft.⁷ He is the God of grace, not the God of rewards and penalties. He is not a shop-keeper every morsel of whose grace is put upon a tariff. Which of us could buy such a morsel, however small, with our merit? The whole idea of merit is here irreligious. Tertullian is here profoundly irreligious, declaring that a good act makes God a man's debtor: *bonum factum Deum habet debitorem*.⁸ Indeed, Tertullian does not shrink from the position that by meritorious works man can amass capital with God which is as it were entered against his name. The sin is expiated, God is appeased.

Against this crass legalism—as it was to develop in cultus, penitential works, asceticisms, meritorious acts—was directed the Protestant doctrine of God's free unmerited grace and man's being put right with God by appropriating that grace in faith alone. The sinful are received into sonship and have peace with God, not because of any holiness or good works on their part, as though they could deserve so great salvation, but only and altogether because of God's infinite mercy actualized and freely granted in Jesus Christ, to all who in repentant faith cast themselves on his forgiving love. *Simul peccator et justus*, cries Luther, in wonder, gratitude and joy. This we sing out of the evangelical experience of the saved soul in the language of Luther or Gerhardt, Watts or Doddridge, Cowper or Wesley. This is the word of Reconciliation committed to us.

IV

Is it easy to preach this? Yes and No. Luther knew the difficulty, and in that mixture of German and Latin of which the *Table Talk* is full he once burst out: *Remissio peccatorum sol dich fröhlich machen. Hoc est caput doctrinae christianae et tamen periculosissima praedicatio*.⁹ It is easy to preach this good news, because no news could be better or more wonderful. It is hard to preach it without losing sight of the high *mystery* of grace and seeming to justify antinomianism, and an unethical "evangelicalism." Yet this is the glorious gospel of the blessed God. And it is our privilege and task to commend it to the conscience and the mind of the modern man and woman. God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. . . . He has entrusted us with the word of Reconciliation.

⁷ I owe the figure to Professor T. W. Manson of Mansfield College, Oxford.

⁸ See Karl Holl: *Was verstand Luther unter Religion?* (*Gesammelte Aufsätze*, ii.)

⁹ Forgiveness of sins should make a man joyful. This is the corner-stone of Christian doctrine, yet how dangerous a thing is preaching!

Humanism and Barthianism

ALBERT C. KNUDSON

IT is a familiar saying that Christianity is not a circle with a center but an ellipse with two foci. One of these foci may be said to be Man and the other God. Both are essential to a full-orbed Christian faith. As Christians we must believe both in the dignity of man and in the sovereignty of God. But since the World War two significant movements have arisen that have been seeking to transform religion from an ellipse with two foci into a circle with a center. One of the movements has found its center in Man, the other in God. The motto of one is "Glory to Man Alone"; the motto of the other is "Glory to God Alone." One is an extremely radical movement, the other is conservative. One was American in its origin, the other German. But both have awakened a more than national interest and, under the names of Humanism and Barthianism, have become familiar to the whole Christian world.

The two movements are, as indicated, antithetical to each other. One is the denial of the other. But they have a common psychological or historical and a common philosophical background, so that they may with profit be studied together. My purpose here is to present a brief exposition and criticism of each and then in conclusion draw a theological moral. I begin with Humanism.

HUMANISM

Humanism is a great word in the history of modern thought, but, like other common nouns spelled with a capital letter, it shelters a complex of ideas. There are three historic movements to which the term has been applied: the Humanism of the Renaissance, which was a reaction against the other worldliness of scholasticism and the narrow ecclesiasticism associated with it; the Humanitarianism of the eighteenth century, with its exaltation of man's dignity as over against the ecclesiastical doctrine of human depravity; and Auguste Comte's positivistic Religion of Humanity. These movements have been in part friendly and in part hostile to historical religion. At present there are in America two vigorous movements representing these diverse tendencies and both laying claim to the name Humanism or New Humanism.

The first is represented by the late Irving Babbitt of Harvard University and Paul Elmer More of Princeton, and in the more distinctly religious field by Lynn Harold Hough. This type of Humanism is commonly referred to as "literary" Humanism. It stands opposed to naturalism or animalism, and emphasizes those moral and spiritual elements that are distinctively human. It is an important and significant movement; but with it I am not here concerned.

The type of Humanism which is antithetical to Barthianism, is sometimes called "religious" or "theological" Humanism by way of contrast with "literary" Humanism, and at other times "naturalistic" Humanism by way of contrast with "Christian" or "theistic" Humanism. It is really a revival in modified form of the Comtean "Religion of Humanity." But there is this important difference, that the new Humanism is more closely related to the church. It was a group of Unitarian ministers who started the new Humanist movement, and at present the ministry of the Unitarian Church is divided between Humanists and Theists. The movement, however, is not confined to any one denomination. It has distinguished representatives among literary men connected with various churches and no church. We may, for instance, mention M. C. Otto, A. E. Haydon, Edwin A. Burt, Herman Randall, Jr., Roy Sellars, Harry Elmer Barnes, Walter Lippmann, and, most famous of all, John Dewey. Six of these men, together with twenty-eight others, issued a short time ago *A Humanist Manifesto*, in which they expressed in fifteen propositions their common belief. A bi-monthly magazine, called *The New Humanist*, is also published by representatives of the movement, and many books have been written in support of it.

The distinctive characteristic of religious Humanism is its antithesis or at least indifference to the belief in God. Some Humanists or near Humanists, it is true, have defined Humanism as merely a reaction against an unethical otherworldliness, and have argued that all might properly be included in the movement who are interested in man's social well-being and who lay emphasis on the ethical side of religion and on present human values. But so interpreted Humanism has no distinctiveness as a religious movement. It might even be said to be a correlate of theism. For it has been characteristic of the great theistic religions (Christianity, Judaism, Mohammedanism, and Zoroastrianism) that they have laid special stress on the worth of personality and on the importance of the life that now is.

In this ethical sense of the term every true follower of the prophets and of Jesus might properly be said to be a Humanist.

If Humanism is to have any distinctive religious meaning, its differentiating element must be found, not in its otherworldliness, but in its philosophical naturalism, in its rejection of theism as essential to religion. This is the sense in which its most ardent advocates interpret it. They describe it as "naturalistic" Humanism, and claim that it is not simply a new sect, but a new religion, something unknown in the past history of religion. It marks, they say, the first complete break with supernaturalism. It has no God or divine revelation; it puts its faith solely in man. And it is destined, they tell us with prophetic assurance, to be the religion of the future. This enthusiasm on their part reminds one of Comte's prediction eighty years ago, that by the year 1900 the historic faiths would all be displaced by the Religion of Humanity; and it will probably prove equally trustworthy.

There are two fundamental reasons why the intelligent Christian believer is not seriously disturbed by the pretensions of Humanism.

One is the hopeless poverty of the movement from the religious point of view. In this respect it is akin to the so-called "religion of reason" or "natural religion" of the eighteenth century. The latter movement professed belief in God; it was called Deism. But it had no vital faith either in Providence or in the redemptive power of the Divine Spirit, and hence failed altogether to satisfy the religious nature of men. The result was that it perished; and what happened in its case we may expect in the case of religious Humanism.

It is strange that men will not learn the lesson of history. If there is anything made clear by the religious history of mankind, it is that no made-to-order religion, no "religion of reason," no "religion of science," will ever command the allegiance of men or fulfill the function that religion ought to fulfill in human life. The only religion that will avail among men is the religion that springs up spontaneously in the world, the religion that arises both as a divine revelation and as a normal and vigorous expression of the religious nature of man. This lesson was written so plainly on the pages of human history by the Deistic movement and was championed with such brilliancy and resourcefulness by Schleiermacher a century ago that one would think it could not so soon be forgotten. But error, ever changing with chameleon hue and Protean form, disappears for a moment only to reappear in new disguise. And so Humanism to-day, with a somewhat

altered garb, seeks to re-enact the rôle of Deism. It will give us a new religion of "reason" or of "science" to take the place of the discredited historic faiths. But its new religion without God and without the immortal hope is even more sterile, more emaciated, more anemic, more barren of content than the desiccated Deism of the eighteenth century. It may for a while attract the attention of the superficially religious, but ultimately it will, in my opinion, because of the inherent and essential poverty of its religious outlook and spirit, meet a fate similar to that of Deism.

A second fatal weakness in religious Humanism is the naturalistic and positivistic type of philosophy upon which it is based and the mistaken conceptions of religion resulting from it. The acknowledged leader of this type of philosophy in America is John Dewey. It is he more than anyone else who is the intellectual father of Humanism; and if one were inclined to be facetious he might suggest this as an appropriate rallying cry for the movement: "There is no God and John Dewey is his prophet." His pragmatic instrumentalism is an easy-going and popular philosophy. It has at present in America a vogue suggestive of that enjoyed by the agnosticism of Herbert Spencer fifty years ago. Many people accept it as a kind of final philosophy and think that the religious beliefs of the future must be made to conform to it. But, like the Spencerian philosophy, it will, I am confident, prove to be a mere passing fashion. Before long it will be discarded in favor of some other type of secular philosophy, and with its disappearance will go theological Humanism in its present form.

The Humanistic philosophy, as expounded by Dewey and his followers, is an inconsistent compound of naturalism and agnosticism. Its exponents are very certain that there is no God and that the naturalistic world view is correct; but they do not as a rule offer a rational justification of their impersonal metaphysics. They simply assume it. The only prominent Humanist, so far as I know, who has attempted to develop a rational world view, is Roy Sellars of Michigan University. In his *Evolutionary Naturalism* and other books he has given us a systematic exposition of the philosophy that underlies his Humanism. He calls it a "new materialism"; but in principle there is little that is new in it. It is the old hylozoistic type of materialism, accommodated to current natural science but shot through with the contradictions and unintelligibilities inherent in every impersonal and necessitarian system.

Other Humanists seem to realize the insuperable difficulties involved

in a closely reasoned system of naturalistic metaphysics, and hence take a more or less agnostic attitude toward metaphysics in general. Their philosophy might be said to be an *ostrich* philosophy; it buries its head in the sand with the hope of thus escaping its critics. Or it might be said to be a *cuttle-fish* philosophy. The cuttle-fish, when attacked, squirts ink about itself so as to avoid being seen by its enemies. And so it is with not a few naturalistic Humanists. They conceal their fundamental position by a cloud of obscure words. Others have what might be called an *owlish* philosophy. They shrink from the noonday brightness of personalistic theism and seek the dim twilight where it is difficult to distinguish between theism and naturalistic pantheism. They love the vague and the obscure. They refuse to define their ultimate beliefs, and if they attempt to do so it is often difficult to understand what they mean. There is a great deal of philosophical *glossolalia* abroad, a speaking in unknown tongues. One could wish that writers in the field of philosophy would more generally be guided by the apostle Paul's statement that "five words with the understanding" are worth more than "ten thousand in an unintelligible tongue." But many naturalistic Humanists apparently take a different view. They resemble their philosophical leader who has been described as a "loquacious apostle of sweetness and darkness." Certainly they shed little or no light upon the fundamental problems of philosophy. They hold to a naturalistic world-view that has been pulverized again and again by philosophical critics, and then seek to cover up its weaknesses by throwing over it the blanket of agnosticism. But this device can not permanently deceive men. Consistency will eventually be demanded of every system of thought. Naturalistic agnosticism is, in my opinion, an obscurantist philosophy. It stands in the way of true enlightenment when it comes to the deepest problems of life.

It also carries with it a mistaken view of religion and of its relation to science. In his Gifford Lectures Dewey, for instance, begins by saying that there are two methods by which men have sought certainty: the religious method of prayer and submission, and the scientific method of actively controlling the forces of nature. And the assumption is that these two methods exclude each other, that prayer is hostile to action. But this assumption is certainly not warranted by history. If there is anything made clear by the history of the prophetic type of piety, it is that religion is the great dynamic of life, that there is no other stimulus to action so powerful

as it. Between it and science there is no antithesis. The two go together. The idea, that the less we believe in God and the more we believe in science the better it will be for mankind, is an altogether perverse notion. The belief in God is the great inspirer of faith in man and in his scientific achievements.

Equally mistaken is the Humanistic notion of what religion really is. It has, we are told, "nothing to do with truth," it does not offer an explanation of anything, it is "neither revelation nor demonstration," it "has no light of its own," it is "a moving force," a "life to be lived," and "not a light." But such a religion is a mere abstraction. It has no real existence; and if it did, it would have no self-perpetuating power. It would be a parasitic growth. And that is what Humanism is at present. It draws its life from the living church, whose teaching it denies. Without the church it would soon perish.

BARTHIANISM

We now pass from the extreme left of present-day religious thought to the right. Barthianism and Humanism are, as we have previously stated, antithetical to each other. Yet they had a common source in the war. Humanism saw in the war a negation of God, and has sought to found a new religion without God. Barth saw in the war a negation of man, a condemnation of human pride, a refutation of human culture. Previously he had been a Christian socialist, and had entertained the hope that a new social order—one of peace, fraternity and equality—would be introduced through human initiative. But this hope was shattered by the war. The war to him was not a revelation of the impotence of God; it was a revelation of the impotence of man, a revelation of his sinfulness and helplessness. It was not Christianity, he held, that was on trial in the war; it was human culture that was there weighed in the balance and found wanting. What the war made clear was man's inability to save himself; it made clear his utter dependence on God. So Barth turned away from his religious socialism and fixed his attention upon God. God became the one ground of his hope and the center of all his thinking. "Glory to God Alone" became his motto, and in its name he raised the banner of revolt against the self-sufficiency of the modern man. He attacked human pride wherever and whenever it manifested itself. He hewed to the right and the left, and in his wrath against human pretension cut down religion itself in so far as it

was viewed as a human achievement. If he had constructed his theology for the very purpose of giving the lie to American Humanism he could not have aimed his shafts more directly at it. Its glorification of man was to him the essence of irreligion. True religion for him had its Alpha and Omega in God.

At first even the Germans hardly knew what to make of his extreme polemic against modern Humanism. It seemed to them a curious vagary. But this initial impression did not last long. It gradually gave way to increasing respect, and to-day Barth is generally recognized as one of the great theological and religious forces of the world. He is no *dilettante* in the field of religion as are most of the American Humanists. He is a scholar, a profound student of religion and of human nature. And as between his conception of religion and that of the Humanist there can be no doubt that his is correct. Religion will either stand or fall with the idea of God. A godless religion will in the long run prove a contradiction in itself; and a religion also in which the human emphasis tends to obscure the divine emphasis will soon lose its power. In so far as Barth has seen this and with unexampled clarity and vigor has challenged the humanistic tendency in modern thought, he has rendered a very real service to the cause of religion. And it is because he has done this that there is at present a world-wide interest in his teaching.

But valuable as the teaching of Barth is as an anti-humanistic emphasis, it is itself in several respects so one-sided and extreme as seriously to impair its own usefulness as a system of theology.

First, we may note its dualism and its rejection of the doctrine of the divine immanence. The dualism of Barth is not absolute or ultimate; nor does he lay as much stress on it as he did at first. But it is still in principle the key to his theology as a whole. The world, he holds, was created by God; but it has now "fallen" so far from him that there is "an endless qualitative difference between time and eternity." The "fall" applies not simply to the human will but to the entire world order. How it took place, we do not know. The idea is an ultimate of religious thought. Barth thinks he derived it from the Word of God. But most of his critics are of the opinion that he read it *into* Scripture rather than *out* of it.

In any case it was this dualism from which he took his start; and it, of course, implied the rejection of the doctrine of the divine immanence. This doctrine, according to Barth, is the arch heresy of the modern church.

To accept it would be to undermine everything that is distinctive in his own theology. But, on the other hand, to reject it is to close the door to the only method the modern mind has of conceiving the relation of God to the world. There was a time when Christian people thought of God as having a definite abode in the universe, so that when they formed a mental picture of the world they always included God in it. But the Copernican astronomy put an end to that; and since then the only way in which the human mind has been able to think of God as a constituent and indispensable factor in the world is to think of him as its immanent ground. And that one way Barth has cast aside in the interest of his own radical dualism.

Another serious defect in the Barthian theology is its alliance with philosophical skepticism. Here Barth is in accord with the naturalistic Humanist. He denies that there is any way of justifying the Christian religion by an appeal to experience, to reason, or to utility. The whole modern theological movement from Schleiermacher down to the present he denounces as leading to "a manifest destruction of Protestant theology and the Protestant Church." There is, he insists, no way of making the Christian faith or revelation rational. If you ask him why we should believe that the Bible is God's Word he answers: "The Bible is God's Word because it *is*." "Revelation," says his friend Emil Brunner, "grounds itself or it is no revelation." The act of faith by which we recognize the Word of God is itself miraculous. It is a divine act within us. We cannot understand it. It is "paradoxical and unthinkable," an "unreal reality" and an "impossible possibility." And so also it is with the idea of God. God has created the world, says Barth, and has left his tracks there but they are "the tracks of an Unknown." "Even in his revelation, yea, precisely in his revelation," he is "known as the Unknown." "All we know is that God is he whom we do not know." But if so, how can he also be the God of grace and truth? No light is thrown on this question. All is left in mystery and in general intellectual befuddlement. It is so also with the person of Christ. "In the resurrection (of Christ)," says Barth, "the new world of the Holy Spirit touches the old world of the flesh. But it touches it as a tangent does a circle, without touching it, and by virtue of the fact that it does not touch it, it touches it as its limit, as a new world." Cryptic utterances like these abound in Barth's writings, especially his earlier works, and leave the reader in a haze. He himself used to protest against the idea that he was seeking to introduce a "new theology." His theology, so far as there

was anything distinctive in it, he said, consisted "in one single point, and that was not a standpoint, but a *mathematical* point on which one could not stand, a viewpoint." But whether regarded as a standpoint or a viewpoint, it is, in my opinion, a distorting medium when it comes to the apprehension of theological truth. It leads to contradictory conceptions that exclude each other; and no amount of paradoxical hocus-pocus can remove the intellectual scandal involved in such a position. Paradox, it is true, may temporarily conceal the scandal; but the human mind cannot remain permanently perched on a paradox. It insists on having a rational theology or none at all.

A third source of "offense" in Barthianism is its strict predestinationism and consequent limitation of the divine grace. Here we are carried back into the pre-Methodistic era. What was theologically most distinctive and significant in the Wesleyan movement is repudiated. There is no "universal redemption," no freedom of the will in the Arminian sense of the term, no "sanctification" in the Wesleyan conception of it as an actual triumph over the principle of sin, and no "Social Gospel" such as we to-day preach. All of these beliefs are discarded as out of harmony with the Reformation theology. And with them goes also the only logically consistent basis for the great evangelistic, missionary and social enterprises of the modern church. This is evident in Barth's own case. He has no real sympathy with the aggressive and progressive type of Christianity. A prominent missionary with Barthian leanings told me recently that he "got the shock of his life" when he learned from Barth himself that he was rather indifferent to evangelistic and missionary work. If the Barthian theology were to be widely accepted in the church it would almost certainly act as a restraint upon Christian activity. It would prove to be a sedative rather than a tonic.

In view of the foregoing facts it is evident that Barthianism, valuable as it is as a corrective of an extreme Humanism, is itself too one-sided to meet the permanent intellectual and religious needs of men. It will run its course, and for a time serve an important function as a theological stimulant; but after that it will be laid aside as an interesting and brilliant but temporary revival of theological irrationalism.

A THEOLOGICAL MORAL

In the preceding discussion my primary aim has been to present a brief critical exposition of the two types of contemporary theology dealt

with. But I have also had a practical purpose. I have wanted to point a theological moral.

Barthianism and Humanism are in certain respects, as we have seen, diametrically opposed. One is theocentric, the other anthropocentric. One is deeply spiritual, the other thoroughly secular. One glorifies the religion of the past, the other repudiates it. One exalts God, the other denies or is indifferent to him. One has its eyes fixed on the eternal, the other sees nothing but the temporal. One is idealistic, the other naturalistic.

And yet both have a common logical, as well as a common historical, source. Both are the outgrowth of philosophical or metaphysical skepticism. One says, "We can know nothing about ultimate reality; let us, therefore, trust in revelation." This is the message of Barth. The other says, "We can know nothing about ultimate reality; let us, therefore, cease to think about it; let us make of faith in man a new religion." This is the message of Humanism. But such a humanistic religion is no religion; and the faith in man on which it is built is as blind and irrational as faith in God ever was. And as for a religion founded purely on revelation, without any rational support, it is a kind of cathedral in the clouds, in which the modern man can put no abiding faith. If we can through reason and experience know absolutely nothing about ultimate reality, then faith, both humanistic and theistic, will fall to the ground. Neither Humanism nor Barthianism can stand the test of time or of criticism.

Now the moral I want to point from our brief study of these two movements is this, that *a theology which feeds on philosophical skepticism will perish thereby*. It matters not what conclusion we may draw from our philosophic skepticism. We may with Barth draw an authoritarian conclusion or we may with the American Humanist draw a naturalistic conclusion. The end will be the same in either case. Our metaphysical skepticism will undermine both our authoritarian and our humanistic faith.

Theology is at present suffering from a number of serious diseases, but the most serious of them all is its alliance with philosophical or metaphysical skepticism. Not until this disease is cured, not until the fatuity of every attempt at a non-metaphysical theology is recognized, not until a rationally grounded theism has supplanted the current philosophical agnosticism, will the superficiality and one-sidedness of current religious thinking be overcome and a sound theology be reinstated in its proper place within the church and within the intellectual life of mankind.

Spiritual Ministrations to the Sick

RICHARD C. CABOT, M.D.

I

I AM persuaded that the minister has a place in the sick-room—a place not that of the doctor or the psychiatrist or the social worker or anybody else. His duty there is to bring all he can of the great energies, certainties, faiths and comforts of the Christian religion. I know well that most of the time, and to most patients, he can bring very little of these. But the point is to be always ready. If he has these faiths (and otherwise, of course, he has no business in the ministry) he has a very great asset, perhaps the greatest of all assets that a person could have in dealing with the sick. The peculiar privilege and capacity of the clergyman springs from the fact that he has a living and practical belief in God, in immortality, in the saving qualities of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and in the literally infinite possibilities for growth in every human soul.

Most of the people in hospital wards are very feebly religious and have no cognizance of either the words or the conceptions of the great working faiths of religion. You cannot evangelize a stone or a dog. You cannot convert an idiot. Many whom the minister ought to visit have scarcely more capacity to receive the religious message than a person under ether or crazy drunk. Nothing could be more fatuous than for the clergyman to assume that he can begin to minister the Christian religion in terms of belief to the great majority of persons whom he will meet in a hospital ward. He is not there dealing with members of his own parish who may be presumed to have already some interest in religion, and he should not confine himself, in his hospital work, merely to the few devoutly religious people who happen to be within its walls. Of course they need him and he will go to them. But he is more needed by a great many others to whom the words of religion mean almost nothing.

I insist that the minister's business is purely and distinctively religious. I insist that he cannot immediately or directly deliver his message to a great majority of those in a hospital. I insist also that he should nevertheless see and work with many of this very majority in our general hospitals.

Are these statements reconcilable? Yes, if one holds as I do that the

familiar belief that everybody is a child of God has practical consequences in the field that I am talking about. That every one is a child of God means that every one is potentially religious. His irreligion is sometimes skin-deep, sometimes tissue-deep, sometimes down in his very bones, but always in a rebellion against the plan that is built into his body and into his soul. The so-called "non-religious" people are starving for religion or else are getting it already in ways that they would indignantly refuse to call religious. Because I believe that sick people and well people are thus starving for religion I think that the minister should go into the hospital with his vital religious message under his arm or in his pocket or somewhere where it cannot scare anybody—determined that in the end he will deliver that message or some fraction of it to many "non-religious" persons, but equally determined that in the beginning he will meet them where they are and not where he is. It is this distinction between the enormous freight of religious good news which it is his business to deliver and the consciousness that he must begin delivering it very gradually, that I am laboring to express. I have been told, however, that there are ministers who will walk up to anybody, even one to whom their words mean nothing, and begin to pray or ask him if his soul is saved. If there is any one foolish enough for that it is the parson who tries to treat the patient starting from where he, the minister, is, and not from where he finds the patient.

By starting where he finds the patient, I mean starting with the needs, crying needs or grumbling needs or inarticulate needs, that he, the minister, is capable of supplying. That does not mean medical and physical needs. Those are being supplied already. It does not mean psychiatric needs. Those he should not try to supply. In most up-to-date hospitals it does not mean economic or "social" needs. We have social workers for that purpose. And if the patient is fully supplied with visitors and friends there may be no need at all where the minister can even start on his attempt to climb the whole distance up to the ministry of the Christian religion. He may have to pass by such a patient altogether. The minister's usual starting-point is with the patient who is not so overwhelmed by pain or fever, drugs or toxemia that he is out of the field altogether, who is glad to see a visitor, glad to talk with almost any one, and on the other hand not so luxuriously supplied with friends that there is no chance for the clergyman to get an opening. This patient represents the majority of all those in our general hospitals, especially of those in convalescent states, those who have come in

for an operation, and patients with troubles like heart disease, whose minds remain clear and active.

In the mental and emotional life of all such persons there exists what I am going to call, for purposes of this paper, a "*growing edge*," and I am going to spend some time now in saying what I mean by that.

The labors of the experimental pathologists have shown us that we can grow human tissue outside the body, as for fifty years we have been growing bacteria in the laboratory for study and experiment. We can grow in the laboratory a bit of liver tissue or a bit of kidney tissue taken from the living body and kept in saline solution at the right temperature. We grow it like a plant or a fungus. Then, if the conditions are right, we can see under the microscope the "*growing edge*" of this bit of tissue, the whole of which at the start was perhaps as big as one's little finger-nail, and after some weeks twice as big. Its growing edge is a good deal like the frontier of the United States in 1840 as it spread across the West with a last station for the railroad and a last settlement, always shifting on and on.

Apply this metaphor to the human mind or soul (terms here used synonymously). My belief that each person is a child of God involves the idea that in the build of each individual there is laid down a general plan of development, which sooner or later, before his death or after his death, he is meant to follow. The stages in this are to be recognized by their growing more and more intimate with God, as a basis for intimacy with everything else in the universe.

Let me hasten to say that I do not suppose the clergyman, merely because he is a man of religion, has arrived at the peak of this growth, or that he should try fatuously to draw people up to his own eminent position. The minister's effort should never be to make people like himself, but to make them more like their own selves, from whom they are now dreadfully exiled. The minister is self-exiled also, but not quite in the same respect or with the same piteous lack of ways for getting back home. He does not think himself better than those he ministers to. He thinks he has some better foods for the soul, and he wants everybody to try those foods.

Now come back to our idea of the "*growing edge*" of any one's soul. It is the present frontier of his growth in that ever fuller and fuller personality which was laid down in the plan of his make-up. He can work toward it or work away from it; he can stunt or cripple it, but it is there all the time, waiting for him, the thing he needs most in the world, the plan

of his life as it was laid down by his Creator in the beginning. The minister's unique privilege and opportunity with sick people is to find the growing edge of each person that he deals with. He will not use my terms, but he must use terms not wholly unlike them, because he too believes that every one is a child of God, and the growing edge means the present frontier in the advance of this child. There is no greater opportunity in the world. Only a person who is equally devoted to the religious view of life could have such an opportunity, and he would be essentially a minister whether he were called such or not.

Preaching and theological education are now handicapped by not realizing sufficiently that no person can grow except from the point where he is just then. This is still more obvious in college education. When we try to teach students history, languages, or physics, these things can develop a student only insofar as they manage to hitch on to some growing, protruding need of his which is just then feeling its way out like new columns of cells on the growing edge of a tissue-culture. Ordinarily in college teaching we never find the student's "growing edge" at all, and so the information that he takes in and holds in his mind until after examination, makes little or no contact with the living tissues of his nature. He is not ready for it. He is thinking about girls, about college clubs, or athletics, and not about the things that we teach him. They are not his personal problems. Yet they must be, if he is to learn.

What is true of college education is true of the development of a human being's personality as a whole, which is the object of the clergyman's vocation with people sick or well. But can we really teach or even cultivate religion? It is an arresting question. But no more arresting than the doubt whether we can teach music or the spirit of scientific inquiry or the habit of good philosophic thinking. People learn most of these things by their own efforts. Can any vital subject, anything beyond the three R's, be taught unless we can somehow discover in the pupil something that is reaching out for it already? We cannot give a man religion, but neither can we give him art or taste or the power to think. He may catch a spark of religious impulse or of medical insight or of scientific fervor by contagion.¹ But he must educate himself in all the more important branches of culture. It is all the more signally true that he must educate himself in religion. But

¹"How often an admiration spoken of by someone we admire has opened to us the gate into a new world of beauty! The glow of æsthetic appreciation is a catching fire."—Logan Pearsall Smith: *On Reading Shakespeare* (Harcourt, Brace, 1933), p. 38.

we can do there what we do (and with some success) in other subjects. We can supply the atmosphere in which growth is favored. That is the business of the teacher, and especially of the kind of teacher whom we call a clergyman. As a gardener of souls he can only supply the environing earth, moisture, air, light and chemical reaction. But that is much, and that he can do if only by good listening he can find the growing edge of a person's life.

It is not so terribly hard to help a person to grow, provided we like him and he likes us and provided we can find out where he is. The trouble is that his development has often reached out in such different directions from our own that our experience does not help us much to recognize the present stage in his.

II

Now after putting as clearly as I can the difficulties of the clergyman's task with the sick, I want to attempt something positive. What are the foods of growth? I do not ask now about the "best growth" or about the most direct growth, or what we think is in the right direction, but about any growth at all, even that queer, spiral, groping progress in which most of us have to walk, through mistakes and misunderstandings, through wrongdoing repented of, through sudden revelations of opportunity or of some one's heroism. I will mention four familiar nourishers of growth which, as we visit sick people solely and singly with one object—their spiritual growth—we try to favor, even though we may realize how far off we are from discovering to them the riches that we ourselves have found in the Christian religion.

(1) Whenever people sincerely love anything or anybody, they grow. They grow more when they love that to which they have to reach up, because it is so far above them, whether in science or art, in human personality or social endeavor. But whoever loves anything is enlarged and brought nearer to God by that very act. I am uncomfortable when liberal clergymen quote the familiar words of Scripture, "God is love," because I am sure that God is many other things besides. He is beauty and knowledge and chastening besides. But because love is part of God's nature, any one who is governed for a time by a love that is not selfish or merely sensuous, is advancing along the path in which it is the minister's object to accompany and to encourage him. Insofar as the minister can so guide his interviews that he discovers, through good listening and good questioning, some

interest of the patient or some affection that through conversations and their results can be deepened, he has done something for the cause that he represents.

(2) If he can help the patient to learn anything, if he can get him interested so that new facts, new truths, take root and grow in his mind, he has assisted, no matter how little, the divine process of his development. Or if in the arid soil of this life he has made two games grow where only one grew before, if he can enlarge him from a one-game man to a two-game man, then he has helped him to learn something which, like everything else that he learns, may branch out in unexpectedly valuable directions.

(3) We live in a country in which beauty is perhaps less appreciated than in any other, but if even in America we can help any one to appreciate more of this great kingdom of beauty, we are favoring another side of his growth. One can grow forever in the appreciation of music, of literature, drama or landscape, as one can in knowledge. But in my contacts with the sick, beauty has come more often, not as a cumulative growing activity like knowledge or love, but as a brief moment of success or of delight, like a flag floating over a moment of attainment, as a reward of our last effort and a stimulus for our next. In the sick-room the "major arts" tell less effectively than the "minor arts," humor, for instance, or good humor, or the art of conveying love in one's face and voice. Especially does beauty punctuate and reward the phases of our growth, when we can join it to something that comes out of the hand of God rather than out of the hand of man. I mean natural beauty. The ancient hackneyed impulse to send flowers to the sick is one of the soundest. They heal not merely by their beauty but by their freshness, their wildness, their independence of man's little, hot strivings.

In the field of beauty I include humor, which has surely a place in the ministry of the sick. Part of the minister's vocation is to secure for himself and for others the right sort of detachment (not aloofness) from life. Humor refreshes us because it gives us its particular kind of detachment from the drama of life. Reward is another of the minister's concerns. Motive-power is still another. Like other sorts of beauty, humor is the reward of our last effort and the impulse for our next. It is not in itself a gradient in growth. It is one of those anticipations of heaven, those foretastes of the end, without which our long effort for development could not move on. In a moment's delight in beauty or humor, the soul (consciously

or unconsciously) praises God. It sees that the world is good, in spite of all the evil in it. A hearty laugh is often praise of God, and not only in those who are sure that they know God.

(4) Service. Perhaps this account of paths along which the minister may assist that growth which for him always means growth within the plan of God for this soul, has sounded too self-centered. The sick need to know that they are of use to some one else. Suppose a sick patient learns to translate into Braille type some of the books never yet put into that type. Any one can do it. It is an enfranchising and enriching service to some one cruelly handicapped. There is no end of it to be done, and it piles up sheet after sheet, day after day, in satisfying testimony to the fact that we have accomplished something and made ourselves useful. Of course the sheer usefulness of such an occupation is not enough, unless it somehow makes connection with the frontier of the patient's spiritual growth. Mere utility is never enough. It must be such utility as gets the patient along his own road too, else it becomes mere routine with no life-giving quality about it.

III

I have asked and tried to answer the question, What are the foods of growth?—love, learning, beauty, service. But some of my hearers may say: "This is all very well, but what has it to do with religion or with spiritual growth? Has the patient any better hold of God, any stronger habit of prayer, by reason of the useful but mundane activities that you have described?" My answer is that the proof of religious life is not in the employment of religious terms or even in clearness of religious belief, but rather in a certain quality of thought and of action of which any earnest person has some and no one has enough.

Take the most divine words ever spoken, "Father, forgive them, they know not what they do." That sentence contains an overtly religious word, "Father," but one can imagine something like that being said without a religious word in it. "I forgive them for they know not what they do." The essence of this divine act, as I see it, would then still be there, for it is the returning of good for evil. Whenever one returns good for evil, one is in intimate contact, I think, with the divine spirit of the world, whether one knows it or not. One is imitating that world-plan which pours out on every one of us more love, beauty and success than he deserves.

Don't misunderstand me. I am sure that much is added if we recog-

nize that when we return good for evil we are following Jesus Christ and through him following his Father. But I insist that whenever we return good for evil, the essence of a religious act is there, in whatever name we do it, or whether we do it in any divine name whatsoever. The "religious" man does not win God fully and once for all. There is on earth no final attainment, no final tearing away of all veils and mediators. Nor can we ever get altogether out of touch with him. We often talk as if he had no business in our souls except when we are believing in him, calling upon him, or communing with him. But surely he is busy in us and rushes out of us sometimes in heroic action when we have no awareness of him. Action is still and forever the last proof of religion. When men act religiously they are religious.

I know that a great deal more needs to be said to explain what I mean by "religious action," but now I must pass on.

IV

So far I have said that the minister's task in sickness is to bring the life of God into touch with the "growing edge" of some one's soul. I have exemplified the foods of growth. Now I want to speak of the minister's effort to prevent sick souls from going backward.

Of the two campaigns which the minister undertakes in the hope of helping the growth of the spirit in "non-religious" people, one is relatively hard and one is relatively easy. I have tackled the hard one first—the effort to develop the potentialities of character along the path of the Christian way. I turn now to the much easier and more immediate task, the attempt to keep people from sliding backward spiritually. It is hard to help them forward, and almost no sick man asks us to do it. It does not present itself. We have to go after it. But to try to stop sick souls from going astern is a task that jumps in our faces when we confront the problems of sickness. People go backward in their spiritual growth when they are terrified, depressed, bitter, lonely. They come to a painful pause in their forward progress when, as is so often the case in illness, they are dreadfully bored.

This effort to keep people from going backward spiritually is parallel to many of our medical endeavors. In pneumonia doctors try to hold up people's strength, to maintain their nutrition, to keep them from exhausting themselves in delirium or restlessness. So the minister, if he meets the

patient at the spot where his immediate needs jut out, will begin with attempts to fortify him against whichever of the mental and emotional poisons just mentioned he is then fighting. I shall have something to say later about what the minister can do to meet these spiritual poisons—fear, depression, and the rest. But first I want to say that, as in medicine, our only reliable and permanent ways to prevent people's sliding *down* hill are those which so invigorate their tissues that they begin to go *up* hill. The only long-time treatment of the ills of the spirit is to forward the spirit's own growth, not merely to check its tendency to slide backward.

To the recognition of this fact we are not always vigorously urged on by our medical colleagues. They want the patient to be quiet, serene, uncomplaining, unemotional, unexcited; but they do not always realize that we cannot keep up such serenities merely by banishing or suppressing their opposites. Stagnation is as bad for people as restlessness, and the reiterated medical prescription of rest sometimes leads to atrophy of the spirit as it often leads to atrophy of the muscles. The good life for every capacity of the soul is a life that is moving ahead, not that of one who has merely ceased to explode or to wear himself out with emotion.

But when we have said this, when we have realized that the only radical and permanent treatment of mental suffering is the nurturing of crescent life, then we may set ourselves to "meet the patient where he is," right on the surface where his symptoms and sufferings appeal for our help. Then we can do something to meet fear by showing that many fears are groundless. A great deal that patients dread about taking an anæsthetic, about operations, about the supposedly high-handed or careless ways of doctors, can be wiped off the slate by a full, painstaking explanation of the truth. But behind many specific physical fears are often the deeper spiritual fears. Hence the clergyman, whose faith gives him the only ultimate defense against the deepest of all fears, is in a position to watch for any sign that these deeper and more general fears are there in the background of the patient's mind. By watching for them, he can be ready to meet them if opportunity comes. The fear of death is far commoner than most people realize, even in patients whose illness is to us obviously quite trivial. They are not so certain as we are of its triviality, and so they see spectres that seem to us almost laughably unreal. But they often say almost nothing about them. When this is the case, surely one of the clergyman's golden opportunities is in sight. No matter what people think or do not think about

religion, they are glad of any one who will try to give them courage against the fear of death.

Loneliness is a foe of many a sick person, even when he has plenty of people about him, because they often fail to reach the core of his suffering. They do not know what he is lonely about, or what piece of him is lonely. Or his loneliness may have grown up because he feels useless, or because he thinks that his sickness has made him so unattractive or uninteresting that people come only as a matter of duty. In a case like this the clergyman can perhaps be a little more penetrating than others in studying the nature of the patient's loneliness. As an outsider the clergyman may be quicker than the others to catch its flavor, and by giving companionship and affection he may effectively palliate the symptom. But, as with the fears I spoke of a moment ago, it is always quite possible that behind the obvious loneliness there is a deeper loneliness, a sense that no human being can ever understand what he cares for most, that his real home is not on this earth at all—in short, the religious loneliness which has been the beginning of religious faith in many of us. To be ready to recognize this, to see slight dawning symptoms of it, and to be ready to respond the instant he does see them, is another of the clergyman's golden opportunities.

Bitterness and grudge, either against some one who the patient thinks has treated him ill, or against a particular group such as the rich, or against society as a whole, retard the convalescence of many a patient. The palliative treatment of this is to lead the patient to pity and so to excuse those who he thinks have wronged him, then to laugh at them, and finally to laugh at himself. This is vastly difficult yet it is possible now and then when we have previously laid a basis of friendship and appreciation so that the patient is sure that at least one person respects and admires him. But like terror and loneliness, so bitterness has often a cosmical tinge, a theological background. A man who is bitter against some one who has cheated him, or against his family, is apt to harbor in the background of his resentment a sense of bitterness against the universe. This is one of the toughest problems that the clergyman, the doctor, or anybody else can tackle. I have often failed altogether to solve it. On the other hand, if first we can win the patient's regard and can win him to the certainty of our regard for him, there is no limit to what may happen, and happen quite suddenly. His exasperation may crumble all in a moment. Usually it will rise up again

because it is often the habit of years. But if it has once given way it may subside more easily the second time.

V

Perhaps the hardest and most useful task of the minister, in his pursuit of spiritual nurture, is to recognize in sick people religious ideas, religious emotions, and religious will-sets when hidden under all sorts of unconventional disguises and in the minds of people who have no idea they are religious. The tyranny of words is at least as common in religion as anywhere. Some of the most religious people I know are hardly aware of "religion" under that name, and many who are always talking of God and faith seem to me scarcely religious at all. The more genuine a religious experience is the more individual it is, and the less it wants to put its new wine into old bottled phraseology. I do not say that the old terms are to be discarded. I think they have permanent and irreplaceable value, once we have learned to use them intelligently and sincerely, because they link us with all who have used them passionately, heroically, faithfully, across the continents and down the centuries. But in the beginning people often reject them because they seem outlandish, like scientific or mathematical terminology, or (more vehemently still) because they sound hypocritical, arrogant and mawkish. It is then that the minister can learn to make his mind especially sensitive to catch the tone and attitude of religion behind all sorts of masks and in many one-sided or twisted shapes. Many, perhaps all of these are defense-reactions against the Christian religion, weapons against the pursuing "Hound of Heaven." I will list a few:

1. The Kiplingesque or Old Testament attitude which in its modern form originated with Carlyle, was one of those popular masks of religion in the last generation and is not quite outmoded yet. The "strong, silent man" was the earthly representative of the loveless God of Power. In an earlier and nobler form this was the Stoic ideal, and stoicism is still a constant factor in the unconscious religion of masculinity. The "stiff upper lip," the resolve to "burn one's own smoke," are its most familiar expressions. Once it often quoted Henley, "Under the bludgeonings of chance my head is bloody but unbowed." It is still the "best in sight" for many men, and for a few women. It should always be treated with respect because of all it stands for, and until it can evolve itself into something less rigid, less self-conscious and less devoid of humor. For it is the representa-

tive of God himself. It is starving for the New Testament, and overdosed with the Old. Nevertheless, it has nerved men to live and to die nobly, if somewhat self-centeredly.

If there were time I should try to describe how we can plan a campaign for Christianizing the outlook of the Stoics. But under the circumstances I will leave that to your imagination.

2. The "Henry Adams attitude"² of humorous detachment is to-day, I think, a commoner defense-reaction against the deeper realities of religion than the Kiplingesque attitude. Humor is not merely good fun. It is a shield and a sword. It is a refuge from a disagreeable, chaotic, or invasive world. It raises us above the hard surfaces and the feverish urgencies of experience. In the form of hearty laughter humor may be true praise of God. But when it takes the Henry Adams form of a defense-reaction against the invasion of deeper religion it is apt to enervate and to retard one's growth. Still I insist that because detachment from life is as essential to the Christian as the love of life, the minister should deal respectfully with this defense-reaction. He should try to see all that has led to it and grope his way toward helping the patient to outgrow it. For, like the Kiplingesque attitude, it is often an attitude of the post-adolescent period which many pass through and get over. But what the next stage is depends in part on what alternative or richer conception of life the person then sees as a possibility. The minister may have the chance to present the Christian alternative—a detachment without contempt or despair, a detachment joined to hot love of life.

Other noble half-way houses on the path of spiritual life are devotion to social welfare, to science, and to beauty. They are familiar enough and I have no time to do more than name them. The test of any one of them is the question: Can they give us not only hope but certainty as a basis for daily living in sickness and in health? To be prepared for either alternative, life or death, success or failure, joy or sorrow, is one of the tests of a viable religious faith. Then "to live is Christ and to die is gain." The scientific man whose experiments are properly set up so as either to prove or to refute his hypothesis is in as secure a position as Paul's. In that field, whatever happens, he wins. If the hypothesis is verified in his experimental test, obviously he wins. But if the test refutes his thesis, still he

² I do not forget Adams's "Mont St. Michel and Chartres." There religion almost breaks down his defences. But still he fights for his old habits.

wins because that negative result is itself an important proved fact, guiding the experimenter away from a mistaken path of endeavor and to a better one. "If it be possible," his experimenting ardor says, "let this experiment succeed. Nevertheless thy will, O Truth, be done."

Every heroic attempt to save life in an emergency shouts the same certainty. Whatever happens, the attempt is worth while.

To this attitude of the sincere and truthful scientist, of the heroic venture, of the Christian saint, the clergyman must try to bring the sick man whether his recovery seems possible or not. Stoical courage, humorous detachment, humanitarian devotion, are still half-way houses on the way to the joy of Paul's declaration: For to live is Christ and to die is gain. The growth which the minister tries to feed will rarely attain the other dimension—joy—unless the Christian message itself can somehow be transfused into the sick man's veins. Joyful growth is possible in all sickness that is not drowned in physical or mental pain. Humbly acknowledging that he can only "stand by" when patients are overwhelmed by these tragedies, the minister has left still the vast majority of sick people whose spiritual growth he can encourage.

SUMMARY

1. The minister's business with the sick is purely and distinctively religious. But he will always meet the patient where he is.
2. He will try to discover his present needs, to nourish his spiritual growth through such foods as affection, work, and beauty, and thereby to prevent the spiritual retrogression produced by fear, bitterness, loneliness, and other spiritual poisons.
3. He will sensitize himself to recognize many kinds and symptoms of inchoate religion, and especially of the defense-reactions against religion just now so prevalent.
4. Thus he will give aid sometimes in the cure of disease, oftener in the maintenance of happy and growing life, whether recovery occurs or not.
5. He will work with the sick patient only when the doctor and the family and friends of the patient desire his presence and his help.

Blind Leaders of the Blind

Some Reflections on a Current Tendency in American Education

KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE

NOT long ago the head of the department of sociology of one of our oldest American universities, when asked what criteria he would set up to determine whether any action in behalf of a social group would help or harm it, declared that he did not know of any. He was saying, in effect, that the scientific study of human society discloses no standards by which one may judge whether any effort on behalf of the human race or any section of it is good or bad. Fairly recently, one of our most distinguished American teachers of history ended a notable series of lectures on a famous revolutionary period by asking whether those had died in vain who in the midst of the struggle had gladly given their lives, believing that by so doing they were furthering the progress of humanity. His concluding words were, "Who knows?" He too was saying that the past experience of the race fails to reveal facts which enable us to determine whether any effort, any sacrifice, makes for the betterment of mankind.

These two apparently casual incidents have more than passing importance. Both men are known among their colleagues for the honesty and keenness of their intellectual processes. Both wield wide influence. Both have arrived at a basic agnosticism which questions whether human beings have sufficient intelligence to determine what is good or bad for themselves or for groups of their fellows. They represent, moreover, a widespread tendency whose consequences, if not checked, must ultimately be the disintegration of civilization, or at least of civilization as we now know it. They are the products of an intellectual atmosphere which permeates much of our American academic life and, indeed, great sections of scholarship the world around. It dominates most of the American centers of graduate study in which teachers are trained and textbooks written, and from them spreads to our colleges and so ultimately to our secondary and primary schools and to the masses of the population. This attitude of mind has come upon us fairly rapidly and yet so unspectacularly that few, seemingly,

are fully aware of what has happened and still fewer of its significance. Only a generation or so ago the prevailing climate of opinion in our colleges and universities was far different. Most of our older institutions of higher learning were founded under church auspices. Some of our most venerable and influential universities and the majority of our colleges bear on their seals and in their charters the stamp of their religious origin. However much the bodies which gave them birth might differ in details of dogma, they all had a common body of beliefs. They were agreed upon certain basic ethical standards which they wished to see realized in individual lives and in society. In them no question existed as to the ultimate tests to be applied to determine whether actions were good or bad or as to whether efforts on behalf of society or any section of it were helpful or harmful. They might hold to very divergent convictions concerning the efficacy of specific social programs—such as the emancipation of the slaves—but they did not question the standards by which the truth of their convictions were to be tested.

In this our American colleges and universities were but products of Western civilization—of Christendom. Europe and the America which sprang from it have been so long under the influence of Christianity that they have accepted unconsciously, and almost as axiomatic, standards of social ethics which are derived from that source. To be sure, Christianity has never fully controlled the Occident. It has always been modified or more or less neutralized by other factors. For instance, the church itself was the vehicle for the transfer of much of pre-Christian classical culture from the ancient world to the middle ages and so to the modern world. We have, too, from time to time through the centuries seen periods of revolt against the Christian tradition. Such were much of the Renaissance and the "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth century. Some, indeed, would trace the present temper of mind in a continuous line back to the Renaissance. Christendom has never been a really accurate designation. Yet Christian ideals for human conduct have become the common property of European peoples. Even many who have broken most completely with the church and with official Christian dogma bear the stamp of their Christian heritage. Communism, itself apparently such a stark antithesis to Christianity, bears in its very warp and woof ideals and convictions which come historically from Christianity.

This current attitude, however, is a complete negation of basic Chris-

tian convictions. It would question the ethical standards of the Christian Scriptures. It would declare that it is impossible to determine whether the death commemorated by the central symbol of the Christian faith has made for the welfare of mankind, and would not be at all clear that the sufferings of all those who have freely given themselves for the Christian cause have been justified by the results. Not only that, it would express a similar agnosticism as to the validity of any other standards or of sacrifices made on their behalf.

This attitude, in anything like its present strength and form, is so recent that we have not yet had time fully to realize its results. Certain consequences, however, must inevitably follow and in many quarters we are already beginning to see them. First of all, education is losing its traditional moral objectives. Since no way exists for determining what is good and what is bad, education becomes primarily and almost exclusively an intellectual pursuit entered upon because of the pleasure which accompanies it, the prestige attached to it, or the power which it gives. College graduates adopting such a philosophy are not likely to attach themselves passionately or sacrificially to any movement, whether it be the League of Nations, disarmament, civic reform, the struggle to improve the lot of the underprivileged, liberalism, democracy, socialism, or communism. If they do subscribe to any cause, it is simply for the reason that they feel their own comfort to be at stake, or because they have found in it a certain pleasurable excitement or see an opportunity for a career, with power or fame. Such education has as its finished product the polished, sophisticated cynicism of the parasitic dilettante or the ruthless egotism of the exploiter. It cannot but imperil all social coherence and threaten the existence of the state, the family, and of education itself. That these results are already beginning to appear no one of us who knows any large number of graduates of American universities can well doubt. The old standards die hard. Social ideals and customs have a way of surviving, even among those who profess to have abandoned them. The Christian churches, too, are still strong, even though their hold upon universities and colleges has been weakened. In what is almost certainly an increasing number of lives, however, the results of this intellectual atmosphere can be seen.

A second result, which does not follow so quickly as the first but which is also beginning to appear, is the substitution of other ideals and criteria for the traditional ones. Human beings appear to be so consti-

tuted that they require an integrating factor for their lives, an ideal objective to which they can devote themselves. If one is taken away they demand another. Having been deprived by their training of the objectives given them by the old faiths, they have sought new. Some have found this in their families, some in business, some in their own aggrandizement. Others are seeking it in Fascism, in Communism, or in a rampant nationalism. Thus far this second result is more apparent in Europe than in America. Among the intelligentsia the disintegration of the traditional standards has been in process longer on the Continent than in Great Britain or the United States. In our colleges and universities the Christian tradition has been slower to die. In Europe nationalism is taking the form of the totalitarian state. In its present forms usually a new development, it goes back to nineteenth-century nationalism. In it the state becomes the center of devotion for the many individual citizens who compose it. The individual is to be regulated for the welfare of the state and is to know no higher loyalty. Education, business, the family, the lives of the citizens from birth until death are fully in the hands of the state and are to be molded for its ends. These ends, in contrast with those of Christianity, are purely this-worldly. Man is regarded as an animal whose breeding, whose training, whose entire life is to be directed by the social group represented by the state. Individual liberty is reduced to the minimum or completely wiped out. If allowed to continue in a modified form it is always on sufferance. Democracy, in the sense of granting to each individual the maximum amount of freedom, is denied.

At first glance this displacing of democracy by the totalitarian state may seem to have little connection with the agnostic attitude toward the traditional ethical and social values of Christendom. It appears to be chiefly a reaction from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberalism. That liberalism, in its dress of democratic representative institutions, was always more or less exotic in many countries and there had the hearty allegiance of only a small minority. It was adopted because the fashion had been set by the Anglo-Saxon world or the French Revolution, or because, as in the case of Italy, it provided convenient tools for the achievement of national unity, or, as in Germany, when an existing monarchy had been discredited by war.

A deeper insight, however, will disclose a fact which is often ignored—that the decay of democracy is due to the weakening of the Christian

elements in Western society. Ultimately democracy is based upon a conviction of the dignity and worth of the individual. This conviction is in large part, though by no means entirely, derived from the Christian conception of man and of God. Men, Christianity holds, have open before them an eternal destiny. Their privilege it is, if they will but accept the possibilities which its gospel offers them, of being transformed, by contact with the divine life, into sons of the Eternal Spirit, with the high privilege of association with him and ultimately of a full vision of him in which is their highest joy. This Eternal Spirit is represented as the central fact of the universe, as caring so deeply for men as to have revealed himself once in time in human guise, to make possible, by his suffering, their transformation, and as continually striving, through his Spirit, without violating man's freedom of choice, to win men to fellowship with himself. This conception of man has historically been an important factor in the emergence of democracy. The earliest purely democratic societies were radical left-wing groups which arose out of the Reformation—such as the Pilgrim Fathers and the Quakers—but the ideal was foreshadowed much earlier by some Catholic thinkers. Many of the eighteenth-century liberals who did so much to create French democracy and had such marked influence in America reacted against traditional Christianity, but carried over, as their dominant convictions, conceptions of the worth of man which, while not fully Christian, were largely of Christian origin. It is in circles which remain only superficially Christian, or where the decay of Christian convictions is marked, that the abandonment of democratic ideals has usually proceeded furthest. To be sure, a formal connection with the church is often preserved, and, as in the case of Italy and Austria, an actual alliance between the church and a Fascist state may be effected. Fundamentally, however, an irreconcilable conflict exists between the two. As a leading Fascist said, in a burst of confidence: "One cannot be both really Christian and a loyal Fascist." In Germany the antithesis between the totalitarian state and the church is much more clearly discerned, and in Russia it is being followed to its logical conclusion. In Great Britain, where, in contrast with Germany, the Protestant democratic tradition has been deeply implanted in the political institutions, and where sentiments created through the churches remain important in molding public opinion, democracy is still unshaken. In the United States, where the fundamental skepticism among the educated toward traditional Christian values is much more

recent and Christianity, particularly its more democratic Protestant forms, is still strong, the movement toward the exaltation of the state has not proceeded so far. Even here, however, the tides are setting strongly in that direction. As evidence one has merely to point to the refusal to grant citizenship to those who decline to set allegiance to the state above their convictions as Christians.

Throughout Christendom, then, the lines are being more and more closely drawn between the conception of man embodied in the totalitarian state and that which has come down from the Christian past of the West. The thoroughgoing agnosticism of some of our intellectuals cannot be, for the majority of the leaders and the led, more than a passing phenomenon. Men insist upon positive convictions, upon a center of loyalty. If they are deprived of the traditional ones they will find new. If their leaders profess agnosticism, they will, in the pressure of the present age, give allegiance to those who possess positive convictions. At present the tendency is toward the exaltation of the state. That way lies the end of the older American political ideals, the passing of the type of family which we have known, the eclipse of freedom of thought, whether in or out of universities, and, eventually, disastrous economic and armed clashes between states which, having extinguished the liberties of their citizens, demand the unqualified devotion of their lives and possessions to aims formulated by those in power.

In the face of this development, with its consequences staring us starkly in the face, some of us find our solace in a continued and growing adherence to an historic Christian faith. To us the hope of human society lies in a revival of Christian convictions—among intellectual circles and in the country as a whole. Of such a revival some of us believe we see indications. Here and there thoughtful men in middle life, who themselves were reared in Christian convictions but abandoned them, are returning to them. They had once thought it possible to carry over the ethical and social standards inherited from their Christian past while denying the philosophical and religious roots of these standards. In the bewilderment and lack of objective of their children they are now seeing the futility of their course and are seeking to retrace their steps. In more than one nation, moreover, and in numbers of university centers, some of the younger generation are beginning to explore the possibility of finding in the faith which many of their elders have rejected an answer to the persistent and insistent questions

of the meaning of human life. So far their numbers are not large. What the future of the movement will be no one ought confidently to predict. Whether it means the beginning of a widespread and potent revival of Christianity only the next few decades will disclose.

Those who do remain or become convinced Christians must face the possibility that they will undergo more severe persecution than their predecessors have known for some centuries. The totalitarian state will eventually permit of no easy-going compromise. Already in some lands Christians have had to make a choice which involves suffering. The persecution is no longer merely social ostracism or, what is so widespread in American academic circles, the half-amused contempt for any who may be so stupid as to hold to religion. It is of a more vigorous kind.

Ultimately one's adherence to a Christian faith cannot be on the basis of mere utility. To hold to it simply because it seems to preserve a type of society which we prefer is to dodge fundamental issues. In the final analysis an abiding and tenable conviction of the truth of the Christian position rests upon far more deep-lying bases. These many of us believe to exist. To us it holds the key, as does no other, to the mystery which surrounds us from the cradle to the grave. On the other hand, that a society which incorporates it, even though very imperfectly and incompletely, should be desirable, must not be taken as a condemnation of its truth. We hold that those leaders, including the agnostics, who take another, no matter how intelligent and honest they may be, are blind to the central facts of the universe, and that if they and those who follow them do not come to disaster it will be because a sufficient number of their neighbors have insight into those facts, and have trusted themselves to them, to prevent the debacle.

The Bible for Our Times

A. BRUCE CURRY

IN the general confusion and uneasiness of our times, when men's hearts are fainting within them, fearful for their own lives or burdened for the woes of others, it is not unnatural to find the human spirit striking out in every direction for practical solutions. Should some commanding voice be put upon the air-waves, announcing to the human race that the fundamental solution of its major problems was to be found within the covers of the Bible, it is interesting to imagine the reactions that would follow. Doubtless the statement would be ignored by the majority. By countless others it would be dismissed with a few crushing words of superior sophistication or contempt. Even those who care most for the alleviation of the world's distress and are not without appreciation of religious values, might be slow to suggest the Bible as the answer to our modern plight. Three questions might haunt their minds with special insistence, making them slow to urge upon our times the practical implications of the Bible.

First arises the question whether any book so ancient can be truly relevant to our present-day life. It is characteristic of the modern temper to assume the negative answer. The very suggestion seems preposterous that the complexities of modern existence could be genuinely illumined by primitive Jewish-Christian documents, pale with the dust of two thousand years and more. Taking up almost any current book or magazine in which our shipwrecked contemporaries are wrestling with the troubled sea, we find their testimony almost universal that for them there is no help to be expected from the Bible or from the religion of the Bible. Even the more thoughtful student—who may be still on the border-line of biblical illiteracy—may not escape the insurgence of this troubling doubt. Suppose the Bible did contain "ancient good," must not time have made it quite "uncouth"? Must we not indeed look elsewhere to find the understandings and techniques which are needed for the restoration of modern society? Are our teachers then, who even in liberal circles keep harking back to the Bible, only the more urbane successors of the primitive Protestant evangelists who pounded the Bible with vigor, thumped it with cordiality and recommended it as final truth, from cover to cover?

Of course, the question can be answered truly only by those who will pay the price of scholarly and penetrating understanding, first, of the Bible's proposals for human life, and second, of the underlying nature of modern society's malaise. Only then are they in a position to judge the importance of the Bible's contribution to the practical affairs of our world. Few of those who minimize the timeliness of the Bible have met these conditions of proper judgment. There is a contempt that is born of unfamiliarity. Doubtless the best-equipped judges will discover many biblical recommendations which *are* now genuinely outmoded. They will be the first to discard some old wine-skins which are certainly incapable of holding the new wine of contemporary life. They will urge the need of discrimination between values transient and values permanent. They will welcome the supplementation of the Bible's viewpoint by all that modern knowledge can supply. But we find them still insisting that there are in the Bible unique and priceless ingredients, for the lack of which our contemporary culture has withered and failed of its expected fruitage. It might be worth while for those whose interest is most ardently practical to investigate this claim.

The second question which must give us pause is whether the evident misuse of the Bible in the past has rendered it a clumsy and inept medium through which to approach the more intelligent minds of our age. Granted, for the sake of argument, that some rare practical values lie embedded in the Scriptures, is it not an almost insuperable handicap that they must be dug from a mine which has been made to produce in past generations so much that seems now only "fool's gold"? Think for a moment of the popular conception of the Bible. To many people of our day it appears as an impossible mixture of earthenware and stardust, demanding assent to incredible views of nature and impossible codes of conduct—stultifying, therefore, both to the intellect and to the highest moral sensitivity. They see its proponents offering it as an absolute external authority to a generation which can accept no such authority; using it as a doctrinal arsenal for bitter warfare between themselves; drawing from it proof-texts to support wild and irreconcilable views. As one of my Bible-shy friends put it, "There may be hidden treasure there, but there is too much underbrush to be whacked through in order to find it."

Let us confess that here is a genuine barrier to the effective mediation of the Bible's inner contribution. Whether we shall capitulate before this barrier, or exert ourselves to hurdle it, depends upon our answer to the

following questions: Just how valuable and unique is this "hidden treasure"? Is it of such worth as to justify precise and even tedious processes of scholarly search and research? Could our generation secure spiritual and moral goods of equal value from some source other than the Bible, some source more direct, more congenial to its habits of thought, less distorted by the errors of the past? No hasty answers to these questions can possibly be satisfying. Here again, only those careful students who have pushed the quest to the utmost have the right to speak. Rather striking is the unanimity with which they report that the results are more than worth the struggle; that going through the process is in itself a liberal education; that they know of no simpler short-cut, and would desire none for this generation or any other.

After all, it is easy to exaggerate the importance of this special problem. Perhaps we have been so busy pointing out the unfortunate misuses of the Bible on the part of others, that we have failed to work out for ourselves a reasonable and effective method of releasing whatever gifts the Bible has for our daily living. Especially, on the practical side is it true that in reading the Bible the wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err quite so much as we have supposed. Unless he is using popular objections to the Bible as a screen for his own moral cowardice, he will be able to discern the rather evident value of the biblical summons to justice, mercy, and service to the neediest of men. The question was once put to Mark Twain, "What can I do about the Bible—there is so much in it which I cannot understand." The canny humorist replied, "The parts of the Bible which give me the most trouble are those I understand the best."

The third troubling question is whether it is fair, in any case, to press the Bible for a practical contribution to our day and time. Why not enjoy and appreciate the sacred writings, each against the background of the situation which originally called it forth, without eternally asking whether their messages would be good or bad as a rule of faith and practice to-day? Their authors certainly did not dream of addressing distant peoples separated from themselves by oceans of space and millenniums of time. Why then should we presume to consider ourselves addressed, or suppose it necessary to give either yea or nay to the counsels and injunctions which once echoed about the Palestinian hills or stirred along the Mediterranean shores?

The most direct answer is that the Bible itself points beyond the life

out of which it came, beyond the situations to which its messages were originally addressed. With a timeless and universal offer of *the way* of life, it confronts the conscience of humanity with its proposals, and demands acceptance or rejection. Even in the Old Testament we are given the picture of all nations streaming up to the house of the God of Jacob to be taught his ways and to walk in his paths. Israel's supreme function is that she is to serve as "a light to the Gentiles." While at the culmination of the New Testament message stands one who says, "I am the way, the truth and the life." "I am the light of the world." These claims may be rejected by the twentieth century, but they refuse to be ignored. Here in the Bible is the classical expression of the good life. We whose interests lie in the moral and ethical sphere can no more avoid its judgments on contemporary life than artists can avoid the searching criteria set by the classical works of Greece.

The brilliant and painstaking attempt of scholars during the past century to place the biblical writings in their proper literary and historical settings need not divert the attention of students from the chief value of the Bible, which lies in the help it offers for meeting man's most vital needs. Indeed, it is the large degree of success in the scholarly task which now at length makes it possible to return to our main question: What has the Bible to offer that is valid for the thought and life of modern man?

When one takes this approach to the Bible, having worked his way past these initial difficulties, he finds himself overwhelmed by the wealth and variety of the Bible's contribution. Those who are most at home in the Bible will bear me out in the statement that, even when all irrelevant material has been discounted, there are few pages of the Scriptures that do not yield some delicate and penetrating insight, or some thunderous and sobering challenge, for the conduct of our present-day existence. Hence, when we are asked to be specific as to just what the Bible really has to offer to the modern struggling spirit, we find ourselves in the predicament of a lover of poetry who might be asked what he found in the poets that really made a difference; or in such case as William James, when an innocent young woman at dinner-table turned to him with the bright demand, "Do tell me all about philosophy."

For the purposes of this occasion, therefore, it will be necessary to pass over, however reluctantly, the myriad points at which the Bible might touch our present-day need with light and healing, and to center our atten-

tion upon several of its more general practical emphases which can be ignored only at our peril. We have previously hinted at the Bible's "unique and priceless ingredients," at its "hidden treasures" without which our life must remain deeply impoverished. It is time now to ask what the nature of these may be.

Think first, then, of the superb ideal for human life with which the Bible confronts us. It would have us believe that men can actually live together as brothers; that in the face of clashing interests between individuals and groups, men can and must subordinate their instinctive passions of lust and power to the good of the larger society; that man must thus love his neighbor as himself, the strong bearing the burdens of the weak; that thus justice may "roll down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream." In the language of Utopias there is nothing to match the heights and depths of this picture of the potentialities of human relationships. From the standpoint of present-day disillusionment with human nature, we are likely to view it wistfully but sadly as the figment of an impossible dream. Indeed it might be claimed that the Bible does us only a disservice by taunting our harassed minds with an ideal so glittering yet so entirely beyond our grasp, placing us in a plight beside which the tortures of Tantalus pale into nothingness.

And this might stand as the final verdict, did not the Bible in the next breath offer us the incomparable boon of a method by which this ideal is to be brought into reality. This is the method of so changing or redeeming human nature that it may, suddenly or progressively, rise to the levels set by the splendid ideal. For no modern cynic could be more realistic in his recognition of the frailty and incompetence of human nature than were Hosea and Jesus and Paul. Yet against the centuries of utterly discouraging human history they staked their faith in the method of redeeming love which would slowly but surely break through the callousness of pride, greed and selfishness, that a new creature might stand out in man, matched to the stature of a nobler destiny.

But no sooner are the implications of this method grasped by modern man, than his brow-beaten spirit sinks again in despair. For if the biblical ideal seemed impossible, the biblical method of its achievement seems impracticable. For it promises no quick results of enthroning justice, truth and freedom in the world. And he demands quick results, even at the cost of hate and violence. Furthermore, this method runs counter to his

most cherished conception of how people are to be changed. For he is committed to the principle that one changes people by making them suffer for their ill-deeds; while this method of redeeming love knows that the deeper changes are wrought in wrong-doers, not by making them suffer alone, but by suffering with them and for them. Contemporary man, therefore, lacks both the conviction and the greatness of soul necessary for putting this method of love into practice. In his spiritual bankruptcy he is scarcely capable of responding to this method himself, much less of becoming its protagonist and exemplar in a world given over to brute force. Wherein does the Bible help us, then, if it proposes an ideal, however beautiful, which floats only in the clouds, and bids us reach it by a method, however sentimentally touching, which almost no one can use?

Here the Bible comes forward triumphantly with its third and most profound contribution, namely, the offer of divine resources which can transform us into men who *can* effectively use the method which alone gives promise of achieving the social ideal. It maintains that life in fellowship with God is the sole clue to the realization of the good life. For it presents its matchless ideal as a revelation of the mind of God for the life of man; its strange and so difficult method as that by which God himself works; and the power for its accomplishment as available only to those who share deeply in his mind, his spirit, and his life. The Bible makes plain how men may enter this divine fellowship, culminating in the life that is hid with Christ in God. It will now be apparent that this religious faith and experience is the heart and basis of the Bible's most practical gift for our times. Yet it is just this element which is most widely rejected in our day. Men want the fruits without the roots and will not come to terms with the laws of the spiritual world.

It lies beyond our scope to argue here the validity of this, the Bible's major premise. We can only point out in passing that much of the modern cynicism about the biblical ideal for man's life, and much of the repudiation of its method of redemptive love, is due to men's inability or unwillingness to accept its offer of the divine resources. For men see with a true insight that the Bible's threefold contribution stands or falls as one complete structure. Let me call attention, rather, to certain peculiarities of the Bible's practical proposals, which follow as corollaries from what has been said, and which can never be called too insistently to the attention of this generation's religious leadership.

Notice, for example, how the Bible nowhere argues the existence of God, but rather assumes it, and invites men to discover through moral experience what God may mean to them. We are reminded of some thinkers who insist that modern discussions of God should not start with the question whether God *is*, but only with the question as to what elements in human experience one may identify as the divine. Certainly, by intellectual argument very few non-believers are convinced of the reality of God. One becomes aware of God when he sees in nature and especially in human nature that for which no other categories will suffice, and thus knows himself in contact with divinity. Intellectual constructs then fall into their rightful place as reasonable attempts to bring this special experience of reality into harmony with all other experienced reality. What a practical matter this makes of one's very belief in God, and how urgently it needs recommendation to our age! T. S. Stribling, in *Unfinished Cathedral*, has caught the meaning of it when he writes of the student who, in theological seminary days, "had substituted proof for awareness of God . . . as if the water-lily had decided to open its white heart by the calendar and not to the passion of the sun." And that amazing young American poet, Paul Engle, warms to the same truth when he says in his "Letter to an Elder Generation":

"You say you buried God (weeping you say it)
And split the flesh to its essential parts—
But you have left us bodies bright with flame
And buried God no deeper than our hearts."

We are reminded also of Pascal's passionate cry, "Not the God of the philosophers, but the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob." For the chief distinction here is that the God of the philosophers is introduced as a last resort to solve an otherwise knotty intellectual problem, while the God of Abraham is made manifest as one goes on life's unknown way, and the God of Jacob becomes real when one opens the eyes of his soul and says, "Surely God was in this place and I knew it not."

Or, consider, again, how great a need the Bible may meet in helping us to keep ethics and religion carefully distinguished yet vitally related. Especially might the biblical viewpoint deliver us from three common errors of our day: first, the pretense of so-called religion which leaves its adherents insensitive to the crying ethical and moral demands of the times; second, the false hope for deep-going and lasting ethical achievement apart

from religion; and third, the humanistic attempt to substitute ethical idealism for religion. The Bible, from Amos to Jesus, brings a scathing word of rebuke for all who profess religious experience, but show little disposition to square their lives by religion's ethical imperatives. It insists that there can be no true religion in those who retreat to the security of their ivory towers, unconcerned with the wrongs and injustices which they themselves help to perpetuate and which they might help to alleviate. Many who agree with *this* biblical emphasis are not so open to the Bible's equally insistent warning on the other two points—that religion cannot for long be left out of the program for ethical improvement, and that it is an enfeebling mistake to think that even the passion for ethical values can take the place of religion. Unless our perspective can be made true in all these matters by the profounder insights of the Bible, we would seem to be entering years of barren gain and bitter loss, with an outcome of futility for the pseudo-religious people, disillusionment for the non-religious social idealists, and a world set no step forward toward the city of our dreams.

Once more, think what inestimable aid the Bible may yield by establishing our faith in the ultimate triumph of good, without allowing us to lapse into the shallow optimism, sentimentalism and romanticism which hastened the undoing of a previous generation of well-meaning idealists. Never would the Bible have deceived us with false hopes of automatic progress. Never would it have encouraged us to gloss over the deceitfulness and desperate wickedness of the human heart, either in ourselves or in others. We were misled by alien voices and were persuaded that the biblical writers were a bit morbid about human nature and took sin with too great seriousness. Now in the day of our painful awakening we are more ready for the Bible's moral realism. But it can save us, likewise, from the opposite swing of the pendulum into utter despair, and loss of faith in any good outcome of the human drama. This it offers to do, as in the days of Babylonian exile when all dreams had faded, by lifting our eyes from the hopeless contemplation of our own wretchedness, reminding us anew of the Mighty One in the midst of us, and saying, "Behold your God." This is another way of saying that heaven and earth stand ready with the resources for our restoration, if we will lay hold upon them with new moral discrimination and with robust faith and courage.

Finally, lest all these messages of the Bible might seem to be purveyed in the form of abstract theories and teachings, difficult to grasp or easy to

repudiate, the Bible reaches home to the hearts and consciences of all generations by summing up its many words of life in the person of Him who is *the Word* of life. Not one of the elements which we have claimed as constituting the Bible's central contribution to our times, but finds its complete and most convincing expression in Jesus. We cannot think of the great ideal which the Bible portrays for the life of mankind, without being reminded that it was the hand of Jesus which added to that picture its touches of supreme genius, and that it is the personality of Jesus which convinces us beyond doubt that such heights are possible for our humanity. We cannot mention the Bible's method of redeeming love without having our vision lifted to "that strange man upon his cross," and without having our lingering doubts as to the effectiveness of that method dispelled by the thought of the redemptive power there released in the world. Nor can we question the reality of the resources to be found in vital fellowship with God when we see their mighty demonstration in the experience of Jesus. So it is with every other practical emphasis of the Bible which we bring to bear upon the desperate needs of our own day. Is not this what we mean, then, when we say that Jesus is the answer to our world's cry for life that shall be free and true and significant? If the Bible were only a book of ancient maxims and exhortations, we might brush it aside as irrelevant. It is because it mediates to succeeding generations a unique spiritual culture which flowers in the matchless figure of Jesus Christ that it keeps its hold upon our contemporary life and places us forever in its debt.

This consideration of the Bible's potential value for our times places upon the Christian leadership of our day three major responsibilities. First, the minister or teacher must know in his own experience the reality of these truths which the Bible sets forth. He must be steeped, not only in the lore of biblical literature, but in the essence of its religious and ethical spirit; not in the letter that killeth, but in the spirit that giveth life. If this involves the transformation of his own viewpoints and beliefs, of his attitudes, motives and habits, he must be willing to be born anew. For our sick world is not going to be healed, even by the message of Jesus, purveyed at second-hand. The call is not for salesmen, but for witnesses. The Christian leader must know the Bible better than any other book, must know it in scholarly and discriminating fashion, must be at home in its highest levels of moral and religious teaching, and must, at least in some modest degree, know it in the texture of his own quality of life and spirit. Second, there

follows the responsibility to know the life of his own day with all the intimacy and realism of which he is capable. How else shall he sense the need of our world, or be more than a blind leader of the blind? We have perhaps too many pathetic figures in the ministry whose knowledge of the Bible comes to naught because they are innocent of any genuine understanding of the turbulent life of our times. Third, the Christian leader is put under responsibility for working out sane and effective methods of mediating to people of our day the incomparable contributions which the Bible stands ready to offer. No skill in preaching and teaching is too great for this delicate task. It demands the highest powers of one's entire personality.

Here, then, we stand in the midst of a generation at the crisis. Behind us a world falls away, a world which we loved and trusted overmuch, making us blind to the subtle causes of its disintegration. Before us a new order struggles to be born, a civilization as yet largely without character, with no guarantees, save what we may bring to it, that it will be in any wise superior to the old. Here stands the Bible revealing the causes of our past failures, sitting in judgment upon the shabbiness of our characters and our institutions, even upon the inadequacies of our washed-out Christianity; but offering again the clue to that new life which alone is worth the making. Be it ours to follow that clue to the utmost in our own living and to build its gift of divine life into the structure of the new society, that the kingdom of this world may indeed become the Kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ.

Preaching to the Religiously Perplexed

WILLARD L. SPERRY

DURING the war the Y. M. C. A. huts at the cantonments were crowded on Sundays and on the week-day evenings with soldiers. They came there to rest, to talk, to play games, and to write letters home. They came also to listen to sermons and speeches. The address which always got the best hearing was the one which tried to explain how the war began, what its European backgrounds were, and what its issues were likely to be. No entertainer ever got as large an audience as that gathered to hear some historian—probably a college professor—discuss Europe from 1870 to 1914. The average man wanted to know what it was all about.

His interest was not academic. It was intimate and imperious. Professor Hocking said, at the time, "With all that can be done to support and inspire the soldier's feelings, the one durable factor of morale that is open to direct control is the man's thoughts. Beneath the superficial soldier, sensitive about his small discomforts, and ready to be amused, there is a thoughtful soldier. The time comes when he must realize that it is *his* career that is going into the hopper, *his* life, possibly the welfare of *his* family. Social persuasions will not help him then—nothing but his own convictions. Morale is at bottom a state of will or purpose: and the first factor in any mature human purpose is *knowledge*."

That was in war time. But the distinction between times of war and times of peace is a difference in degree rather than in kind. War is an acute attack of ills which are chronic in society. There is always some influenza, the doctors tell us, and every so often there is an epidemic. War is a serious epidemic of the chronic competitive view of human life from which we suffer more or less constantly.

There is in the Wisdom of Solomon a magnificent verse which furnishes a useful text for these days. The people, says the wise man, "have erred in the knowledge of God; but whereas they lived in the great war of ignorance, those so great plagues they called peace." A friend said to me the other day something to just that effect: "I now find myself back in the war-time frame of mind." It is a mistake to call the great plagues which

now afflict us, "peace." They are part of a "great war of ignorance" which is still being waged in the modern world.

It is as true to-day, as it was when Hocking wrote about soldiers, that the one durable factor of morale in this mortal life is a man's thoughts. Beneath the pleasure-seeking citizen there is a thoughtful person. His career, his life, the welfare of his family are going into the hopper, to what purpose he cannot understand.

This fact has meant a change in the mood and substance of our sermons. The sermon as a rhetorical stunt, as a professional *tour de force*, is out of fashion. People simply will not listen to it. The old-fashioned oratory which held hearers spellbound falls to-day, and ought to fall, on deaf ears. The preaching which is listened to is that which simply and honestly tries to help people understand themselves, their fellows, their times, in the light of a knowledge of God. Therefore doctrinal preaching, theological preaching, has come back into favor.

It was probably wise that the nineteenth century revolted against an excess of theology in the sermon, and struggled for more religion. But it is very hard to use words in a sermon without being theological. You cannot avoid a certain amount of description. Religion, like love, is something to be caught. "One loving heart," says Saint Augustine, "kindles another." But it is not always easy to spread that fire by words, particularly by words prepared in advance and delivered under a formal setting in accordance with the calendar and the clock.

We probably have been too afraid of theological preaching. In my own experience, even in the pre-war years, congregations welcomed it as a solid substitute for rhetoric, sentimentality, and edifying entertainment. They were always willing to have their knowledge of God made more explicit. We have underrated the interest of the plain man in theology and his capacity for responding to it. The "discussion group" which in the colleges has supplanted the Bible study class and the prayer meeting, is a gathering of young lay theologians. They are dealing with the problems that theology has always considered. Is there a God? If so, what is his nature and character? Has man an immortal soul? What about evil, how can it be squared with the goodness of God? Is the church valid and necessary?

We ministers ought to be quite clear on the distinction between religion and theology. Religion is the life, the experience, the first-hand thing.

Theology is a reflective account of the life and the experience. Theology is the science of religion. It stands in the same relation to its subject that biology stands to physical life, psychology to the human brain, æsthetics to our feeling for beauty. No science can create the fact which it studies, it can only interpret the fact. Biology cannot beget life, nor psychology a brain.

So it is in our field. Theology cannot breed religion. Religion is begotten and born in other ways. But theology can help us understand the religion which we have experienced and can prepare us for the experience of a still more adequate religion. Therefore we should not underestimate the contribution which theology makes to the religious life. No one can be said to possess any of his greater experiences until he has reflected upon them at a later time, and no one can hope for still greater experiences who does not know what he may expect and who does not do what is humanly possible to make such an experience likely.

Theology surveys the tangled field of experience and distinguishes between the wheat and the tares. It sets about clearing the field of stones and overhanging shade. It plows new fields and harrows them, to have them ready for to-morrow, if the sower should pass by. Theology gives us something like permanent possession of our own religious experiences; it provides a language by which we can communicate with one another about matters which at first seem ineffable; it rids life of errors of thought which are both painful and dangerous; it gets the soil of character in still more receptive state. None of these things that theology does is the actual begetting or transmission of religion. Yet its services to religion are so great that no religion is permanently possible without theology, and future religion can be prophesied safely only with its wise aid.

If, therefore, you find yourself to-day turning more or less automatically to theological subjects in your preaching, you need not regard this change of emphasis, in contrast to a more casual and often more trivial preaching in the past, as a defeat. Trusting our own instincts and the needs of the time, we are probably nearer in line to-day with the great preaching tradition of the Christian Church than we have been for a century past. We have come out from tributaries and backwaters into the main river system of the sermon.

"Preaching to the Religiously Perplexed." They are all around us. If we are fair to them and if we have anything to say to them we need not

want for a hearing. Only, this is a day when the world will not be put off with a stone, it will continue to stand in the bread-line.

There is, however, one change in our preaching temper that is demanded. This is not a time to propose what in more leisurely days was described as "The Problem of Christianity." As one looks back, even on the men of so recent a time as a generation ago, one sees that they could allow themselves the luxury of treating religion as being in itself a problem. Doctor Jacks has protested, justly, against an over-emphasis on the problematical nature of the Christian religion, which has cost it what he calls its "lost radiance." And Canon Streeter has gone on to say that only in these more recent years has he realized that he had been putting the question in the wrong place. It is not religion that puts the questions, but life. Religion is, or attempts to be, an answer to the inquisitions and perplexities of experience.

We shall do well, therefore, not to make the burden of our time more grievous by adding, in the name of religion, to the problems it is already facing. Not that the final faith of religion is not shrouded in mystery and surrounded by queries that will occur to any one. But rather, religion, at its native best, is a working answer to the questions life puts to us. William James once said wisely, that religion helps us to bear cheerfully and hopefully what must be borne anyway. It cannot guarantee, with the assurance of a natural science, its boldest beliefs. But it can point out the next step which may be taken.

If the first word of advice is this: do not add in religion's name to the already heavy problematical areas in life—a second word of advice follows; do not propose in religion's name to "solve all questions in the world and out of it." I know of no habit in a preacher which so undermines trust in him as the habit of "crying peace, peace, when there is no peace" in the realms of honest thought. This is a fault especially common among us when we are young, inexperienced, and enthusiastic. How much wiser Phillips Brooks was, when he said, "He who comes to me saying, Lo, I will now read you the riddle of evil, closes my ears with his offer."

Some of you will remember Schweitzer's testimony about his experience in Strasbourg during the war. In addition to his academic work he had certain parish duties, and these duties brought him in touch with young men who went off to war. He said that he observed that, as they came back to Strasbourg on leave or finally at the end of the war, they had not, as so

many boys had, lost their religion. This, he said, he put down to the fact that he had drilled it into them in their youth that religion does not necessarily undertake to answer finally and beyond contradiction every perplexity in a human life. It offers help, mitigations, ways of dealing with the difficulty. It does not settle these matters once for all.

Whatever we may think of so modest a claim for religion, there is much truth in what Schweitzer said. For, in religion, men are still asking the same old questions which have survived every supposedly final theology. Theology offers what we may call working hypotheses and a *modus vivendi*. It is, as a science, outside its territory when it assumes that it can give the kind of conclusive answer which a science gives to questions in its field. Were it able to give such answers there would be no such thing as faith, and even after all these centuries faith still remains the differentia of religion as against the restricted sciences.

We should not forget that the book of Job is being perennially re-enacted. Life itself is greater than dogma, and when experience contradicts doctrine, as it will, life and experience will win. Religiously it is better to be on Job's side, even at the price of his tentative agnosticism, than to be on the side of his friends who were sure of what is not so. As a Christian minister you will make and keep more confidence throughout your congregation by a decent theological humility, than by theological arrogance. For life rebukes the presumptuous sins of an excessive dogmatism.

This is particularly true of so much of Christianity as is touched by a genuinely Protestant spirit. There is in Protestantism always a certain tentativeness, an experimental temper, a patient confidence that more light is yet to break, which makes it what it is. It is true that we are living at a particular period of the world's history when this attitude toward life is not merely out of date, but unwelcome. The dictator in politics is the fashion of the day. And since the metaphors of religion are always drawn from the world around, and the processes of religious thought unconsciously influenced by our general outlook on life, those religions which claim and seek to exercise authority are at the moment the most popular. People the world over are tired and willing to hand over their destinies, both in time and in eternity, to any person who is ready to assume the responsibility of dictatorship.

If I were taking short views of religion I should counsel you to identify yourself with Catholicism and its claim to ecclesiastical control of

life, with Barthianism and its passive faith in the Word of God, with Buchmanism and its utter dependence on guidance. These are the forms of Christianity which make the strongest immediate appeal to tired and bewildered humanity. I do not wonder, given the history of the last twenty years, that Catholicism is gaining ground in Europe, that Barthianism appeals to defeated and frustrated Germany, that Buchmanism attracts puzzled Englishmen and Americans. Each in its own way sounds the note of certainty, and the note itself is welcome. Indeed the bare assumption of certainty is more reassuring than the content of the certainty. That any one can be certain of anything to-day is heartening. That is why these movements gain new recruits.

But if you know anything about Christian history at all, you realize that each of these claims, the old Catholic claim and the newer claims of Barth and Buchman, is simply storing up trouble for the future. Barth's doctrine of the Word of God is going to re-enthroned, if it prevails, the doctrine of the absolute Sovereignty of God which involved Protestant theology in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in such ethical difficulties, difficulties from which we escaped only at the price of great suffering. And the Buchman theory of guidance, despite its measure of truth, is loaded with psychological dynamite which, in explosion, may do as much harm as good. The casualty list of the Oxford Group Movement is altogether too heavy to reassure us that it is the whole truth and the only truth.

A long-range answer to the perplexities of the time is the only one to which some of us, at least, can pledge ourselves. To preach, for the sake of quick returns in the way of church attendants or new members, some short-range solution of life's perplexities, which attracts people because of its assumption of certainty, is only to make trouble for ourselves, or if not for ourselves then certainly for our successors, at some later time.

All of the serious perplexities of life resolve themselves sooner or later into the problem of evil. The lesser difficulties can be negotiated. But before the problem of evil, once it has been envisaged, the mind stands in more or less permanent bewilderment. Professor Whitehead has gone on to say that this problem of evil is the sunken rock on which sooner or later most religions suffer shipwreck. In the same vein President Lowell said to me one morning after the Sunday service at Harvard, when he had read one of the chapters of Job as the Old Testament lesson, "The most

acute form of the problem of evil is the suffering of an innocent person, a gross injustice to the individual."

Our success as preachers to this day will depend very largely upon our power to make this suffering in some way endurable, and to acquit Almighty God of the charge of being unjust in his dealings with men. Here, as Browning has it, is "the post of the foe." The facts are plain and cry out to high heaven. Life at the moment is cruelly unjust to millions of human beings. They are born into homes where they cannot be fed. They are graduated from colleges which cannot find them work. They fall in love but cannot afford to marry. They walk the streets of our cities and scour our countryside, asking for a share in the primal curse of work—and how strange that old idea of work as a punishment seems at the moment. They have seen the savings of a lifetime vanish and are confronted in mid-life or age with poverty.

You can no longer treat the sufferings of the innocent, or the injustice meted out by life to individuals, as an exceptional fact which does not impair the general rule of a benevolence that keeps a cash account with each one of us, and gives us a balance on the credit side. The volume of evidence to the contrary has crept up from the footnotes into the text, and the exception seems in danger of becoming the rule itself. We all of us know such persons, and their lots are too poignant for us to try to comfort them with old platitudes, much less to insult them with dogmas which have no parallel in their painful experience.

Now I have no ambition to solve the problem of evil, and, on the strength of what I have already said, am prohibited from the attempt. But there are certain considerations which any thoughtful person may advance. Here and there these considerations help, even though they may not wholly satisfy.

I think we shall do well to renounce the rôle of Job's comforters altogether. We might as well admit that life is unfair to individuals and that for reasons which we do not wholly understand innocent individuals have to suffer. Why it should be so, whether it ought to be so—this is hard to say. That it is so, none of us who is honest can deny. But in the things of the mind, as in the things of the body, a pain is a little more endurable if we understand the cause and the nature of it. The pain is still there, but once we have made even a tentative mental peace with it, we are stronger to bear it.

The suffering of which we speak is a mental suffering. It is the protest of the human mind against irrationality and cruelty in the scheme of things, or at least in the present order of things. In the widest sense of the word we shall do something to help the religious perplexity of our time, if we part company with the old individualistic scheme of ethics, which assumed that a man was paid in the terms of health, wealth, and long life, for his character. This never was so. Job exploded the fallacy twenty-five hundred years ago. Yet it is fair to say that too much of the individualist teaching of Protestantism has laid our religion open to that interpretation. Puritanism inclined too far in the direction of Job's friends. The work of men like Max Weber and Tawney has made that clear. And far too many Protestants have carried over from the excessive individualism of their tradition during the last two hundred years the innate and uncriticized conviction that their character and their circumstance are interdependent, and that you can equate so much piety in the terms of so much income or so much health.

We need in our churches to-day re-education on this whole matter. It is conceivable that in the Utopia the cash account of each single man with the moral order will balance accurately, so that circumstance will be a faithful record of character. But this is not Utopia. We are living in a world where in a thousand ways, some of them known and others of them still unknown, we are involved in each other's pain, and where even the best of characters guarantees no immunity.

I think we can say that over a long period of years, many generations, and many centuries, a whole society gets something like its creature deserts for its ideals or its want of ideals. Nations persist because they are on the whole morally healthy, and they fall eventually because they have gone rotten. Some such verdict probably may be passed. But within those limits it is difficult to isolate any individual and to equate his character and his circumstance. Disease and its irrational transmission, that is, ethically irrational, is the most familiar instance of this truth. But to it we may now add all those other forms of suffering—want of work, hunger, idleness, the break-up of homes—which are the consequence of an ill-regulated political and economic order.

I would then concede up to the hilt the injustice of life to countless individuals, if justice requires that their worth of character is a guarantee of a job and a wage. The fact that, in the pulpit, we speak with sympathy is

in itself a help. Mark Rutherford once said that the greatest help which he got in time of trouble came from some one who could say quite simply, "I have experienced all that." Most of us have not had to experience this injustice in its acutest modern forms. We have had our work, and our pay, and our health. But in so far as life has forced us to live more simply we can understand what men are going through to-day. And imagination is given us to help us make good the gap which is still left—imagination which is the supreme form of Christian charity since it is unselfishness of the mind.

It is our duty, in justice to the facts, to rid our preaching of the last remnants of an incredible ethical individualism, whether that of Job's friends or of some one of their successors, and to concede the injustices to the innocent which we may see anywhere around us. Our renunciation of this imperfect ethic will of itself be a help. If people find that the Christian Church actually sympathizes with them, instead of merely pitying them, they will not turn away from it.

Having said this we should then go on to say two further things. First, that the Christian religion at its best has never taught a crudely materialistic ethic. It has always said that the real rewards of religion are inner. Spiritual things are to be judged by spiritual. Now there are many to whom this is a hard doctrine, and they will turn away from it as cold comfort, as Swinburne turned from the "cold Christ." But neither the New Testament nor any other great witness to Christianity has ever offered anything else. What we call our religious perplexities have too often arisen from the assumption that Christianity offers something less than this. Just as the rich young ruler "turned away sorrowful," there will be to-day other persons at the opposite end of the scale who will turn away sorrowful, because they think that Christianity ought automatically to guarantee them, in recognition of their character, a happy state of life, with creature comforts.

I do not know that there is much that we can do to help such. Their whole conception of religion is based on a misconception. What they think of as religion is not religion at all. It is residual magic. It is a hang-over from the days of the medicine man. Only some patient process of re-education can persuade them of the facts, and whether in their present condition they are amenable to education, I do not know. They are in the meantime a pathetic comment upon the wrongness or the ineffectualness of the religious teaching of the past. Somehow or other they have been allowed to grow up with mistaken ideas as to what religion is.

On the other hand there are persons, and they are more numerous than we might suppose, who in this school of hardship are for the first time getting their values right. We have all of us met them, persons whose lot is much harder than ours, and yet who seem to have won their way to a joy that we have not attained. We feel humble in their presence, but profoundly grateful to them. They are showing forth in their lives truths which we professional preachers have too often only showed forth with our lips.

I think of a friend I met this year in London, who ten years ago had a country estate and far more than common comfort. To-day he is poor and looking for any way to make a shilling or a pound. But he was not complaining. He said that physically he had never felt better in his life. A Spartan diet had put his body in shape once more. And he went on to say, "I have never found life as intensely interesting as it has been during these last three or four years. What is more, save for an occasional and inevitable black fit of depression, I have never enjoyed it as much." I have racked my memory for evidence to the contrary. I cannot think of a person who has bitterly complained to me at his share of the hardships of recent years. And many persons have said without the slightest qualification that the kind of life they are now forced to live is more wholesome for the body and for the spirit. They are not without their natural regrets for the fleshpots that have been taken away, but their second thought never makes them resent the change. They rise to the occasion. They are discovering, many of them for the first time, that spiritual things are judged by spiritual and rewarded by spiritual. And their experience has not left them unrewarded.

Now if we have the courage to preach to this doctrine and the volume of fact which exists in support of it, we shall get a much wider hearing than we suppose. Only, our own lives must be so lived that we are not to be charged with the insincerity of asking other people to take the rewards of the spiritual life in terms which we refuse for ourselves. If we can keep a clear conscience in the matter we may preach with the assurance that we speak to more persons than we might suppose, when we say that religion repays men in its own coin, and that this coin is the gold reserve of the world.

Finally, a word as to the future. Harold Höffding says in an unforgettable passage that formerly religion was the pillar of cloud by day and of fire by night that marched in the vanguard of history, but that to-day it

is only an ambulance corps trailing along in the rear of the conflict, caring for the sick and wounded.

Preaching must always have a double intent. It must deal with the immediate human situation to which it is addressed. But at the same time it must never forget the church of to-morrow. How is it that Browning puts it?

"Oh, if we draw a circle premature,
Heedless of far gain,
Greedy for quick returns of profit sure,
Bad is our bargain."

A good deal of immediately effective preaching draws this premature circle in its greed for quick returns. But the Christian Church cannot afford this bad bargain. It should always be concerned with far gain as well. In the world of affairs men are saying that we should not allow the emergency frame of mind and emergency measures to become settled habits. That holds of preaching. We are speaking to certain perplexities in the common mind which are very widespread. They are not new; indeed they are very old. But their dimensions are such that none of us is allowed to forget them.

It is, however, a mistake to allow ourselves to be forced permanently into the rear of history to fulfill merely the duties of an ambulance corps. We ought to keep something of the quality of the pillars of cloud and fire.

While we are trying to help people understand present circumstance and bear cheerfully and hopefully what they have to bear, we should be trying to educate the on-coming generation so that it may be spared in its maturity the mental pain of wrong ideas about God, man, nature, history, good and evil. In the ministry, as in medicine, there is a call for "preventive medicine." I brought away from my own years in the active pastorate a vivid memory of what seemed to me the unnecessary mental pain which countless human beings are suffering because of mistaken ideas about religion. Many of these mistakes could be traced to types of religious teaching which regarded religion as an emergency measure and which encouraged people to drive short, sharp bargains with themselves, their fellows, their time and their God. I left the pastorate with a mounting resentment against such teaching which had eventually created serious difficulties in human life.

We owe it to those who are coming onto the scene to save them, as far

as we can, from the pain of wrong ideas about God and the Christian life. This is definitely a theological task. To prevent unnecessary religious perplexity in the future is as important an element in preaching as to resolve perplexities which hold over from an ill-taught past.

I began with a reference to the war. Let me end with a similar reference. Neville Talbot, before the war chaplain of Balliol College in Oxford, was during the war one of the Chaplains General of the British Army. He wrote during the war a little book called *Religion at the Front*. It is one of the few war books I ever read which twenty years after it was written will stand re-reading.

In the book he says in substance this: The trouble with war-time religion is that it is an emergency measure. But a religion come at as a last resort in an emergency is not the Christian religion. This was not the religion of Jesus. The religion of Jesus stood the severest test, namely, the quiet of normal and uneventful days.

We who are preaching must bear in mind that our preaching should be long range enough to anticipate the severest test to which Christianity can be put, the quiet of normal and uneventful days. We must work in the sub-soil of the mind of our time, as well as on its surface. We may not allow the immediate serviceableness of any argument or idea to capture us, if we are in doubt as to its permanent validity. We may say nothing now which we would not say in better times. Indeed, saying the sort of thing which should be said in better times is perhaps one of the ways in which the church is to help bring again those times.

The Revelance of the Ethic of Jesus for Modern Society

JOHN C. BENNETT

WE have entered a period of confusion concerning the relation of the ethic of Jesus to contemporary life. A few years ago it was all so clear. The task of Christianity was to apply the principles of Jesus to the whole contemporary world. The rediscovery of the conception of the "Kingdom of God" provided a charter for social Christianity. It was taken for granted that the social gospel was the original gospel which had been obscured by the orthodox tradition. Christians had their authority for their social task in the teachings of Jesus and they approached the future with a clear sense of direction and with a faith that they could be co-workers with God in building his kingdom in this world.

To-day this clarity and this confidence are gone. It seems as though the leaders of Christian thought had just succeeded in waking up large sections of the church to its social task and then themselves had grown uncertain and cold concerning that task. There are many reasons for the change but one of the most important is an inhibiting doubt about the relevance of the ethic of Jesus to the contemporary social problem.

In this article an attempt will be made to deal with four closely related problems which must be faced before we can get our bearings again in regard to the relation of the teaching of Jesus to modern society. The problems are:

1. The difference between our age and the age of Jesus.
2. The apocalyptic teachings of Jesus.
3. The absoluteness of the ethic of Jesus.
4. The relation between the ethic of Jesus and social change.

THE CONTENT OF THE ETHIC OF JESUS

It may prevent much misunderstanding if, before we consider these problems, we present a summary of the content of the ethic of Jesus.

1. The ethic of Jesus is rooted in his religion. God is the pattern for ethical life. We are to be perfect, merciful, to love our enemies in

order to be like God. Moreover, the worth of persons, which is a basic assumption of this ethic, is known from God's love for them.

2. For Jesus the moral problem is primarily a problem of the inner life. Overt acts are merely the expression of the motives and dispositions of the heart. "But I say unto you that every one who is angry with his brother . . ."

3. Central and controlling in the ethic of Jesus is love—love without barriers and love to the point of self-sacrifice. The circle of love must include enemies, sinners, publicans, Samaritans, "even these least," the unnamed victims of society. Love should be absolute not only in its inclusiveness but also in its intensity. It demands singleness of mind. It must forgive seventy-times seven. It must be willing to pay the price of the cross.

4. Jesus maintains a balance between love and an aggressive dealing with evil. There is what John Mackay calls the "Christ of the whip." He came to cast fire on the earth, to bring not peace but a sword. His denunciations of the Pharisees and his cleansing of the temple, instead of being blemishes to be explained away, reveal the balance of his character.

5. Jesus' scale of values gives first place to the highest spiritual goods but it makes room for the primary needs of health and bread. He saw the evil of wealth and the evil of hunger. He avoided the extremes of ascetic religion and of this-worldly religion, of Hinduism and of Communism.

6. Jesus saw the moral and religious importance of humility. One should be as receptive as a child. The poor, the meek, those who know that they are sinners—they are the folk who are most fit for the Kingdom of God. The parable of the Pharisee and the Publican gives in perfect form this side of Jesus' thought.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR AGE AND THE AGE OF JESUS

This first problem is raised by those who undercut the relevance of Jesus at the start by calling attention to the difference between our age and the age of Jesus. This has been put most stridently by Harry Elmer Barnes in his *The Twilight of Christianity*. It has been put more soberly by the Randalls in their book, *Religion in the Modern World*. They sum the issue up in these words:

"There was no science for Jesus, nor had the notion of natural law, or the

search for knowledge, even begun to enter the spirit of his age. For him neither the form, the spirit, nor the fruits of scientific enquiry existed. Similarly he had no interest in the artistic pursuits of a complicated society. Above all, he had no inkling of the power over nature that technology was to bring, or the variety of instruments for living that it would create. These are the conditions of our lives; somehow we must fit them into an ordered and satisfying harmony. Jesus could of necessity see neither these building stones, nor the very problems their wise utilization presents."

Those who speak in this way are trying to say one thing which needs to be said. They are protesting against the assumption of much conventional Christianity that Christ is "all sufficient" for salvation, against the neglect of specific modern methods for dealing with the soul and society.

The fallacy of this position lies in the assumption that the changing elements in history are more important than the things which are permanent. Usually this assumption goes with an exaggeration of the importance of science as a way of knowing and as a way of salvation. Science itself, and especially its results, belong to the changing elements in civilization. But surely in the moral and religious life, and even in the stuff of which a good society must be made, the differences between our age and the age of Jesus are superficial. There has been no important change in human nature, in our basic needs and emotions, in the effect of suffering and sin and death upon us, in our essential dependence upon an apparently indifferent nature, in what we most admire, in our experience of God. The permanence of great literature, the permanence of Plato (who is even John Dewey's¹ favorite philosopher) suggests that there should be no *a priori* difficulty about the permanence of Jesus.

Those who are most impressed by the idea that Jesus has been left behind by the changes in civilization usually begin with the assumption that Jesus was mistaken in his idea of God and that he was the victim of illusion in his experience of God. It is natural that those who start with that assumption should look for ethical guidance which is less mixed with religious illusion. But those who start with the conviction that the religion of Jesus is valid have a completely different perspective. One of the chief reasons why they can maintain the relevance of Jesus is the precise balance between religion and ethics which they find in him.

We have sketched in merest outline the kind of answer which can be made to this preliminary challenge. If this answer is sound we can at

¹ *Contemporary American Philosophy*, Vol. 2, p. 21.

least approach the question of the relevance of Jesus without an initial negative attitude. This challenge comes for the most part from outside the church.

THE APOCALYPTIC TEACHINGS OF JESUS²

A far more serious problem for those of us who are within the church is the rediscovery of the apocalyptic teachings of Jesus. These have seemed to mean that Jesus had no ethic which is relevant to the task of changing society gradually, by human effort. They may be taken to mean that Jesus had an *interim ethic* suitable for the short period before the coming of the kingdom, an ethic which could disregard long-run consequences, or that he had an absolute ethic which is inapplicable to the actual situation in which we find ourselves. I can do no more than state dogmatically a few conclusions about this problem. The important thing is that all of these conclusions be kept in mind at the same time.

1. Jesus probably did think in terms of an apocalyptic kingdom. That is, a kingdom which was expected to come *soon*, in a *catastrophic* manner, and by *act of God*. The kingdom was not to be the result of an evolutionary process or the product of the cumulative efforts of men.

2. The thought of Jesus was preserved from fatalism or even theological determinism by his emphasis upon repentance as the condition of entrance into the kingdom. Fortunately, he did not raise the theological problem of the relation between the grace of God and the repentance of men (except perhaps in the Fourth Gospel, John 6. 44). The structure of the kingdom would be the work of God, but the entrance of men into the kingdom upon which the kingdom in its fullness would depend was to be a matter of human choice.

3. Jesus was not obsessed by the apocalyptic expectation. It did not make him a fanatical ascetic who was blind to the values of common life. Von Hügel has a fine passage in which he describes the "leisureliness of mind" of Jesus. Jesus even had time "to disport himself with children."³

4. Jesus put new moral and religious content into the apocalyptic form of thought. I think that we could rest the case for the significance of Jesus upon the moral difference between his teaching and conventional

²The most balanced discussions about the apocalyptic teachings of Jesus which I have found are: Manson, W.: *Christ's View of the Kingdom of God*; and E. F. Scott: *The Kingdom of God in the New Testament*.

³*Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, first series, page 127.

apocalyptic. (One might add the intellectual difference between the simplicity and directness of Jesus and the tiresome verbosity of the apocalyptic writers.)⁴

5. It was one of the results of his apocalyptic form of thought that the ethic of Jesus retained an absoluteness which might not have been possible if he had been interested in the next steps for the Jews in Palestine in the first century instead of the conditions for entrance into the eternal kingdom of God. As it is he has set forth an ethic which is not fully applicable to any age but which is the regulative ideal for every age.⁵

If these conclusions concerning the apocalyptic teachings of Jesus are sound, they raise two great problems which correspond with the two problems with which we have yet to deal. The first problem is raised by the fact that Jesus' ethic seems to have been an absolute ethic which cannot be applied to our situation without serious compromise. The second problem is created by the fact that Jesus was able to leave structural⁶ social results to God alone, whereas we cannot escape responsibility for those results.

THE ABSOLUTENESS OF THE ETHIC OF JESUS

Glib talk about applying the principles of Jesus has become unreal. We can no longer speak of a Christian social order. The best that we can hope to achieve in this world will involve a compromise with the ideal of Jesus. The historic Christian way of expressing this realization of the imperfection of all human achievement has been to say that man never loses the status of sinner. At best he becomes a forgiven sinner. To reduce the whole human problem to the problem of sin may be a dangerous oversimplification, but it arose out of a realistic insight into the human situation which is nearer the truth than recent American optimism. In what sense can the ethic of Jesus be relevant if it is too absolute to fit the facts of contemporary life?

It is necessary to begin by distinguishing clearly between the inner side of the ethical life, the side of motive and intention and the external conduct which at any given moment is possible. There are no definite predictable limits to the embodiment of the absolute ideal in the realm of motive and intention. For all of us there are limits in practice which are the result of egoistic impulse, but men can push those limits very far. We can sincerely

⁴ It is especially illuminating to compare the judgment scene in Matthew 25 with that in Enoch 62.

⁵ Schweitzer, A., *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, p. 400.

⁶ As compared with the entrance of individuals into the Kingdom.

intend to seek the total good as opposed to any partial good and men show an amazing capacity for self-sacrifice. For the individual Christian, so far as his inner life is concerned, the ideal of absolute love is not so remote from the possibility of realization that we need to raise the question of its relevance.

It is when we see the limits which social situations place upon our activity, when we see how few possibilities are open to us in society at any given time, that the problem of the relevance of the absolute ethic of Jesus becomes acute. We are involved in the behavior of the nation but we cannot reasonably expect that the policy of the nation will rise above enlightened self-interest. Indeed, at present we should have reason to be thankful if nations were to rise to that level. We are involved in the practices which make possible our economic privileges and the only real escape from responsibility for them is to ally ourselves with those who from motives and by methods which are ethically mixed are seeking to overthrow the economic order by which we profit. In either case we are forced to compromise.

Are we then shut up to a double standard of morality, a Christian standard for the individual and a sub-Christian standard for the group? If we are, we may be sure that group morality will be merely "the will of the strongest." There are, however, three points at which close contact can be preserved between individual and group⁷ morality. The first is that it is not impossible for social groups to attain approximate justice, mutuality, common decency in their relations with each other. Those ideals may fall short of Christian love but they are very much closer to it than is the law of the jungle. The second point of contact is that a world in which groups attain justice and mutuality is a world in which individual Christians can come far nearer to the ethic of Jesus in all their relationships across group lines than they can in a state of injustice or of open or covert warfare. The third is that it is possible for Christians from the highest Christian motives to work for the kind of society in which there is justice and mutuality. Love does drive Christians to seek justice even though justice may be less than love. So, while we can recognize a difference between what is possible for society and what is possible for the individual Christian we can affirm that the ethic of Jesus is relevant to society both as a norm by which it is

⁷ When we speak of groups we are thinking of national groups and large economic groups. Obviously there are selected groups which are capable of as high a level of conduct as their individual members.

to be judged and as a control for the motives and intentions of those who are responsible for social policy.

There are two attitudes which Christians must maintain at the same time and to maintain them together is very difficult. The first is the sense of tension between the Christian ideal and the best possible social good which is open to us. That tension gives us the correct perspective from which to see ourselves and society, and it is a necessary spur to keep us at the task of raising the level of social possibility. To relax that tension is to run the risk of identifying what is at present inevitable with what is divinely ordained. We must be wary about calling any human institution a "schöpfungsordnung" (an order of creation), for man has had too large a part in the creation of such institutions to identify them, no matter how stubbornly resistant to human wills, with the will of God. Usually when theologians have thought of social institutions as orders of creation they have recognized that on account of the fall nothing is as God created it. Nevertheless there has been a strong tendency to sanctify the existing order of things, if only to regard human institutions as divine punishment for sin without realizing that this punishment must seem a reward to the classes on top.

The other attitude which must be maintained side by side with the sense of tension between the ideal and the possible is to look upon the next-best-thing-to-be-done as having behind it the authority of the ideal itself or the will of God. There is no situation which is so bad that there is not a best thing to be done in it. That does not mean that the best action in some cases may not be the refusal of all positive action. There is room enough here for the Christian who is prepared to say that there are courses of action (such as war) which are so evil in themselves and in their immediate consequences that it is inconceivable that some future good can justify them. As a result of this second position our sense of sin should be based not upon the distance between the next-best-thing-to-be-done and the absolute ideal, but rather upon our weakness and failure in doing it or upon careless or biased choice among the possibilities which are open to us.

The worst danger which confronts those who emphasize the absoluteness of the ethic of Jesus is that they will reduce all possibilities to the same level as equally infected with sin. Capitalism, fascism, socialism, communism would be equally outside the circle of the concern of the Christian as a Christian. This tendency is characteristic of theology which is under

Barthian influence. It is good to see that Brunner carefully avoids it. He says that the Christian must seek the better and the more just even though it is not fully Christian. As he puts it, though all economic and political possibilities are relative they are not equal.⁸ If we combine that warning with the conception of vocation which is central in Brunner's ethical thought it can be said that the vocation of the Christian is to do the next-best-thing though it fall short of the absolute ideal. The tension between that next-best-thing and the Christian ideal will keep him in a state of restlessness which at every stage of the process will put the burden of proof on all compromises and which will constrain him to leave nothing undone to create new levels of possibility.

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ETHIC OF JESUS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Part of the solution of this final problem rests upon the result of the discussion of the absoluteness of the ethic of Jesus. That ethic can be social if it provides norms for society though society regularly falls short, if it puts the burden of proof on compromises, if it governs the motives of men even in their choice of the imperfect. But what is to be said about the result of the apocalyptic world view which made it possible for Jesus to ignore consequences on the plane of history? He could act without compromise and leave the consequences to God. We cannot.

Here lies a real difference between the ethical approach which is possible for us and the one which we find in the gospels. We land in confusion when we pretend it does not exist. It is necessary for us to translate the ethic of Jesus into new forms which grow out of a non-apocalyptic world view. Schweitzer is wiser than many theologians who follow him in his interpretation of Jesus. He says of Jesus:

"With his death he destroyed the form of his 'Weltanschauung,' rendering his own eschatology impossible. Thereby he gives to all peoples and to all times the right to apprehend him in terms of their thoughts and conceptions, in order that his spirit may pervade their 'Weltanschauung' as it quickened and pervaded Jewish eschatology."⁹

This necessity of translating the ideal and the spirit of Jesus into new terms is obscured at present by the popularity of the catastrophic view of history which is represented in its extreme form by Marxism. This new

⁸ Brunner, *Das Gebot und Die Ordnungen*, p. 418.

⁹ Schweitzer, *The Mystery of the Kingdom of God*, p. 251.

expectation of catastrophe is hailed as a confirmation of the apocalyptic expectation of the gospels, but that is hardly correct. The Marxists are thinking of a catastrophe within history which is in part the result of revolutionary wills and not of a cosmic catastrophe which is the work of God alone. If we assume that the "Marxist Christians" are right in thinking in terms of catastrophe rather than in terms of gradualness it remains true that we are responsible for the effect of our conduct upon the form which the catastrophe will take. Our efforts may just make the difference between a catastrophe which is creative and one which is destructive in the end.

Now, we can return to the problem which was stated at the beginning of this article. Has social Christianity been wrong in claiming the authority of Jesus? That question is not as simple as it seemed to the earlier prophets of the social gospel, but the answer which they gave to it was decisively right. We cannot be loyal to Jesus in our day unless in his spirit we develop a Christian social ethic in terms of our responsibility for long-run structural results and in terms of the imperfections of all the possibilities which are open to us.

The social gospel is an inevitable development of the teachings of Jesus. If we are to have his concern for the real welfare of persons we must take whatever measures are necessary to overcome the evils which crush persons now. Jesus was deeply interested in the problem of bread and its distribution. In his society there was not much which could be done about it by his followers except in terms of personal giving. There was the kind of scarcity which made it not unreasonable to say: "The poor ye have always with you." Also, what could the individual in Palestine do to change the structure of society? To-day the problem of bread cannot be solved without a new economic system. Scarcity can no longer be regarded as inevitable. The individual in a society which is controlled by public opinion has responsibility for social change and that is even more true of Christians collectively. Our integrity as Christians depends upon our efforts to overcome the injustice which is the other side of our own privileges. Did not Jesus separate the sheep and the goats on the basis of their attitude toward the economic needs of others?

While the earlier social gospel may have been wrong in identifying the kingdom of God with a new social order, entrance into the kingdom

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does depend in our time upon our struggles to remove the obstacles to human welfare in history. That is true of entrance into the kingdom for those who do the struggling and also for those from whose backs are lifted the burdens which crush the growing soul. If these obstacles are never finally removed, every person who is freed from the effects of poverty or war or who is saved from meaningless suffering and frustration is so much gain at every stage of the process. The process will be long. Whether it be gradual or a series of crises, God will not do the work for us. The catastrophes about which we talk so much will have no virtue in themselves, for unless we do our part they will mean punishment without redemption for the countless souls who are in their way. If Christian love means anything it will constrain us to work for radical social change and it will not allow us to be turned aside by sophisticated interpretations of Jesus, by theories of determinism, by perfectionist scruples, or by the opiate of a pessimistic eschatology.

The Dreams That Come True

GLENN CLARK

"TWO gates there are for dreams," said Penelope to Odysseus after his ten years' wandering had ended. "One made of horn and one of ivory. The dreams that pass through the carved ivory delude and bring us tales that turn to naught; those that come forth through polished horn accomplish real things, whenever seen."

Whenever a dream comes forth from the ivory gate that is carved and made by man, shaped and twisted by his wish-thinking, his prejudices and half-formed opinions, it always falls to the ground as worthless; but whenever it comes forth from the gate that God has made, the horn that needs no carving or artificial molding, which requires only a little polishing to make it seen in all its native power and beauty—that dream always comes true.

I know because I have tried it. Ten years ago I dreamed a dream. It was a dream of taking Jesus completely at his word, and placing all the desires of my heart in his hand and letting him bring them to pass in his own way and in his own time. And my dreams came true. This dream, morning, noon and night, in sunshine and in shower, in work and in play, in joy and in pain, has been the dream that I have lived by.

I have put this dream to the most pitiless of tests, both of analysis and of logic, both of life and of experience. I have applied it to the littlest concerns and to the greatest. I have used it in cases of sickness where doctors gave no hope of recovery. I have used it in cases of hopeless drunkards. I have applied it to individuals and to groups. No matter what the difficulty, no matter how great the hopelessness—everything was changed the moment the dream that was made of horn came into action.

I wrote my dream into a little book and thousands of people read it. Then came a deluge of letters from people who had shared my dream and found that it was a dream that came true: people who had been sick and now had become well, people who had dreamed of beauty and now were writing best sellers or painting beautiful pictures, men and women who had faced financial ruin and now were starting anew on the ladder of achievement, literally thousands who had been living to themselves alone, who

were now looking out upon the world with eyes of new-born men. Statesmen and cowboys, football players and Boston bishops, actors in Hollywood and explorers with the Byrd Expedition, mothers in homes and men in business—there was no group or class that was not represented among those who bore witness to the truth of my conviction that our sincere dreams, our dreams that pass through the gate of horn, always come true.

The little book I wrote ten years ago was called *The Soul's Sincere Desire*. I believed then, and I believe now, that a soul's sincere desire is a desire that is always fulfilled. Just as the horns which project from the heads of cattle are made and fashioned by God according to the needs of the animals upon whom they are placed, so I also believe that our sincere desires are placed in our hearts, are molded and fashioned there by the hand of God. An insincere desire, a desire for that which we in our heart of hearts do not really wish, but which, because of our jealous regard for our neighbors or through our desire to keep up with the Jones's, or through the benumbing teaching of an artificial school system, or through the thwarting influence of an antiquated social order, we have wrongly planted in our hearts—such desires are carved by our own wish-thinking, they are made of nothing but ivory, and these desires merely delude and bring us tales that come to naught.

Our dreams, in the first place, rise from our desires. They are indexes of what in our deep subconscious self we seek and crave. And what a person seeks and craves, other things being equal, is something that is good for him, something which God intended him to have, provided he can take it in the way that will do no violence to any accepted moral or social code. One deep desire is to sleep when tired, another is to eat when hungry, another is to play, another is to work, another is to love a maid. What tangles the skein is when one would sleep when he should work, eat that which is not his, and love a maid who belongs to another man.

But I did not write in this book of *desires, unqualified and uncontrolled*. I wrote of *soul's sincere desires*. This immediately changes things, safeguards one against evil, lifts one above wrong. For it is only our little ungrown-up desires that are bad. Every mature desire, every desire that is whole, sincere, complete, and, above all, which acknowledges its relationship to its Divine Maker, is always a good desire. The moment a desire acknowledges its sonship to the soul it becomes a desire for the

mutual welfare of all, and joins the little family of virtues which Paul enumerated in his "fruits of the spirit." For the moment a desire becomes a soul's desire it takes its stand alongside Jesus' great commandment, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," and his Golden Rule which tells us that "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them."

The first test applied to the dream of horn as opposed to the dream of ivory is—Does it come from an integrated personality? The simplest way of applying this test is to ask the question, "Is it a sincere desire?"

The second test applied to the dream of horn is—Does it come from a personality that is integrated with God and man? The simplest way of applying that test is to ask the question, "Is it a soul's desire?"

Every desire that meets these two tests, if converted into a prayer, is *always* answered in heaven. When a desire meets these two tests, and not until then, does it qualify to deserve the title of "A Soul's Sincere Desire."

The chief reason for the widespread doubt of the power of prayer is because our civilization, in spite of its being called a "Christian Civilization," has produced so few truly integrated personalities. Perhaps the only one who completely met this test was the founder of this civilization—Christ, himself.

Our school system has not contributed much toward creating sane, complete personalities. It has, through its standardized processes, repressed personality more than it has released it. Lincoln and Edison were men whose dreams came true because they were fortunate enough to have escaped the "schooling process" altogether, and therefore their dreams were always sincere and always their own. What was their experience, in slightly modified form, has been the experience of all the great inventors, great poets, and great geniuses of every age since the beginning of time.

Every great man whose dreams came true, was first of all an unrepressed individual who knew and was unafraid to know what his honest, sincere desires in life were. When a man honestly and truly knows a thing, he believes in it, and when a man believes in a thing it comes to pass. That is one reason why the dreams that pass through the gate of horn "accomplish real things, whenever seen."

The wisest man of Greece has probably summed up better than any one else this first step in the secret of mastering life in the two words, "Know thyself." How few of the people in this day and age have learned that lesson!

But this is not the only lesson a man must learn who would find his dreams coming true. Another wise man, this time the wisest man of Rome, stated the second step in the secret of mastering life in the two words, "Control thyself." A dream is not a sound dream, a real dream, if it cuts counter to the welfare of others, or if it destroys the precious safeguards of society. "So act," is the ringing categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant, "that the axiom of thy act may become law universal." In other words, a desire or a dream, or even a prayer, must "grow up" and achieve a social maturity before it can walk forth and conquer the world. That is why the prayer of the neurotic and of the psychopathic has always had to linger awhile at the gate of heaven before it could be allowed to enter. Little baby, pouting prayers go up daily from thousands of throats; angry, self-assertive, clamoring prayers of the spiritual adolescent are also heard abroad in the land. All these merit Jesus' gentle rebuke, "First be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift."

But while Socrates and Marcus Aurelius have thus laid down the first two laws that govern the integrated, matured personality through the knowing and the controlling of oneself, it awaited the wisest man of Galilee to state the third and final law for the mastering of life in the two words: "Deny thyself."

Having found your sincere desire and having brought it under control and having brought it also in harmony with the highest principle of society, the final act essential for the dream to come into fulfillment is to lose it. The best way to lose it is to give it over completely into the hands of God. Indeed, without this third and final step all the other steps are but walking around in circles. The final test of the true maturity and completely integrated quality of a dream or desire is one's willingness to give it away.

A child who admires the garden seeds but will not remove them from their bright, illustrated containers which his father has given him, and whose false cupidity will not permit him to bury them in the cold, damp earth, is after all merely a child and we forgive him for his ignorance of the laws that operate in the great garden of God. But the adult who keeps his choice assortment of desires done up in their beautiful dream packages, always ready and at hand to exhibit to doting relatives and friends, is to be pitied; and when he gives utterance to his resentment against an "unheeding and unjust Providence that neither hears nor answers prayers," he

needs to be taken by the hand and gently taught the primary and kindergarten laws that operate in the realm of the spirit.

When I entered the kindergarten of the spirit and first tried to apply these laws, I found that the effort to lift a desire up into the realm of sincerity and next into the realm of the soul was no easy task. But, sensing that it was the task necessary for all true prayer, I kept patiently at it until the lesson was learned.

My first prayers, I found, had to be directed toward the finding of my actual soul's sincere desires, and not till I sought them earnestly and passionately did I begin to find them.

And once having found the real things I was to pray for, and having become convinced, through the preliminary test, that they were things I had a right to pray for, I proceeded to pray for them. Lest this sound like using God as a mere errand boy to run my errands, let me remind you again that the final and most difficult law in the kindergarten of prayer is giving the whole thing—not only the possession of what you want—but even the process of achieving that possession, completely into the hands of the Father. And by "process of achieving" I mean giving God the right of using any avenue and any agency which he cares to use to bring your dream into fulfillment in his own way and his own time.

One way of finding out one's actual soul's sincere desires is to retrace one's footsteps to his childhood, and recall what his honest, sincere life's ambitions were at that time. My memory goes back to the time when my cousin and I talked over our life plans together at the tender age of nine. She wanted to become rich and put on style. I wanted to become a writer. At the age of thirty we met again and confessed that neither of us had attained our life's dream. Then, almost simultaneously, we stumbled upon the third and most important law of the dream that comes true. We both learned how to deny ourselves.

As I looked one day at the boys and girls in my creative writing class it dawned on me that here were greater potential writers than I had ever been. Why cling to my selfish wish to make *myself* a writer? Why not unselfishly devote my energies to helping my students to become great writers? And so with the emphasis changed from "self" to "soul," I gave myself to my teaching with redoubled faith and energy. Then, in an unconscious moment of pure desire to help another I wrote down some

ideas in response to his crying need. "That is too good for me alone," he said. "Why don't you send it to the *Atlantic*?" I acted upon this advice and immediately back came a letter saying, "Send us half a dozen more like it." Thus my boyhood dream came true.

My cousin in the meantime also went through a similar metamorphosis although in an entirely different way. She also shifted her attention from her outer self to her deep self. Her selfish sincere desire became a soul's sincere desire. Then one evening she walked across a street and under the arc light a bug got in her eye. In the corner drug store a tall kindly gentleman drew forth a clean handkerchief and got the bug out. But during the process another kind of "bug" got in *his* eye. A few months later they were married. Then he broke the news to her that he had a comfortable income and he wanted her to pick out her own car and "put on style." Thus her girlhood dream came true.

Hard as it is for people to discover their actual sincere desires, far harder is it for them to convert those sincere desires, when once found, into soul's sincere desires. The most difficult situation in which to make this transformation is when those who are very dear to us are on the verge of death. It is very easy at such times to know what our sincere desire is—it is far harder to give that desire over to the greater will of the Father, and let it become a soul's desire. But when that great surrender has been made I know of no other field of human need where the results are so irresistible, so unexplainable, and so wonderful.

One day a mother called me over the telephone and told me that her son had infantile paralysis and would I pray for him. Two weeks later she called again and her heart was in her voice. "Six doctors have held a consultation and have given my boy no hope to live. He has been paralyzed from the neck down for a week. His back has been punctured eleven times. He has a temperature of 105 degrees and has been having two convulsions a minute for the past four hours. Is there anything I can do?"

"Pray," I replied.

"How shall I pray?"

"Pray not by asking but by giving. As you ask you shall receive. But as you give you also shall receive, and the process of giving at a crisis like this will open your soul more completely than the process of asking. As the tides go out, they will come back. As you give wholly, wholeness

will come to you and to those that belong to you. But to give wholly is harder than it may seem. It means you must give your boy completely and utterly to God. Let God take him into Heaven if it is his will—let him take him and keep him there forever if that is the plan.”

“But I want my boy.”

“If your boy grew to be a man and was elected a Senator of the United States would you object to his going to Washington? Would you want him to lose the opportunity for fulfilling the great destiny God has planned for him just in order to keep him living in your neighborhood so you could have the luxury of seeing him whenever you wish? Heaven is a far more wonderful place than Washington, and to sit at God’s right hand, a far higher honor than to sit at the feet of the President of the United States. You don’t know what your boy’s life on earth might be—what suffering and sorrow he might be escaping by going to Heaven at this time if it is God’s will. Don’t let your devotion for your boy become mere ‘attachment.’ Don’t let your mother love become ‘smother love.’ Go to your room and kneel down and give your boy to the Father—to keep or give back according to the best plan for the boy.”

Presently the phone rang again and a cheery voice said, “I have given my boy to the Father. I am willing to accept with radiant acquiescence whatever he wills to do for my son.”

Within a few weeks this boy was perfectly well and back in school, and without even a limp to show he had been sick.

One after another I have seen children who had been given up by doctors come back from the very threshold of the grave when the agonized prayers rising from mother hearts (and usually from breaking hearts) were transformed, through the miracle of prayer, into radiantly acquiescent “soul’s sincere desires” for God’s plan to prevail.

I have seen many miracles of healing, but the biggest miracle in every case occurred in the healing of the heart of the mother or father, before the more trivial healing of the body of the child took place.

To make this record complete I must state that very old people, especially when attacked by cancer, epilepsy or insanity, when given completely to the Father, have often been taken by him—and sometimes more immediately than they might have been taken had there been no prayer of surrender offered. One must never forget that when one prays the prayer, “Here, Father, take my loved one, and return him to whatever

destiny is in thy Plan," one must not be surprised if the Father accepts the prayer at its face value, and keeps the one prayed for through all eternity.

My experience with financial problems has been the same as when praying for physical problems. The year before writing the *Soul's Sincere Desire* my wife and I wondered whether our desire for a little crystal radio set—the fad was just coming in—was a right desire. We found it would cost us exactly \$8.70 to buy the little toy novelty, so we made our desire a soul's sincere desire by leaving it entirely to the Father to decide. A few days later two checks totaling \$8.85 came to me from absolutely unexpected sources. We accepted this as a sign from the Father that we were to get the radio set. The third day the little wire antenna for connecting with the stations broke and it cost exactly fifteen cents to replace it—total, \$8.85.

That winter we had a sincere desire to get out a little printed tribute to my mother, who had died in the fall. Although my share for the publishing of this would be only fifteen dollars we wanted to be perfectly sure that God would bless us in this undertaking, so we again left the matter entirely to the Father. In the next mail a check for fifteen dollars came from another totally unexpected source.

Finally the question came up as to whether we should buy a car. On my small teacher's salary, with three babies to support, this was a very real question. I have elsewhere related this experience in a booklet entitled *Twelve Parable Miracles of Answered Prayer*, and as there is so much involved in this experience that will help to make clearer the underlying laws that operate in the dream that comes "through the gate of horn" I will ask the privilege of reproducing here that "parable-miracle" as it was recorded at the time it happened.

There was once a man who lived in a great city where, as every one knows, the spirit of "take" rules stronger than the spirit of "give." This man followed the ways of his time. He was very diligent in getting from the wealth of the city all that he could for his family. He spent many hours over the evening light figuring on his accounts in hopes he would find a way he could get more, but the many hours he spent in such figuring reaped as many hours of doubt and fear. For this man lived in a city where people were always afraid. They were afraid others would take from them all that they so diligently tried to take from each other. And he, like the other citizens of that city, went round and round within this fear like a squirrel on a wheel.

One day his wife, who was also very thrifty and never bought what would

throw them into debt and so commit them to the mercy of the other "takers" of the city, came to him and said, "While our children are small we should have a small car, but I have figured our income carefully and find we would need just a hundred dollars before we could with safety undertake to buy one."

Now the man wanted to do all that he could for his children, so it happened that when his wife thus presented him with their need, he caught a glimpse out through the cage of fear that held his city captive and answered her more wisely than he then knew, "I'll tell you what we will do," he said. "When our little child with his tiny hands dug a well upon the seashore, was he afraid that the well would not be filled? No, but instead he sat down beside it, and frail, but with faith, he waited for the ocean, miles wide and miles deep, to stir through and through to its deepest fathoms and fill it for him. We shall be as wise as the child."

But his wife said, "I do not understand."

And he found great difficulty in explaining to her since it had but that moment come to him. But he said, "If we have a well, the great tides of God must fill it. If we have not a well, but only think that we have, then there is nothing to be filled. In other words," he continued, "if we have a need, then that need must be filled. It draws its fulfillment to itself inevitably. It becomes a great vortex, pulling to itself just the amount and kind to fill it, the exact fulfillment for the need, in right proportion with no more and no less. It cannot be otherwise."

So firmly did the man hold to his new vision that he and his wife agreed to leave it entirely to God whether they should have their car by the spring. Still one hundred dollars was needed before they dare venture. But the man did not lose faith. Instead, he said to his wife. "Our child did not lose faith when he sat by his well on the seashore. Perhaps the tides did not come as soon as he had builded the well, but the tides came and he knew they would come. We shall have as much faith as he." And they waited.

Then through the mails came a letter which when opened dropped at their feet one hundred and eight dollars. They looked at each other in astonishment. When they turned to the letter which accompanied it they found that no fabulous person had sent it but that they themselves twelve years previous had given it to a college endowment fund. Now as the need which they had filled was no longer imperative, the tide had turned, their gift had come back to them when their need called. The man and the woman looked at each other, thinking the same thoughts. All they had taken had given them nothing. What they had given now returned to them made rich by their present need.

Thus the man came to know, and it was borne out in his future dealings with his fellow men, that what he took profited him nothing, but all that he gave bore fruits with a thousand seeds, each seed to bear a many-branched tree which would in turn bear more fruit laden with more seeds so that the abundance thus generated could never be reckoned.

When he came to know this he left off fearing and spent his evenings no more at mean figures. He thought no more of what he could take, for he had no need to take anything, for he gave so much and the body of those gifts bore such abundant fruit that his family seemed to live then on the shores of a great sea which bore up to them according to their need and never once after that failed them.

But why mention these little episodes of money and of healing when the great thrilling dramas of the past ten years have been the changing of human souls? I will tell you the reason. These little episodes that pertain to material welfare are *short stories*. Each episode is complete in itself and ends when the material blessing arrives. On the other hand the unfolding, the awakening, the upward progress of human souls is a *continued story*. It becomes an epic which, beginning on this planet, extends, like Dante's "Paradiso" on into realms that have no end. Before I could relate these larger sagas, my listeners would first have to remove their shoes—for where we stand would be holy ground.

The chief essential of the dream that comes through the gate of horn is that it be silent. The chief essential of the seed that grows is that it be buried. My most precious seeds of this spiritual planting are still growing. It would be a sort of sacrilege to pull up these plants by the roots to prove that life is in them. My most precious dream-fulfillments are right now attending high school and college, they are in business offices and in housewives' kitchens. Some of them are carrying messages of God in unmistakable, irresistible words of power to men and women all over this nation. They are not "finished," they are not yet ready to be put in a book any more than the history of the United States in the next twenty years is ready to be put in a book.

You may have heard how Dr. George Carver of Tuskegee goes into his laboratory ("God's Little Workshop," he calls it) and prays, and his great discoveries come to him. One day I wrote Doctor Carver, until then a stranger to me, and immediately I received a letter saying, "I was praying that you would write me when your letter came." So immediately come the answers to some of our soul's sincere desires!

Another great praying soul was George Müller of the Bristol Orphanages. You may have heard of his habit of going into his inner closet and asking God for the financial help he needed for his orphanages, and exactly the sum he required came to him. He said, "When I asked the Father for one hundred pounds, it came; when I asked for a thousand pounds, it came; I am convinced that if I should ever ask for a million pounds it would come just as easily."

I have referred before to Lincoln and Edison as two men who were not "tensed up" by the training of the schools. It has been my observation that all great praying men are simple, relaxed men. Mrs. Thomas Edison

once said to me, "Mr. Edison's methods are just like yours. He is always perfectly natural and always perfectly relaxed. He feels that all his discoveries 'come through Him,' that he is but a channel for forces greater than himself."

Always natural and always relaxed! I don't like to see men work too hard at their prayers. "Beware lest the zeal of thy house eat thee up." When one strains and labors over his dream he is too often carving ivory and not polishing horn. Don't cut too deeply, don't carve too hard, don't paint the picture too much yourself. Get still awhile and let God paint it through you. Wrote Gutzon Borglum, "When I carve a statue, it is very simple. I merely cut away the pieces that don't belong there and the statue itself presently comes into view. It was there all the time."

Gutzon Borglum was an artist, George Carver a scientist, George Müller a social worker—but their methods were essentially the same. And what they tested and proved we too can test and prove.

What are your actual, honest, sincere desires shorn of all inferiority complexes, shorn of all repressions, shorn of all temptations to defense, to compensation, to escape? Spend a week and write them down; erase from time to time the desires you don't really feel sincere about and add others which you find forcing themselves more and more into your consciousness. Half the people of this nation would find that the list of their desires at the close of the week would be very different from the superficial ones they would put down at the beginning. Water that comes from a pump that has long been in disuse is at first muddy and brackish, but after the surface water has been pumped away, the water from the deeper levels comes forth pure and clear and undefiled. As an actual fact, nine times out of ten, the deeper one goes into his inner soul the more genuine as well as the more unselfish his desires will become.

To pray in this way is to pray as a perfectly integrated personality. And remember that the first test of integration is the test of sincerity. *Are you integrated with yourself?* The second test of integration is the test of soul. *Are you integrated with God and man?*

Perhaps the simplest way of summing up everything that has gone before is to say that the chief characteristic of the soul's sincere desire, as opposed to the insincere and superficial desire, is the long look as opposed to the short look, the whole view as opposed to the partial view, the look upward as opposed to the look downward.

Character Values in Indian Art

MARY FRANCES CARPENTER

INDIAN art, by which we shall generally mean the traditional Hindu-Buddhist stream of artistic expression in India, speaks, and is intended to speak, a message. The Western controversy waged around the slogan, "Art for art's sake," is of little interest to India, whose art tradition is flatly against the principle which the slogan expresses. "If a work of art is beautiful," an Indian artist and art critic dryly remarks, "we can perhaps forgive the artist for having a meaning." Indian art thus confesses itself to be primarily "literary" rather than æsthetic in its intention.

It stands in a different class from the general trend of Western art, also, in that it is not "realistic" in the accepted meaning of that term. It claims for itself, however, a realism of its own, holding that the only Reality is the Divine essence, awareness of which it seeks to establish by means of an impressionistic treatment of its imagery.

Being unabashedly and unambiguously both literary and symbolic, Indian art is equally unabashed and unambiguous as to the substance of its message. As one of its eminent spokesmen has pointed out, "Indian art has scarcely known a secular theme." The outstanding exception to this statement would be, of course, the art of the Mogul school, which was exotic in its origin and may be considered as an episode, only, in the art history of India. "Indian art," says Havell, "is the true expression of Indian life, and religion as the interpretation of life, not merely an æsthetic formula." "*You cannot sing anything but a hymn of the Lord,*" has an application not to music alone but also to the entire range of æsthetic expression in India. Indian art therefore has been in the past almost entirely a religious art and is still predominantly so to-day.

The values for character development in Indian art are, in the main, such as are not uncongenial to the Hindu-Buddhist religious outlook on life. Some values in Western art in the nature of the case we may not expect to find in any conspicuous degree in the art of India. We are thinking especially, here, of pictorial art. The art of the West has two chief roots, one being the Greek ideal of beauty expressed in outward form; the other being the Christian conception of that which is beautiful on the moral and

spiritual plane. One brought up under the influence of the Christian tradition thinks not of the Ultimate Reality behind all forms as Being without attributes, but rather as the home of all that is good, true and beautiful. It becomes easy to think, therefore, of beauty, whether of the outward semblance of things or on the invisible moral and spiritual plane, as being in itself a value. To the Indian artist this is not the case so far as it applies to physical beauty. To him all outward forms are but Illusion (Maya), and he cannot be true to his philosophy if, in his art, he allows himself to be dominated by such canons as will demand that he confer upon outward forms an undue semblance of reality. It is for this reason that one of the first impressions gained by the Western mind not having studied the philosophy which underlies Indian art, is that it is lacking in the sense of realism and not æsthetically satisfying. The former of these defects, which is evident in the absence of background and perspective, the modeling of objects and general inaccuracy in drawing, he may attribute to the artist's inability or unwillingness to master the technique of painting; the latter he will probably judge to be due to a lack of sensitiveness, on the part of the Indian artists, to beauty in outward form. Only after much study will he realize that in both of these particulars the effect which he deplores is there by the deliberate intention of the artist, and that by these, to the Western mind, defects of technique, he is preaching his faith in the illusoriness of all phenomenal existence. It is a part of his technique to refuse to bow to technique. In this attitude toward his art he is near in spirit, though not in his message, to Fra Angelico and Giotto and the modern Pre-Raphaelites, who are, among the artists of the West, his greatest inspiration. Mr. O. C. Ganguly, himself an artist and a distinguished art critic, thus epitomizes the attitude of the Indian artist toward outward form: "Instead of busying themselves with recording the superficial aspect of phenomena (they) have worked with a deeper motive and a profounder suggestion, seeking to wean the human mind from the obvious and the external reality of the senses, disdaining to imitate nature for its own sake, and striving to find significant forms to suggest the formless infinity which is hidden behind the visible world of forms." "Good drawing," the same writer says, "is drawing that cannot be altered without destruction of its inner spiritual values—quite irrespective of its correctness as astronomy, botany, or any other science. . . . The artist is not only justified in using, it is his duty to use only those forms which fulfill his

own need." We may not be able to agree with the Indian artist who cannot find in beauty, even physical beauty, a value in its own right, and we may regret that he has sometimes made use of such, no doubt to him, "significant forms" as outrage the æsthetic canons of the West. We may even cherish, in truly Indian fashion, an intuition that the canons of beauty must ultimately be found to be universal, and hold with Fra Lippo Lippi that it were better to "*Make the flesh liker*, and the soul more like, each in its turn," but we must at least be willing to accord to the Indian artist our understanding and respect for the serious purpose and the convinced idealism which dominate his art.

The deepening of the appreciation of the beautiful, so far as it has to do with the outward appearance of things, is not, therefore, in any large degree, among the values in Indian art. We shall occasionally find expression given to an appreciation of the beautiful in the work of Indian artists, but such expression will be only by the way free from self-consciousness, and there only because it is needed in mediating and subjective experience which it is the purpose of the painting to express.

Indian art does have a message both to the mind and to the heart. At times it seems a coldly intellectual message, didactic, speculative. But it is seldom without emotional power. The philosophy which an individual holds is doubtless to a large extent determinative to his character. It is therefore relevant, in discussing the character values of Indian art, to understand—since it has set for itself the task of a teacher of the meaning of things—what it conceives to be that meaning. We have already referred to one tenet of the philosophical outlook which dominates Indian art, the conception that Ultimate Reality is Spirit, and to the manner in which art has sought to express this. To this concept we may add the two others, namely, that Reality is One, and that Reality is That concerning which nothing may be posited, as constituting the main theses of the philosophy most widely held, that is, the Vedanta Philosophy. As corollaries of these concepts are the others, that all phenomenal existence is transitory and illusory, including the seeming existence of individual human personalities.

It might prove of interest to try to trace out here the manner in which the Indian artist has sought to make his art express these abstract conceptions. As we do so we shall see why he insists upon using what at first will seem to us to be unfortunate mannerisms and unæsthetic conventions. We shall feel that his backgroundless and perspectiveless paintings, without

modeling of figures, with a minimum use of chiaroscuro, are his way of saying that such is phenomenal existence, a thing without depth, a mere bubble on the surface of Reality. His art is an art of line, a thing of one dimension, again, like phenomenal existence, as he sees it, which has sequence from stage to stage of the cycles of existence, but which is not permanently real. In the light of the same philosophy we may also see why he so often chooses to paint his dark figures against dark backgrounds, his light figures against the light. So painted we feel less the distinction between the (temporary) individual and the (permanent) undifferentiated Whole on the face of which it for the time being is afloat. And the background he gives to us usually in flat color, for to do otherwise would be to attribute change to That which is changeless.

In addition to the above mentioned conventional methods of the Indian artist for conveying his monistic philosophical conception, we occasionally find others used. For instance, the outline of the human figure may be made to merge into the background. Or a theme may be represented somewhat dramatically, as in Nanda Lal Bose's painting of the Last Journey of the Pandavas, in which Yudhishthira, the hero, is shown in three successive stages of the ascent of Mount Kailasha, at each stage the human figure becoming less and less distinct against the impersonal background of the snowy mountain top, until, in the last picture, he is an almost imperceptible speck.

It would seem that perhaps no one theme has appealed more to Indian artists nor has been treated more frequently, than that of the transitoriness of things temporal. Mr. Abanindranath Tagore, leader of the modern art revival in Bengal, gives us his "Teardrop on the Lotus Leaf," to tell us that the ills of life are transitory; Mr. S. N. Gupta, in his "Broken Strings," reminds us that its music, too, will cease, and, in "Finale," that life itself comes quickly to its close. The same subject is treated again by the same artist in "The Lamp Fails." And we might add many other illustrations of the appeal which this theme has had to the Indian artist's mind.

It is no doubt of the greatest value, in the development of character, to be able to see all things "under the aspect of eternity." But there can be no question that a mind too exclusively preoccupied with the transitoriness of earthly existence may very well fail to see, as, indeed, the Hindu philosophy does consistently deny, that it is still the training ground where

may be wrought out eternal values; nor will a mind so preoccupied be likely to feel a keen incentive toward the amelioration of bad social conditions or the compulsion to engage in the contest between good and evil which arises from the conviction that eternal values are at stake.

If we compare, for instance, such a picture as Asit Kumar Haldar's "The Rainy Day," with the treatment given by any Western artist to the incident of Hagar and Ishmael—and the dismay of the mother as she anticipates the death of her child—the contrast in the points of view of an artist brought up under the influence of the Christian tradition and the customary Hindu point of view will be felt immediately. The subjects are similar. In each case the mother is face to face with the suffering of her child. In "The Rainy Day" the incident depicted is a young mother and her babe, shelterless in the open road, in the driving rain. The mother seeks to give her babe such shelter as she can with her scanty clothing, all too ineffectually. There is certainly mother-love in the picture, and patient endurance. Yes, but is there not *too much* of the latter? This mother will accept what life brings for herself and her child with as much as she can summon of stoic fortitude, knowing that all will pass. She will not, as the other, "Cry, clinging Heaven by the hems," until the tragic circumstance gives way, and relief is wrought for herself and her babe.

It is not our purpose in this article to deal with the iconographic type of picture. In passing, we may say that they are, in common with the didactic type of which we have just been speaking, highly symbolic. Whatever may be the value of the truth behind the symbol, two things about symbolism in general, as found in the religio-philosophical art of India, ought perhaps not to be unsaid, in any attempt to assess the character values of that art. In the first place there can be no doubt that in the vast majority of cases the mind fails to penetrate beyond the symbol itself. This adds importance to the second point which we may not avoid noting; namely, the unfortunate nature, in many cases, of that symbolism. It is a hopeful feature of the present revival in Indian art, that along with the renaissance of the old tradition there has come a more elevated treatment of the old themes. The work of Nanda Lal Bose, head of the art department of Rabindranath Tagore's famous School at Santiniketan, is a conspicuous example of this trend, particularly in his treatment of the Saivite mythology. Of his work an Indian art critic has said, "It is idle to pretend that he has come to view (these myths) with the eye of faith, or that he has any kind of a

religious outlook. Yet his secular outlook is invested with deep and sincere sympathy with his subject—genuinely moved by æsthetic and philosophical appeals." While the older artists gave a humanistic Shiva, he has idealized him, making him the symbol of such fundamental truths as the destructive energy in nature, the spirit of meditative contemplation, and the embodiment of peace and good will. Indian art will be the richer when this process of expurgation has been carried further and her artists in general refrain from seeking to express spiritual truth through the medium of an imagery which through the past has been, and still is to-day, in many cases, all too palpably "of the earth, earthy."

We may turn now to another and for our purposes more rewarding aspect of Indian art. We have already pointed out that while Indian art has a message for the head, it has also a message for the heart. We have dealt, in a very inadequate way, certainly, with the more specifically didactic type of picture. We shall try now, as we may within the compass of this article, to point out some of the character values in that group of pictures which express not so much a philosophical outlook, though that, too, will be found in them, but which hold up for our admiration an ideal. We shall be thinking here more particularly of the work of that group of artists whose leader is Mr. Abanindranath Tagore, nephew of the poet Tagore, and whose artistic activities have centered in Calcutta and Santiniketan. Bombay, likewise, has its artistic revival, but the work of the Bombay School does not so clearly reflect the distinctively Indian outlook, and while more technically perfect, in the Western sense, is lacking in the poetry of the Eastern group.

In the group of pictures of which we shall now think we are at last within the realm of Indian æsthetics. Beauty, as the Indian artist thinks of it, is beauty of spirit, expressed though it may be through that which is outwardly crude, or even, at times, repulsive. What is this beauty which has appealed to the Indian artistic mind? He finds his illustrations of it usually in the old myths and legends, especially in the great epic literature of Hindustan. To the Hindu mind the ideal human life has a twofold significance, which may be expressed under the terms "Pursuit" and "Return." For those who are on the lower path, the "path of pursuit," there is an ideal form of *activity*, determined by the social group or "caste" to which he belongs. This is the "Swa-Dharma," or "Own-Duty" of each group, and is not the same for all. But over and above these special ideals

of the lower plane of "Pursuit," is the one shining supreme ideal realized through the "Path of Return," not through the exercise of, but through the surrender of the will. This, to the Hindu mind, supremest of all ideals, is the realization of the identity of the human spirit with the Divine. It is not always possible to separate the treatment of these two phases of the ideal, as the Ideal *par excellence* may hover about the treatment of any subject, even in the very technique of its presentation. For purposes of study, however, we may cite a few illustrations of the Indian artist's treatment of these two methods of conceiving the ideal in human life.

Loyalty, to the Indian artist's mind, judged from the frequency with which he has treated it, is one of the most beautiful responses of the human soul, as it follows the path of "Pursuit." It may obviously take a variety of forms. One most frequently treated is that of wifely loyalty. N. L. Bose has given most appealing expression to this ideal in his picture "Sati," a term given to the self-immolation of the wife on the funeral pyre of her husband. Though the practice has long been prohibited by law in India, the ideal for which it stood had elements of undoubted worth which A. K. Coomarswamy has indicated in pointing out: "What remains perpetually clear is the superiority of the reckless sacrifice to the calculating assertion of rights. We do not object to dying for an idea as 'suttees' and patriots have died, but we see that there may be other and greater ideas we can better serve by living for them."

Sita, the heroine of the Ramayana, is the outstanding example of the loyal wife, both in literature and in art. No artist, perhaps, has given a more adequate rendering of her devotion to Rama than has Asit Kumar Haldar in his study of "Sita in the Asoka Grove."

The counterpart of this theme, namely, the loyalty of husband to wife, has not received corresponding attention. A few examples, however, might be cited. There is, for instance, Abanindranath Tagore's "Passing of Shah Jehan." Nanda Lal Bose's "Yudhisthira's Ascent of Mount Kailasha," to which reference has been made in another connection, might be mentioned here, although the hero's loyalty to his wife, Draupadi, is only an appendage, so to speak, of the main theme. The picture is, however, a good illustration of a worthy rendering of another aspect of loyalty—Yudhisthira refusing to enter Indra's heaven if to do so he must fail to requite the faithfulness of the dog which had shared the hardships of his perilous ascent.

To each one is his own social responsibility and code of morality according to the status conferred upon him by his birth into some specific "caste," is India's social code. To the warrior caste is the warrior's duty. But it is not so much to illuminate this ideal as to give expression to the necessity of *concentration* upon any task if it is to be done in the highest possible way, that Nanda Lal Bose, again, has given us "The Trial of the Princess." Arjun, greatest of warriors, proves his right to this distinction and reveals the secret of his skill, in his power to put outside his range of vision every object save the target at which he is directed to aim his arrow. In this is illustrated another frequent theme of the Indian artist's brush.

Again, this quality of the "single eye" is illustrated in Bose's three sketches of "Savari's Expectancy." In this case the quality appears as the spirit ever on the watch for the promised coming of Rama. In the first sketch Savari as a young girl in the forest hermit retreat is engaged in preparing flowers as an offering to Rama when he shall arrive. The second study shows her in middle age, an offering still ready. In the third sketch she is an old woman, but, with her crooked stick, still intent on gathering wild fruit from a tree, still occupied with the one thought of having a fitting reception ready for the expected one, whenever he may come. The whole recalls Sorley's lines:

"With parted lips and outstretched hands
And listening ears thy servant stands;
Call thou early, call thou late,
To thy great service dedicate."

A *reverent attitude of heart toward all living things* is another theme frequently treated by the Indian artist. "Ramchandra and the Squirrel," by Srikanu Desai, is a charming treatment in which the hero of the Ramayana, of the warrior caste as he was, is shown as likewise the true gentleman, in the original meaning of the word.

It is of interest to note certain new themes, or perhaps new emphases, in Indian art. The novelty appears sometimes in an idealization of old figures, sometimes through the treatment of incidents from the old literature which have hitherto held but casual and passing interest but are possible media for the expression of some value now in India's day of an awakening social conscience seen to be important. Such newly sensed values lie mostly in the realm of social relationships. Halдар's "Rama and

Guha" may illustrate the type. It depicts Rama on his way to the south to fulfill his years of exile. He encounters on the way a Chandal, one of the most despised of India's castes, who comes forward to assist Rama and his party across the river. Rama's gratitude and friendliness are shown in the picture, the effect emphasized by the aloofness of his brother Lakshan, who apparently does not like Rama's lack of discrimination.

Like this in having a social message is "The Story of Kunala," by the same artist. Kunala, the favorite son of Asoka, falls a victim to the jealousy of a stepmother and is first blinded and then turned out of the palace to become a beggar. His sight is restored by a "holy man" who, having preached a sermon which moved his congregation to tears, collected the tears in a vessel and with them washed the eyes of the blind man, whose sight was thereby restored. Do we not find here the message that by true sympathy and common interest ills may be removed?

Debi Proshad Roy Choudhury's "In Rain and Storm" illustrates another social value which modern artists are finding worthy of treatment—the dignity of manual labor. Social reform movements likewise find themselves supported by the artist's brush in such studies as "The Widow."

Again there are pictures intended to stir up the spirit of patriotism, of which Halдар's "His Heritage" and M. A. Rahman Chughtai's two sketches, "Too Late" and "The Leader," are good examples. The latter has given us another interesting study which he calls "Life Eternal," a lighted lamp drawing on to their deaths a cloud of small insects, the light itself burning through the giving of its own life—symbol of the secret of lasting influence, gained through the sacrifice of life.

We have pointed out that over and above the various ideals which are held to be suitable for the various social stages and relationships, the dominant, that is, the Vedantist, philosophy holds one supreme ideal; namely, the absorption of the human soul in the Infinite. The Buddha is the historical figure in which this ideal has received its most striking artistic treatment. In his illustrations for Nivedita and Coomarswamy's "Myths of the Hindus and Buddhists," Abanindranath Tagore has given us a striking series of studies of this theme. A. K. Halдар's "Dhruva," in the same book, is of the same class. The three ways of "Release," that is, of attaining to conscious identification with that essence of which nothing may be known, in which all self-consciousness is at an end, namely, the way of works, the way of knowledge, and the way of devotion, have again and

again been the theme of the artist's brush, as of the Sage's dissertation. Of the value of such studies we may feel what a recent writer has said as to the debt which the world owes to some of India's ancient Sages; that it "is that with persistence and courage they followed their path to its very end and made the discovery on our behalf that it leads nowhither."

With one further reference we will close this brief analysis of the values for character development which may be found in Indian, and more particularly contemporary Indian, art. In his picture, "The Forgiveness of Chaitanya," Khittindranath Mazumdar presents to us not a cold philosophical conception, but a warmly human and, yes, more than human, appealing note. The youthful Chaitanya stands in quiet command of himself before two intoxicated assailants, one of whom has just struck him with a broken earthen vessel. In the expression of his countenance there is no anger. With one hand he covers on his forehead the wound made by the broken jar. With gentleness he asks the man who has just attacked him, "Can I deny thee love because thou hast hit me?" Vanquished by forgiveness, the tipsy assailant is taken aback and recoils at his own misdeed.

These pictures, which treat the ideal in human life, on the plane of social relationships, are not large in number. That they are taking a place of increasing attention is an encouraging fact, and all the more significant in that it is, as has been pointed out, inconsistent with Hindu philosophy to be concerned with the affairs of a Social Order "Sangsar" which is as unreal an entity as is the ripple stirred by a passing breeze on the surface of the sea. That this shifting of attention is not one of which the artists are themselves unaware is indicated by Mr. Gangoly in Volume One of *Modern Indian Artists*, when he suggests that "Through art, perhaps, the East will work out with the West a new spiritual rapprochement." That through the quickening touch of the spirit of Jesus the Indian artist has found in his own racial heritage things of newly realized beauty and worth, we cannot doubt. The more complete rapprochement between East and West, in art as in every realm of life and thought, may be confidently hoped for as the historic Figure of Nazareth and Calvary in whom mankind has been allowed to gaze into the Infinite and to find that, indeed, "a heart beats there," has become, for East and West, the Focus of vision, the Interpreter of the meaning of the enigma of life, and the Way to the life which is eternal.

Germany Revisited

FRANK GAVIN

SOME years ago—in the time of my far-off adoration of German Doctorates—I asked one of my teachers, who had amassed one, how it was done. He told me various things. Among them was the rather ingenious way by which the selection of his dissertation-subject was arrived at. He said: “My professor thought a minute, then commented on the problem set by the topic: ‘There are five possible explanations of the fact. Four have already been taken. You take the fifth.’” An illusion disintegrated at that very moment, so far as the eager young university student—that was I—was concerned. Even then I wondered, what of all this scholarship? Are these Germans bent on supporting a thesis—or primarily devoting themselves to finding the truth?

This all came to mind when I read in a German newspaper an article “The Student’s Outlook on the World.” I recognized much the same spirit as had appeared in earlier modern Germany—for academic Germany was formerly as devotedly subservient to the then State as the rank and file of present-day Germany is urged to be by, for example, Alfred Rosenberg. Yet the writer of this article could rightly say, nevertheless:

“The National-Socialist student has an utterly different relationship both to science and culture from that of the past generation. For us there is no such thing as ‘a science without presuppositions, rather than a science with presupposition.’ Science as such is not a thing in itself, has of itself no sole proper aim to fulfill, nor lives in its own sphere, but is bound up with and conditioned by both blood and race. The revelation of the Nordic and Germanic spirit has been manifested in the great discoverers and scholars of the world. Science has as its true task, that of serving its own people, and thereafter fulfills its obligation to the whole of humanity. Science is not released to pursue its independent aims but is subordinate to the corporate verdict of National Socialism. Quite rightly its true place can be found only in its relationship with politics, and with reference to our own view of the universe. We NAZI students have a point of view from which we adjudge things, for we are first National Socialists and then afterwards scholars. We have come to our university studies from politics; yet many

professors to-day are attempting to interpret our times and answer its questions from the side of scholarship! But we of the younger generation have achieved our political consciousness in this time of struggle over political power. We have come to our university work to learn still more, and *to buttress and evaluate our already achieved point of view through study.*"

All through the Germanic temperament and history there has been this note of realism. As in former days the newly-fledged Ph.D. had to declare his loyalty to the State, so to-day the allegedly free and independent domain of scholarship is expected to support and promote a thesis. As I grew older I began to wonder about those acres of Ph.D. dissertations. Many of them did not matter at all—but, if the matter of free investigation of facts without presuppositions were truly followed, where would be the whole modern academic world? Yet is it not perennially valid that a man must have a motive for his studies, over and beyond his passion solely for the truth? I thought of the innumerable *livres de circonstance*, and then wondered if the German method were so wide of the mark after all. For the drive of action is desire, and desire is animated by an aim which the feelings dictate to the reason. To establish a habit of enlisting all one's capacities in the service of an immediate aim may be a useful preparation for their being enrolled in the future for some still bigger aim.

I

The most exciting spot on earth to-day is Germany. It is in one sense the frontier of Europe where big battles are being waged. In another sense it is a laboratory in which research experiments are being carried out. As I went about and talked and listened to all and sundry, several things which I had formerly associated with German life and thought were obviously missing. The Liberalism—political, economic and personal—of earlier years is gone. In some curious fashion it has been suppressed or uprooted or made inarticulate. The label of yesterday's respectability has to-day become a reproach. The temper it represented in days gone by may still be alive but it is, to put it mildly, not very vociferous just now. Again, Germany used to be the happy hunting ground of royalty and nobility. To take the place of the instinct for reverencing and venerating certain human beings has come a kind of new Democracy—not a Democracy of a liberal pattern at all but nevertheless a real Democracy. Again, the German temperament seems to have undergone a subtle change: the foreign

visitor always had some experience of a certain touch of arrogance, sometimes even of truculence. One sees few signs of objectionable people, of offensive conduct. I should say that friendliness, genuine and unforced, is more markedly in evidence to-day than ever before, and I saw no sign whatever of a single instance of the kind of truculence in bearing or attitude which was certainly not uncommon some years ago.

It is fatally easy to generalize on the basis of a very brief experience, but as it is a very common trait, I shall continue to allow myself its indulgence. I have heard much, for example, of the grave losses in the intellectual world by the resignations—enforced or voluntary—of distinguished scholars. I cannot say how far this is really true, but am disposed to feel that there have been grave, if not irreparable, losses to the stimulation of Germany's intellectual life. "Academic freedom," like "Ecclesiastical freedom," involves responsibilities. Both are justified by their fruits. I think a case might conceivably be made for the diversion of energy to a common goal, even in things academic, which might be deemed a suppression of this freedom. At all events, my own conviction is that there is a grave danger in any suppression of academic freedom. I talked with several professors who had lost their positions, and could not fathom in some instances whether the action was solely political, or whether inability to accept the new conditions laid down by the government made it impossible for them conscientiously to remain in their chairs. However, any discussion of the university problem can logically and legitimately be had only on the basis of its relationship to the larger principles on which the new order is being built.

II

The Revolution is over and the process of Evolution is on its way. So the Nazis are fond of describing the present state of affairs. There is no doubt at all that there has been a revolution. The passion for regimentation which has long been characteristic of German thought and life thrives on the regimented discipline of the Nazi ideal in practice. Years ago I was utterly bewildered by living among a people who apparently love to obey. Bismarck saw that and in his well-known statement cynically over-stressed it. Without this permanent quality in German mentality and emotions there could have been no Nazi revolution. The relish with which I was told repeatedly, "Now we have plenty of order and law," the fervor with

which people apparently enjoy being dragooned, and the mass movement as well of men's bodies as minds are beyond the imagination of a mere Anglo-Saxon to conceive. In the reorganization of life that Hitlerism has brought about the people are no less honest, clean and scrupulous than before. These qualities have maintained their immemorial position. But within the framework of the old habituations of behavior there has come an entirely new spirit. I can think of no better word to describe it than youthful enthusiasm. It is not a matter of age, of course, but of outlook. It constantly impressed itself upon me as I saw it among middle-aged folk, both men and women, and even among elderly people. I remember a rosy-cheeked, cheerful woman of well over seventy who had got to the Ehrenbreitstein celebration eight hours before it happened and had stood all of that time and through it all and thought herself well repaid. They have renewed their hope and their faith, and so have rejuvenated their youth. There is no question about it—Germany is vividly alive. Some of the obvious signs of it are in the Hitler salute, impressive in the not infrequent casualness of its observance, in the constant singing—for all groups seem to sing on any and all occasions—and in the zest with which the daily routine of life seems to be carried on. It is not feverish or hectic at all, but it is certainly far more vitally alert than I remember having observed on other visits.

Some of the obvious fruits of the new life and hope that have been injected into ordinary relations in Germany can be seen in the absence—very markedly apparent—of pornographic literature, pictures and the like, in the new dignity of manual labor, and in the vigor and enthusiasm of the youth. A word may be said in regard to each of these. I had gained the impression on previous visits to Germany that unwholesome literature was more widely displayed in Germany than anywhere else. I was told that when the order went out such literature disappeared in forty-eight hours from bookshelves and newsstands as well as from the screen and the stage. One of my hosts, a bishop, saw that I got into touch with all of the aspects of the life of his town of six thousand. What intrigued me most there was the Labor Battalion, housed in huge barracks not far from where he lived. I have a shrewd suspicion that not all cases of enlistment in it were as voluntary as the professed principle would have us believe, but the town had no longer any unemployed—loafers and tramps had entirely vanished. Back of the *Rathaus*, around the public houses, along the river banks, and

in the railroad station he told me there had hitherto been a huge adornment of such people. Instead of that to-day was a large group of men in handsome uniforms, obviously well drilled, very fit physically, showing every evidence by their quietness and friendliness of recovered self-respect. The new government has apparently made the shovel as dignified a symbol as was the sword a generation ago. The policing-up of roads, reforestation, public and private works of varying degrees of importance, and music for the public welfare are all undertaken by this labor battalion. They give two or more concerts daily and the men who have any capacities in music do their share by practicing their several instruments.

The Hitler *Jugend* is one of the most interesting experiments in education in young people's work I have ever seen. I traveled a good many hours with a group of two hundred and fifty youngsters who were being returned home after several weeks' visit to an entirely different part of Germany. They were accompanied by their schoolmasters, nurse and leaders. When they arrived at the suburban station of the big town where they got off, a brass band met them and they marched off in great good cheer. They had had a holiday at the government's expense, and the holiday was definitely educational with a great deal of outdoor exercise and enough food and sleep. The primary purpose, however, was to instill a passionate love for Germany, based upon an intimate knowledge of their country's heritage—in the arts, business, and natural beauty. As one of the three or four dominant conceptions which lie behind the Nazi régime there is that of the State as the primary organ of education outside the home.

Naturally enough, this large-scale scheme demands leaders in great numbers and not infrequently adequate leadership for individual groups is not forthcoming. I heard sinister stories of instances of bad leadership, and in one case saw how such a situation was dealt with. My friend, the bishop, on the day of my arrival was fuming over two articles of a series written by a rather unimportant group-leader in the journal of the Youth Movement. He was already engaged in writing a heated letter to Hitler in protest against the aspersions on religion ventilated in these articles. We talked too late that night for him to finish the letter, but in the morning paper the next day a brief paragraph said that this man had been dismissed and disciplined severely. I have reason to suppose that where the non-German press might feature excerpts from these articles—as instances of the evil

ways of Hitlerism—it might conveniently fail to print any notice of the prompt action of the government.

III

What of religion in Germany? While it is perfectly true that history does not repeat itself, it has seemed to me that twentieth-century Germany religiously and ecclesiastically is living through again a good many of the experiences of the Germany of the sixteenth. The ready sympathy with which, on the whole, western Europe has greeted the courageous action of the Notbund and the vigor of the Barmen Synode pronouncements and policies is equalled only by the interest aroused by Cardinal Faulhaber's new book. I cannot pretend to interpret all the facts in regard to the religious situation to-day, but certain things seem to me worth considering, for they are so largely overlooked. First, the clash between the Reichskirche under Bishop Müller and the dissidents, as well as the inner frictions within German Roman Catholicism, have largely a theological basis, where this basis is not philosophical and metaphysical. If Karl Barth has revived a Calvinistic metaphysic and theology, there are sure signs in other quarters of a revival of Lutheranism. To a great extent the supporters of the Barmen Synode are of the Reformed wing, whereas those of the Reichskirche, while *Evangelisch*, are far more Lutheran than Reformed. The instinct animating hostility to the church program of the government is largely under the impetus of Reformed ideas: any dominance of the Church by the State is violently inconsistent with a theology in which the ideal of social organization is theocratic. Historic Lutheranism, on the other hand, regards the church as essentially invisible and attaches no necessary divine sanction to the forms, institutions and organized life of the visible church. From the time of Friedrich Wilhelm III, who constructed the *Evangelische Kirche*, with its quasi-reformed theology and the Lutheran liturgy, the constitutional and organizational side of this church has been largely molded and controlled by the State. Genuine autonomy and independence from the State was really never passionately desired by the true Lutherans. Within it those of the more Reformed wing were always restive under this relationship.

It is often overlooked that the unique relationship to the State of the *Reichskirche* provides that its pastors, as they have an official relationship to the government, are also subsidized by the State and the financing of

the church is to a great measure taken over by the government. Given this unique relationship to the State on the part of the *Reichskirche*, it is not entirely unreasonable that the State should demand of its ministers a personal oath of loyalty to the head of the State. The vigor with which the Barmen group and others have opposed taking the oath is due not only to the terms of the oath itself but also to that which it symbolizes. With reference to the former, with the abrogation of many of the century-long constitutional principles by which the *Reichskirche* has operated, it is to be feared that the oath ties the pastor to a commitment so broad and far-reaching that its dimensions cannot be now defined. With reference to the latter, the oath serves as a symbol for what is allegedly a predacious and aggressive attitude to the Church on the part of the State: if this piece of policy succeeds there is no telling what further control and direction of religion may be exercised in the future by the State.

The oath tendered to the pastors of the *Reichskirche* is without parallel in the other churches, whether Catholic or Protestant. Old Catholics and Roman Catholics have no such oath, nor have the Free Churchmen. It comes down to this: If you want to be a pastor of the *Reichskirche* one of the conditions is the oath. If you do not want to take the oath you may not be a pastor of the *Reichskirche*.

Besides the two chief Protestant trends—Lutheran and Reformed—there are some fringe phenomena such as the "German Christians" and the adherents of the *Glaubensbewegung*. Both these movements are articulate if not vociferous. It is hard to estimate how much or how little they really signify. The Aryan Paragraph may be a necessary concession to the propaganda for a pure Nordic culture agitated by these groups. If the principle of nationalism in religion is anywhere valid then it is not too preposterous that it might be held to apply with peculiar relevance to the reconstruction now going on in Germany. In principle, however, both the Aryan Paragraph and the use of force are inconsistent with basic Christianity. They are only justifiable in practice in view of emergency needs and historical exigencies. From the standpoint of history both nationalism and the use of force have been upheld by stalwart and conspicuous Christian leaders. The criterion of any established church has always been the addition of coercive authority to its moral authority. Even Saint Augustine approved of coercion in certain instances. National churches have usually preserved and maintained a national clergy, thus securing in the realm of things ecclesi-

astical the homogeneity and purity of the race, so essential to the State. As a matter of fact, recent evidence would seem to indicate that the policy of the use of force has been abandoned, and mitigations of the rigidity of the application of the Aryan Paragraph are also discernible.

One of the classic ideals of the relationship of Church and State, formulated in the East by Justinian and in the West by Charles the Great, is the ancestor of the modern Totalitarian State. Such an organization along Catholic lines was characteristic of the Middle Ages. The same parallel phenomenon on Protestant lines is roughly represented by Nazi Germany—as it is on Catholic lines by Fascist Italy. Both claim to be basically Christian. Personal leadership and autocratic control in these modern days lack but the sanction of the divine right of kings. When all religious sanction has been removed the same type of totalitarianism of the secular sort is demonstrated by Communism.

IV

For the sake of the future relationships between peoples it is highly essential to seek to understand the phenomena of Nazi Germany. It is the more necessary because the present German situation oftentimes violates our most cherished vested emotions, and challenges the amorphous liberalism and democracy of our American tradition. Independent understanding of the situation there cannot be had until our emotional verdicts and prejudices are reckoned with. Broadly speaking, we take alarm no less at the thought of Communist Russia than of Nazi Germany. I do not think this a testimony to our strength but rather evidence of our weakness. No assessment of the German situation can be made without sympathy for it, for sympathy is necessary to understanding. The vitality and vigor, the renewed hope and faith, the adventurous courage it shows, and the adherence to its ideals of many distinguished people—such as Krieck in the domain of political theory, and Heim among the theologians—demand a fair and honest consideration of the Nazi scheme and its functioning in practice. These three vital movements in the twentieth century—Fascist Italy, Communist Russia, and Nazi Germany—may well serve as challenges to the careless and easy-going tradition of democracy and liberalism of which we are a part.

Oliver Cromwell

ISAAC FOOT

WHATEVER may be the ultimate conclusions of the English-speaking people on Oliver Cromwell one thing is certain—his name will never disappear into oblivion. No generation will pass without some new effort to interpret his character and to reassess his contribution to the history of Britain and the world. In these days his name is more than ever "familiar in our mouths as household words" and his figure looms larger amidst the affairs of a disturbed and bewildered world. Dictatorships arising day after day have recalled to men's minds the great dictator of English history, and we are told that just as Napoleon read the record of Oliver with diligent interest, so Mussolini, Hitler and their like are turning to the study of the great Protector for their inspiration, and perhaps their warning.

Recent literature has also quickened interest in the study of the first part of the seventeenth century. We have had new books on Strafford, Hampden and Charles the First, and recently Mr. John Buchan has given us his presentation of Cromwell in a biography that does high honor to himself and to his theme.

The character of Cromwell is probably the most familiar battleground in English literature and history. Around his name, more than any other, have gathered the rival forces of eulogy and detraction, and the plain man might well be bewildered when he reads the contributions of famous historians, who, after studying presumably the same materials, come most confidently to sharply conflicting conclusions.

The difficulty arises mainly from the fact that Cromwell was the symbol of a movement and the outstanding representative of certain forces. The hatred aroused by that movement and the opposition provoked by those forces were gathered up in the attack upon the man. He personified the struggle. To strike at the man was so much easier than to resist intangible forces and to fight indefinable tendencies. When the Restoration Parliament ordered the disinterment of Oliver's corpse and his head was exposed on the roof of Westminster Hall to the derision of the city crowd, the hatred was not so much against Oliver himself as against all that he had

stood for, and all the ideals that had grown up around him during his eighteen years of public conflict.

In the last years of his supremacy Cromwell had become the dominating man not only of his country but of the world. His friendship was sought, and his wrath was feared, by kings and princes, and even his personal enemies could not withhold reluctant tribute to his dignity and power.

When in 1659 John Dryden wrote his poem on the death of the Protector, his glowing tribute was undoubtedly representative of the main part of the national opinion:

"His grandure he derived from heaven alone;
For he was great ere fortune made him so:
And wars, like mists that rise against the sun,
Made him but greater seem, not greater grow. . . .

"Swift and resistless thro' the land he passed,
Like the bold Greek who did the East subdue,
And made to battles such heroic haste,
As if on wings of victory he flew. . . .

"His ashes in a peaceful urn shall rest;
His name a great example stands to show
How strangely high endeavors may be blest
Where piety and valor jointly go."

There is no greater tribute to Oliver's power than the manner in which his son succeeded to his place. The Protector's nomination was accepted by the nation with remarkable quietness. The dissensions came later, and with the dissensions came the reaction and the Restoration. The backwash of Restoration excitement seemed to sweep everything away, and down with the rest went the reputation of Oliver. None was so poor to do reverence to the man who but yesterday stood against the world. It was in the time of this reaction that many writers, feeding the appetite of their generation, gave to the world their opinion of the man who had so recently governed England. Scurrilities, lampoons, slanders—anything was welcome that derided the brewer's son, this upstart and tyrant, this psalm-singing hypocrite and regicide. For the time there was none who could check this flood of obloquy. There seemed to be no friends of Cromwell left. Some had died before him. Some had been executed, some were in exile, some in prison, and others, scattered, suspected, dispirited, could only wait until the storm had passed. Milton was there. What he thought about it all we

shall never know. He had himself escaped almost as a brand plucked from the burning. Belial was in the ascendant. Milton had London rather than Pandemonium in mind when he wrote:

"In courts and palaces he also reigns,
And in luxurious cities, where the noise
Of riot ascends above their loftiest towers
And injury and outrage; and, when night
Darkens the streets, then wander forth the sons
Of Belial flown with insolence and wine."

The orgies, however, soon came to an end. Gradually the British people came to the conclusion that the Stuart Kings had to go if the nation was not to go under. With the recovery of national sanity came the rehabilitation of Cromwell. It was a slow business—here a little, and there a little. The writing of history began to take a new form. The study of the records took the place of dogmatic statement, and as gossip and tradition gave way to research and credible evidence, Oliver came more and more into his own.

Then, in the middle of the last century, Thomas Carlyle did an incalculable service in making available such of the speeches and letters of Cromwell as had survived the chances and losses of two centuries. His book had a success beyond all his expectations. It was felt that here at last was the authentic word. As Sir Charles Firth says:

"A collection of all the recorded utterances of a great man has qualities which the most skillful biography, with its abstracts and extracts of those utterances, never can possess. Nothing intervenes between the reader and the records—as he reads, by degrees the facts group themselves together, the breath of life breathes upon the dry bones, and the figure of the man takes shape and rises before him.

"Tennyson has described the feeling which the reading of the letters of his dead friend produced upon himself:

"So word by word, and line by line,
The dead man touched me from the past,
And all at once it seemed at last
The living soul was flashed on mine.'"

This is the process which takes place if we study the *Letters and Speeches* closely enough, and the effect which that study produces. Carlyle's book was welcomed by scholars, but it meant much more to the unlearned. Carlyle sent a copy to his old mother away in Annandale. She read the letters and speeches with delight, but skipped her son's comments and elucidations—they were needless to her.

Since Carlyle's days other letters and speeches have been found and it is safe to say that Oliver's reputation has now been impregably established. The mists of calumny have been dispersed by his own spoken and written word, rather than by the effort of historians who have striven in his vindication.

Second only in importance to Carlyle's book was the publication of the *Clarke Papers* by Sir Charles Firth, our greatest living authority on Stuart history. These documents were of the highest value because of the light they shed on the most difficult part of Cromwell's career, namely, the period between the end of the first civil war in June, 1646, and the death of the King in January, 1649. These two and a half years were a time of confusion and uncertainty. It was the period of manœuvres and controversy, when the King and the Parliament, and the Army, and the Scots, and the Royalists, and the Levellers, were all involved in design and counter-design and in plot and counter-plot. Those who accuse Cromwell of hypocrisy and self-seeking and of cunning and betrayal turn for their justification most readily to that confused period. The *Clarke Papers* proved to be a remarkable vindication of Cromwell's character. They revealed the part he played in the midst of the controversies that shook the Army from top to bottom. They showed him not as the knave, urging his evil designs upon others, but as the patient man, conservative, hesitating, dissuading the violent, reluctant to take extreme courses, and striving always to keep faith and to restore order and authority.

The third factor in the re-establishment of Cromwell's position is the work of Samuel Rawson Gardiner in his monumental *History*. His life was deliberately devoted to the study of the Stuart period. He gave forty years of concentrated effort to the writing of the sixteen volumes covering the first half of the seventeenth century, and only his death prevented him from completing the last two volumes which would have carried his survey up to Cromwell's death. His effort stands out as one of the greatest achievements in the history of English letters. Nothing was allowed to divert him from his purpose, and in his devotion to his self-imposed duty he declined the regius professorship of modern history. He sacrificed his money and his leisure to the demands of unending research, and when he died in 1902 he was able to bequeath a splendid possession to the British people. His *History* worthily completed by Sir Charles Firth covers the whole period of Cromwell's life, and Dr. G. I. Gooch says:

"No Englishman of his time or of any time did more to raise the standard of responsibility in historical work, and he has left us the most exact and impartial account of any period in the history of our race."

The man then who wishes to learn about Cromwell has at his disposal in the *Letters and Speeches*, the *Clarke Papers* and *Gardiner's History* materials such as are not available for any other great man up to the nineteenth century.

That Cromwell was a great man is now beyond controversy. His achievements as a soldier, apart from all else, will assure him a high place amongst famous men. What was his greatness outside the field of war? The real tribute came from those who were his enemies. Sir Philip Warwick speaks almost reluctantly of "his great and majestic deportment and comely presence." John Buchan fittingly closes his book with Abraham Cowley's tribute to the name of Cromwell, a name "not to be extinguished but with the whole world, which, as it is now too little for his praise, so might have been too little for his conquests, if the short time of his human life could have been stretched out to the extent of his immortal designs." Clarendon knew him well in the early days of the Long Parliament and from his exile he must have watched with amazement and indignation his rise to power, but although Oliver was the symbol of all that Hyde hated, he is moved to admiration, and in writing of Cromwell makes constant recognition of his greatness.

"In this manner, and with so little pains, this extraordinary man, without any other reason than because he had a mind to it, mounted himself into the throne of three Kingdoms, without the name of King, but with a greater power and authority than ever had been exercised or claimed by any King; and received greater evidence and manifestation of respect and esteem from all the Kings and Princes of Christendom, than had ever been showed to any Monarch of those nations. . . . Yet wickedness as great as his could never have accomplished those designs without the assistance of a great spirit, and admirable circumspection and sagacity, and a most magnanimous resolution."

Clarendon was impressed too with the thought that Cromwell became a greater man as greatness was more and more thrust upon him.

"Yet as he grew into place and authority, his parts seemed to be raised, as if he had concealed faculties, till he had occasion to use them."

In this respect, as in so many others, Cromwell was like Lincoln, of

whom Motley says: "His mental abilities were large, and they became more robust as the more weight was imposed on them." The impression Cromwell left on the minds of his contemporaries was that of magnanimity. Andrew Marvell, writing on his death, spoke of his majesty and strength and saw him even in his decayed shape as greater than death itself.

Dryden, on the like occasion, dwells on the same theme:

"'Tis true his count'nance did imprint an awe
And nat'rally all souls to his did bow."

Harrington, in thinking of a parallel to Cromwell, looked to Moses and Lycurgus.

When Milton writes of Cromwell "our chief of men" he soars into the empyrean:

"In a short time he almost surpassed the greatest generals in the magnitude and rapidity of his achievements. . . . The whole surface of the British Empire has been the scene of his exploits, and the theater of his achievements. . . .

"For while you, O Cromwell, are left among us, he hardly shows a proper confidence in the Supreme, who distrust the security of England; when he sees that you are in so special a manner the favored object of the divine regard."

It is one of the tragedies of history that we know nothing of the association of Milton and Cromwell. James Russell Lowell, in writing of Cromwell, says:

"Nor shall the grateful Muse forget to tell,
That—not the least among his many claims
To deathless honor—he was Milton's friend."

Milton's friend he must have been, but what the friendship meant we shall never know. What did Cromwell make of his friend's tributes? What was his reaction to these praises? Not the least evidence of his magnanimity is the fact that he remained throughout a man of humble mind, and there is never a suggestion of megalomania. When he was given a triumphal entry into London in September, 1691, Whitelock tells us that "he carried himself with great affability, and in his discourses about Worcester, would seldom mention anything of himself, but mentioned others only, and gave, as was due, the glory of the action to God."

It was about that time that he writes to Colton:

"Indeed, my dear friend, between you and me, you know not me;—my weakness, my inordinate passions, my unskillfulness, and every way unfitness to my work."

When, after the Irish campaign, he passed through the crowded streets of the city and his attendant commented on the multitude, Cromwell, it is said, made his grim jest (more prophetic than he knew): "Yes, but there would be a far larger crowd to see me hanged!"

His rule was dependent upon the power of the army but no man ever hated arbitrary power more than he.

"Arbitrary power," he wrote, in his Declaration in Ireland, "is a thing men begin to be weary of, in Kings and Churchmen; their juggle between them mutually to uphold Civil and Ecclesiastical tyranny begins to be transparent. Some have cast off both; and hope, by the grace of God, to keep so. . . . This principle, that People are for Kings and Church, and Saints are for the Pope and Churchmen, as you call them, begins to be exploded."

Relying, as he had been forced to do, upon armed power, he strove unceasingly to rest his authority on a civil basis. He tells his first Parliament of the boundless authority he had as General of all the Forces in the three Nations "in which unlimited condition, I did not desire to live a day."

A man of war, no one was ever a greater lover of peace. The danger of another Civil War was constantly pressing upon his mind.

"If you run into another flood of blood and war, the sinews of this Nation, being wasted by the last, it must sink and perish utterly."

Another war would, he said, turn the nation into an Aceldama, a field of blood.

"It is the greatest miracle that ever befell the sons of men that we are got again to peace. And whoever shall seek to break it, God Almighty root that man out of this Nation. . . . For the wrath and justice of God will prosecute such a man to his grave, if not to Hell."

Circumstances had forced him to be dependent upon his army, and yet no man more fully recognized the futility of force.

"Things obtained by force, though never so good in themselves, will be less to our honour and less likely to last. What we gain in a free way, it is better than twice as much in a forced, and will be more truly ours and posterity's. . . ."

"In the government of nations, that which is to be looked after is the affections of the people."

When, after Preston, he was rebuked by his friends for his failure to use the strong hand in Scotland, he made his magnanimous reply:

"Was it not fit to be civil, to profess love, to deal with clearness with them for the removing of prejudices; to ask them what they had against us and to give them an honest answer? This we have done and no more; and herein is a more glorious work in our eyes than if we had gotten the sacking and plunder of Edinburgh, the strong castle, into our hands, and made a conquest from the Tweed to the Orcades."

A man of intense conviction he was yet a champion of toleration. "Notions," he said to Parliament, "will hurt none but those who have them. Liberty of conscience is a natural right; and he that would have it, ought to give it." In a generation when intolerance was generally regarded as a virtue, he dared to write words like these:

"Truly the judgment of truth will teach you to be just towards an unbeliever as towards a believer; and it is our duty to do so. I confess I have said sometimes I would rather miscarry to a believer than to an unbeliever. This may seem a paradox; but let's take heed of doing that which is evil to either."

When a member of the Committee for the Propagation of the Gospel declared that he had rather be a persecuting Saul than an indifferent Gallio, Cromwell replied, "I had rather that Mahometanism were permitted amongst us than that one of God's children should be persecuted."

He was insistent on his rights when the dignity of his high position demanded it or when he was asserting the claims of the nation, but in his private relations he was utterly simple. He writes to his son, Henry, in Ireland:

"Take heed of studying to lay up for yourself the foundation of a great estate. It will be a snare unto you. . . . I pray you think of me in this."

He is disturbed to hear that his son, Richard, is inclined to worldliness and writes to his father-in-law:

"But if pleasure and self-satisfaction be made the business of a man's life . . . I scruple to feed his humor; and God forbid that his being my son should be his allowance to live not pleasing to our Heavenly Father, who hath raised me out of the dust to be what I am."

Above and before everything else Oliver was a religious man. The accusation of hypocrisy could never be sustained since his letters became known. These are not, for the most part, public documents. Many were never intended for the public eye. Written to his wife, his children, his intimate friends, his colleagues in public affairs, and his comrades in war, they reveal the man himself. Here we find him deeply concerned about the

spiritual welfare of his children, mistrustful of himself, wistful, tender and compassionate. When he was on his death-bed he was heard praying and someone in attendance wrote down his prayer:

"Lord, though I am a miserable and wretched creature, I am in covenant with thee through grace. And I may, I will, come to thee for thy people. Thou hast made me, though very unworthy, a mean instrument to do them good, and thy service; and many of them have set too high a value upon me, though others wish and would be glad of my death. Lord, however thou do dispose of me, continue and go on to do good for them. Give them consistency of judgment, one heart, and mutual love; and go on to deliver them, and with the work of reformation; and make the name of Christ glorious in the world. Teach those who look too much to thy instruments, to depend more upon thyself. Pardon such as desire to trample upon the dust of a poor worm, for they are thy people too. And pardon the folly of this short prayer—even for Jesus Christ's sake. And give us a good night, if it be thy pleasure. Amen."

There was the Cromwell of Marston Moor and Naseby, the Cromwell signing the death warrant of Charles, the Cromwell seeing red at Drogheda, the Cromwell striding up and down the floor of Saint Stephen's Chapel and crying out upon Sir Harry Vane, but there was also the man of kindness and gentleness, whose eyes (as Marvell said) had "a piercing sweetness." His was

"A soul whose master bias leans
To homefelt pleasures and to gentle scenes."

It was this quality that made Dryden write,

"He had his calmer influence, and his mien
Did love and majesty together blend."

John Maidston, his personal servant, knew him better than Dryden did. He knew him in the more intimate associations of his domestic life. Writing, not long after his death, he said:

"He was naturally compassionate towards objects in distress, even to an effeminate measure. . . . A larger soul, I think, hath seldom dwelt in a house of clay than his was."

Mr. Buchan begins his masterly book with the words: "A great man lays upon posterity the duty of understanding him." That duty is one which the English-speaking people should be glad to discharge. Cromwell, like Abraham Lincoln, is the common possession of England and America. The civilization we enjoy and the liberties we have inherited owe something to

his courage, his endurance, and his devotion to duty. Whatever may have been his faults, his many virtues and achievements stand as an example and inspiration for our own time. He represents those things which are of supreme concern in every generation. He championed causes which in our day are in jeopardy. In the struggle for the maintenance of liberty and ordered progress we need the Ironside fervor and we are none the worse for what Lowell called "a whiff of Naseby." Every re-reading of Cromwell's life helps us to know what we fight for and love what we know. Above all, in these days when the chief enemy is defeatism, and our worst danger is a surrender to disillusionment we need Oliver's intensity and his determination to see things through.

Upon the struggle in the Civil War depended in some measure the future of civilization. Had the result been other than it was we should all be living in a different world, and different for the worse. There were times when the issues all apparently depended on a single man. Had Oliver failed there would have been failure everywhere. He did not fail. He believed in God, and with that belief came his hope.

We see him on the eve of Dunbar. David Leslie commands the passes. For most men it was a time for desperate counsels, and an occasion for despair. He writes his letter to Haselrig. The letter is dated the second of September:

"We are upon an Engagement very difficult. . . . All shall work for good. Our spirits are comfortable praised be the Lord—though our position be as it is. And indeed we have much hope in the Lord; of whose mercy we have had large experience. . . ."

It was a contemporary who wrote of Cromwell:

"He was a strong man; in the dark perils of war, in the high places of the field, hope shone in him like a pillar of fire when it had gone out in all others."

The Faith of John Dewey

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

FOR many years past, John Dewey has been widely acknowledged the foremost among living American philosophers. In his voluminous writings on politics, education, sociology and art as well as philosophy proper, the references to religion have been fragmentary and inconclusive. But it was significant that each of his major works closed with a vague recognition of the climactic importance of the religious attitude. These references encouraged the expectation that he would some day set forth his views on religion, and especially on its central issue—the question of God.

That expectation has now been fulfilled. In three brief chapters (originally the Terry Lectures at Yale University), penned with unexpected clarity and suffused with almost evangelical passion, Professor Dewey has not only declared his personal convictions on the major issues of religion; he has proposed a “common faith” to which he summons all men of good will to give their adherence.¹ It is unnecessary to suggest that the appearance of his book is an event of first importance in the religious world.

The argument of the book may be summarized as follows:

At the outset, we must distinguish between “religion” and the “religious attitude.” Religion, whatever its specific form, always centers upon belief in the Supernatural and always involves institutional practices. In contrast, the religious quality of experience may attach to every object and every end or ideal. Whenever the various elements of our being are composed and harmonized through adjustment, a religious attitude is attained. Again, whatever introduces genuine perspective into existence is religious. Above all “any activity pursued in behalf of an ideal end against obstacles and in spite of threats of personal loss because of conviction of its general and enduring value is religious in quality.”

Adherence to “religion” is no longer possible for men of our day—partly because its beliefs in the Supernatural are no longer credible, partly because its multifarious forms render significant unity impossible (we actually confront many religions, but not “religion”), partly because its reliance upon supernatural support dulls the edge of moral action. All efforts of religious apologists to salvage religion through readjustment or restatement are futile, so long as a particle of belief in

¹ *A Common Faith*, by John Dewey. Yale University Press, 1934. \$1.50.

the Supernatural remains. The ultimate issue is between allegiance to the scientific method of discovering and changing beliefs, and allegiance to even an irreducible minimum of belief fixed in advance. The great need of our day is that the religious attitude be divested of its irrelevant encumbrances of belief and organization. The faith of religion in the ideal as already completely real should be displaced by religious faith—devotion to the ideal and to its realization. The object of such faith may be called "God" provided it be clearly understood that by "God" is meant the ideal ends, developed by the imagination, which at a given time and place hold authority over one's volition and emotion. These ideals have their roots in natural conditions and, through human embodiment, are existent forces. This "working union of the ideal and actual is identical with the force that has in fact been attached to the conception of God in all the religions that have a spiritual content."

A further consideration urges the replacement of traditional religion by the religious attitude—the increasing secularization of man's corporate life. For the first time in human history, religion is now a special interest within a secular community—"the greatest revolution that has taken place in religion in all history." Thereby the community is deprived of that marriage of intelligence and emotion, that passionate devotion to intelligence as a force in social action, so needed in contemporary society. When idealizing imagination, thought and emotion have been transferred from a mythical Supernatural to the values of natural human relations, we may expect a revitalization of religious experience and social consequences of incalculable promise. Nor will the change destroy the churches; rather it will enable them to function without an unnecessary incubus.

In this argument there is nothing essentially new. It was hinted, though never developed, in Professor Dewey's earlier works. It has been made familiar in recent decades through the writings of Professors Haydon, Otto, Sellars, Ames, Wieman and others. But the position has never been given more succinct, self-consistent and persuasive exposition. Because of the eminence of its author, because of its brevity and clarity, because of the passionate sense of mission which inspires it, *A Common Faith* gives promise of becoming the acknowledged "testament" of what is loosely termed "non-theistic Humanism."² This is some measure of its importance.

Let it be said at once that this is a work not only of distinction, but of rare power and charm. Many of the passages which voice Doctor Dewey's hope for society are couched in a moving, though always controlled, eloquence. And no honest Christian can fail to be stirred and challenged by his withering exposure of the weaknesses of much supernatural religion. Had the book been confined to the development of a constructive position, one would have welcomed it as a noble *credo* for those who cannot take

² That Doctor Dewey is not to be considered a theist, in spite of his willingness to employ the term "God," is made unmistakably clear in his communication in the *Christian Century* of December 5, 1934.

their place within the Christian Church, however one might dissent from its metaphysical premises. But the positive position rests its appeal squarely upon not only the intellectual inadequacy but the moral mischief of Christianity. It is the validity of these strictures upon traditional religion which it would wish to have critically appraised.

The first impression yielded by a careful examination is that this volume, like all of Professor Dewey's writings,³ is dotted with ambiguities, contradictions and astounding historical generalizations which, though they often have slight bearing on the main position, induce a natural distrust of the main contentions. To select at random two or three typical instances:

In discussing the problem of evil, Doctor Dewey suggests that, if the conditions which create the mystery of evil were removed, the incentive to creative endeavor would likewise disappear, since "the notion of possibilities to be realized would never emerge" (p. 45). Of course, the exact reverse is the case. In a world from which irrational and inexplicable evil had been eliminated, the creative powers of man would be freed for their maximum expression. Not only would "notions of possibilities to be realized" be multiplied; their actual realization would be increased. Were the situation as Doctor Dewey describes it, were obstacles which stimulate endeavor the only evils in life, there would *be* no "problem of evil"—for either theist or naturalist. The problem of evil is created not by the presence of hindrances and difficulties which stimulate endeavor, but by factors in the nature of things which render any realization of possibilities impossible (e. g., insanity, premature death, etc.). These alone constitute "evil" as a metaphysical perplexity. It is difficult to understand Doctor Dewey's oversight of this distinction, familiar to every elementary student of the matter.

Again, deprecating the tendency of religion to attribute social evils to moral causes, it is said:

"The sinfulness of man, the corruption of his heart, his self-love and love of power, when referred to as causes (of social evils) are precisely of the same nature as was the appeal to abstract powers that once prevailed in physical 'science.' . . . Demons were once appealed to in order to explain bodily disease. . . . The importation of general moral causes to explain present *social* phenomena is on the same intellectual level" (pp. 77-8).

³ An admirably balanced but incisive examination of Professor Dewey's general philosophy, with special reference to its ambiguities and contradictions, has recently been made in W. T. Feldman, *The Philosophy of John Dewey: A Critical Analysis*.

We are to understand, then, that a plague of locusts and a plague of racketeering, an epidemic of cholera and an epidemic of stock-market speculation, a flood of rain from heaven and a flood of graft from Tammany Hall are identical in character and cure? Indeed, the proposal to hold human agencies in any measure responsible is, in each case, "on the same intellectual level." How much confidence can be placed in social philosophy proceeding from such faulty analysis?

Again, on the same page, we are told that "the fundamental root of the *laissez faire* idea (in politics and economics) is denial of the possibility of radical intervention of intelligence in the conduct of human life." Would any student of nineteenth-century history believe that the advocates of *laissez faire* in that period doubted the possibility of "radical intervention of intelligence in the conduct of human life"? Or, indeed, that they were lacking in the will to employ intelligence for that purpose?

In a writer less learned and deliberate than Doctor Dewey, we would put these amazing statements down to hasty composition or pardonable naïveté. But we must pass on to more central matters.

Doctor Dewey's case is built upon the following propositions:

1. The "religious attitude" may be and should be divorced from "religion."
2. The multifarious forms in which religions appear make it impossible to identify "religion."
3. The present crisis in religion is due to discredit of the Supernatural.
4. Traditional religion, with its appeal to the Supernatural, has diverted the energies of men from socially fruitful endeavor.
5. Religion is no longer a living factor within the whole of society, but a *special* institution within a secular community; thus its usefulness to the corporate life is greatly diminished. This situation is something utterly new in human history.
6. The religious attitude, divested of its irrelevant supernatural beliefs, would command widespread allegiance, revivify the churches and yield unmeasured social results.

Each proposition requires careful examination.

1. An initial question might be raised at the distinction, fundamental for the whole argument, between "religion" and "the religious." Religion, Doctor Dewey holds, always connotes an attitude toward a definite object, the Supernatural; the *Oxford Dictionary* definition is cited to this effect. But the "religious attitude" may be directed toward any ideal object. (In passing, let it be noted that the *Oxford Dictionary* sanctions no such diver-

gence in meaning between noun and adjective.⁴) Now, if æsthetics be the pursuit of Beauty, could it be held that the æsthetic attitude had no relation whatever to Beauty? If science be the quest for Truth, would it be appropriate to define the scientific attitude without reference to the object of that quest? And so on, *ad nauseam*. Strange, indeed, such a proposal from a teacher of logic! This objection to Professor Dewey's proposed usage is no mere quibble over the meaning of terms. It points, on the one hand, to a palpable underestimate of the significance of the God-idea in stimulating and supporting the religious attitude, and, on the other hand, as we shall note in a moment, to a quite unwarranted confidence as to the possibility of inducing the religious attitude without defining its object.

2. One of the principal objections to religion, in Doctor Dewey's view, is the variety of forms it has assumed in the course of human history. Among these no unity can be achieved except on a least common denominator so general as to be without significance. We must deal with a multitude of religions, but no such thing as "religion." Nor is any principle of discrimination which might distinguish the higher from the lower, or identify a normative type of religion permitted. Throughout the book, the varied expressions which religion has taken since the dawn of consciousness are lumped into an indiscriminate and heterogeneous bundle of equal significance—the Mana of the Melanesians and the fetish of the Africans; the divine heroes of the Greek Pantheon and the divine Idea of Plato; the religion of the Sioux Indian or of Judaism or of Christianity; phallic worship or the offering of the humble and contrite mind of the Hebrew prophet; mortification of the flesh and philanthropic zeal; the hysterical trance of the American Indian and the mysticism of William Blake; the faith of primitive man and the faith of Saint Francis—all are of equal importance in the search for the meaning of religion. To such a view it is perhaps sufficient response to point out that its thorough-going application would make nonsense not only of all historical criticism, but of all science and art, and even education. Indeed, it would oblige Professor Dewey to recognize the educational philosophy of the Legislature of Kentucky as of equal worth with that of Teachers College, and the social philosophy of the African headhunter as on a par with the social principles of the League for Independent Political Action.

⁴ Nor did Professor Dewey in his earlier work, as far as I have discovered. Cp., for example, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 212: "Poetry, art, religion are precious things."

3. The present crisis in religion is intellectual in origin; it is due to the fact that the indispensable beliefs of traditional religion are no longer possible for men schooled in modern science. This is the interpretation one would have expected from an incurable intellectualist, even one who has been at pains to stress the dominant influence of men's practice upon their beliefs. At least two facts give pause to so simple an explanation. First, there has probably been no time in the past fifty years, perhaps since the rise of modern science, when so many scholars of first rank, especially scientists, have given their convinced adherence to the indispensable beliefs of religion as to-day. Second, if it is the outworn beliefs of religion which are alienating men from religious affiliation, one would expect them to flock to associations which aim to promote the "religious attitude" divested of obsolete beliefs; there is no evidence of such a wholesale migration to Humanist societies. Another explanation is possible. It has been stated thus: "The root cause of the present sickness of religion is not theoretical skepticism but practical non-concern. It is the function of a society which has fixed men's attention upon the externals and appurtenances of living rather than upon its delicate and inner apprehensions, which has centered their energies upon the amassing of things, the multiplication of accoutrements, the perfecting of appliances and contrivances, and which has fostered in its children a grotesque self-importance. Here is the fundamental failing in contemporary faith—not in men's belief but in their practice, in the ideals of personal life and the unchallenged ethical procedures of corporate life, above all in their tacit denial of the influence of God upon human society. And the philosophies most characteristic of the period have increasingly become pallid and rather pitiable reflections of the age—naturalistic, humanistic, pragmatic." Dare we look for cure to philosophies which are so largely products of the diseases from which we seek release?

4. Religion, Doctor Dewey believes, has been an obstacle to serious grappling with corporate human problems. "It diverts attention and energy from ideal values and from the exploration of actual conditions by means of which they may be promoted. History is testimony to this fact. . . . Dependence upon an external power is the counterpart of surrender of human endeavor." "Supernaturalism regards the drama of sin and redemption enacted within the isolated and lonely soul as the one thing of ultimate importance" (pp. 46, 53). These are sweeping historical generalizations. Their adequate examination would far exceed available space.

In comment, one might cite Professor Hocking's summary of a careful examination of the actual influence of religion in history:

"From such a survey but one uncontradicted impression emerges: the thing has been radical; it has had some grip upon the original instincts of human nature. . . . All the arts of common life owe their present status and vitality to some sojourn within the historic body of religion; there is little in what we call culture which has not at some time been a purely religious function. . . . Religion, I shall say, according to this vague figure, is the *mother of the Arts*: this is its pragmatic place in the history of mankind and of culture."⁵

Or Professor Leuba, surely not to be accused of bias favorable to traditional religion, who reports that "Whatever the mystics may say that seems to subordinate unselfish activity to the passive enjoyment of God is belied by the general trend of their writings, and still more convincingly by their lives; all of them, so soon as unity was established in their consciousness, have spent themselves without stint in the service of their fellowmen."⁶ Or one might list over the great enterprises for human amelioration and improvement which had their birth within the life of the church and were nurtured there through their critical infancy until secular conscience could be educated to their maintenance—education, hospitals, social service. And to this list one might add the succession of reform movements, each at its inception a difficult and daring crusade in the face of prevailing sentiment, each pioneered by men and women directly under Christian impulsion—for abolition of the slave-trade, for prison reform, for the abolition of slavery itself, for improved working conditions of women and children, for factory legislation, for slum clearance, for temperance, for the abolition of child-labor, etc., etc., etc. Or one might point to the known social consequences of the Franciscan movement, the Wesleyan revival, the Oxford Movement. But the most damning refutation is Professor Dewey's own testimony. When he wishes to illustrate ideal ends determining human conduct—*his* ideal of social fruitfulness—he turns to concrete instances, and mentions—Florence Nightingale, Howard, Wilberforce, Peabody. Of the last, I cannot speak; but with each of the other three, the ideal ends which they served and the unswerving tenacity with which they served them were derived directly and unequivocally from a conviction of personal commission by the supernatural God of the Christian religion. Each in his own way would have echoed Florence Nightingale's resolu-

⁵ W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, pp. 13-14.

⁶ J. B. Leuba, *Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, p. 128.

tion—"I am thirty, the age at which Christ began his mission. Now, no more childish things, no more vain things, no more love, no more marriage. Now, Lord, let me only think of thy Will," or Wilberforce's declaration that God Almighty had set the suppression of the Slave Trade before him as the object of his life.⁷ Each would certainly have testified that the resource through which alone he was able for his tremendous undertakings was "dependence upon an external power." No careful student of the history of religion is blind to the conservative and other-worldly strains in its influence. But in the face of the brute facts of prophetic Christianity's impact upon social institutions and traditions at almost every period of its history, the statement that it has regarded the drama within the isolated soul as the one thing of ultimate importance is so perverse a distortion of the truth as to cast question upon the reliability of its author.

5. But the most serious fact about the present situation of religion, in Professor Dewey's view, is not the effect of science upon the creeds of religion or its social ineffectiveness, but the new "*social* place and function of religion." This is "the thing new in history, the thing once unheard of"—that the church is now "*a special* institution within a secular community." This represents "the greatest revolution that has taken place in religions during the thousands of years that man has been upon the earth" (pp. 59-65). What an extraordinary reading of historic records! What, one might ask Professor Dewey, does he consider to have been the status of the religion of Socrates in fifth-century Athens, or of Amos in eighth-century Israel, or of Jesus in Judæa at the turn of the ages, or of the early Christians in second-century Rome, or of Savonarola in fifteenth-century Florence, or of John Wesley in eighteenth-century England? However we describe its status within the community of its day, it was of such a character as to bring upon its adherents derision, persecution, and in most instances martyrdom. "The essential point," Professor Dewey feels, "is not just that secular organizations and actions are legally or externally severed from the control of the church, but that interests and values unrelated to the offices of any church now so largely sway the desires and aims of even believers" (p. 65). A thing utterly new in history! Could one imagine a more apt description of the actual situation in Nineveh and Tyre, Babylon and Assyria, Athens in her decline, imperial Rome, late Renais-

⁷ Hugh Martin, *Christian Social Reformers of the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 123, 61. The whole book is a vivid commentary on Doctor Dewey's contention.

sance Italy, not to speak of revolutionary France and Georgian England? The clear testimony of history is that prophetic religion, *living* religion is almost always a *special* interest within a community which, whatever its lip service to formal religion, is, at the springs of its life, through and through secular. Is there reason to expect that the new "common faith" to which we are summoned, if it is to embody living and socially potent aspiration, will suffer any kinder fate? Thus we are led to question Professor Dewey's last proposition.

6. For, at the end, the strength of his case rests upon prophecy. It is his profound conviction that the promotion of the "religious attitude," wholly freed from encumbrances of belief, will rally widespread support, will effect profound social change, and will revive the life of the existing churches. It may be questioned whether there is one scintilla of evidence, historical or contemporary, to lend support to these expectations.

What hope is there that the new faith would unify general idealistic aspiration where religion has failed to do so, binding vast numbers of men into a common devotion to ideal ends? The prospect offers great promise until we realize that, soon or late, those "ideal ends" *must* be defined. Let us allow Doctor Dewey to define them. How many may be expected to join him in the new fellowship of religious aspiration? As many as share his definition of the goal, and no more. One imagines a group who with passionate intelligence aspire to a communistic society and another group whose intelligence leads them with equal passion to conceive the social ideal in terms of the totalitarian state linked in a profound common faith that the ideal and the actual can be united through "the radical intervention of intelligence in the conduct of human life." What unites men is not the common possession of a "religious attitude," but devotion to common ends. It is as possible to unite all men who share a "religious attitude" as it is to unite all who are characterized by a "political interest."

As to the hope of great social result from such a faith, we have already gathered some witness from the past. Even in our time when we are told that the churches no longer function significantly in the social scene, it is surprising to discover what proportion of those who guide prophetic social causes have been drawn from the leadership of the church, to note how often it is the Christian voice which first and most doggedly is raised in unpopular defense of social values, and to be told that the most fertile ground for the seeds of progressive social outlook and action among youth

is still within the Christian Associations. In contrast, the philosophy of Naturalism has not yet demonstrated great fecundity for courageous and determined social pioneering.

As to the likelihood of a great movement sweeping the churches to renewed vitality in the name of such a common faith, we are not wholly dependent upon guesswork. There is evidence from the past. The adventure to which Doctor Dewey summons us has been tried. Toward the middle of the last century, Europe saw the meteoric rise of a movement proclaiming an almost identical faith. This movement, likewise, saw the doom of traditional religion in its enslavement to outmoded belief in the Supernatural. It, too, yearned to release the native religious aspirations of men, now so largely inert, in the service of high social ends. It despaired of the effectiveness of a merely ethical idealism and sought to effect the marriage of intelligence and emotion for its high designs. It aimed to retain the services of ritual and symbol, purged by science of irrelevant and dishonest associations. It confidently expected to claim the passionate devotion of great numbers of men without spiritual home. Its goal was, not the destruction of existing churches, but their renewal through internal purification. The final result is also familiar matter of history. The Positivist Movement, after beginnings of brilliant expectation, slowly sank into practical in consequence. Two reasons appear to have been most influential—the advance of thought rendered its metaphysical premises obsolete; and it proved impotent to rouse and permanently hold the religious devotion of men. Over its remains was spoken by one of its disappointed followers this epitaph: "*Une religion sans Dieu! Mon Dieu, quelle religion!*"

The faith which Doctor Dewey proposes is not in every detail identical with that of Positivism. But the kinship is so intimate as to offer material for reflective suggestion.

Book Reviews

Personality and Religion. Lowell Lectures, 1933-34. By EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.50.

IN Professor Brightman's writings, we have reassuring evidence that the "Personalist" school of philosophy has not settled down into a sterile dogmatism, but is dealing open-mindedly with contemporary issues. It is an excellent thing to have the approach of personal idealism so ably defended, in a time when the opposite (realistic) approach threatens to have things all its own way; but one is glad to note that the Bowne Professor at Boston University dares to depart from Bownean orthodoxy whenever the facts seem to require it—as in his well-known contention that God has to reckon and wrestle with limitations that are "given" in his own nature.

In this latest book, Professor Brightman clarifies his position in several important respects. He makes plain what he means by calling God personal rather than superpersonal; what he means by asserting that God's will is finite and not omnipotent; and finally, what are the consequences, for personal and social religion, of belief in a personal, finite-infinite God.

If the idea of God as superpersonal means "superhumanly personal," Brightman has no quarrel with it, though he would prefer to speak simply of the divine "transcendence." But if it implies a real denial of God's "consciousness, reason, will and purpose," he feels that it "goes too far beyond the available evidence to be useful," and lands in a vague agnosticism which denies that

we can really touch God in our human experience at its best. (Chap. II, pp. 56ff.)

The objection is often made that the idea of God as personal imposes finite limitations upon Deity. Brightman candidly accepts the logic of the objection, and admits that God is finite and imperfect in some respects, while infinite and perfect in others. As the human will is limited by the passive aspects of human experience, given in *sensation* and *the laws of reason*, so the divine will, too, is limited by "conditions in the divine experience which the divine will did not originate." Although God is infinite in the sense of being self-existent, eternal, and inexhaustible in the richness of his nature, the whole world process presents to us a spectacle of divine struggle "against obstacles which necessitate waste, a great amount of unnecessary and unproductive suffering, and vast areas of futility." (Chap. III, pp. 82ff.)

Against those who would assert the omnipotence and absoluteness of God as essential to vital religion, Brightman contends that both personal and social religion, in their highest forms, are consistent with his view. To recognize God's limitations is to be more certain of his goodness, while "the denial of absolute power leaves him still sufficient power to control the ongoing of the cosmic process and sets no bounds to the eternal growth and creativity of spiritual life in the universe." (Chap. IV, p. 115.) The "feeling of membership in the whole" and the "unmercenary trust" which are among the characteristics of the best personal religion are fully present in such a faith. In the realm of

social religion, the view of God as finite-infinite implies what Brightman calls *organic pluralism*, in distinction from the *absolute organicism* of the totalitarian state and the *absolute pluralism* of "rugged individualism." Politically this would mean an insistence upon maintaining a real degree of democratic freedom and initiative, while recognizing that our society needs a higher degree of central organization, to eliminate the "intolerable waste and cruelty of the present capitalistic system." (Chap. V, p. 154.)

Professor Brightman has never presented his philosophy more simply and clearly than in these lectures. Many will find in them the best introduction to his other works.

WALTER M. HORTON.
Oberlin College.

An Introduction to the Books of the Old Testament. By W. O. E. OESTERLEY and T. H. ROBINSON. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$4.00.

THIS is a third volume within the last three years from the prolific pens of these two well-known scholars. In quick succession they have enriched the world of Old Testament scholarship with *A History of Israel, Hebrew Religion*, and now, to complete the trilogy, comes this valuable *Introduction to the Books of the Old Testament*.

The volume is welcome for there was need of just such a work. Not that there is a lack of such Introductions, for we have many that offer to introduce one to the writings of the Old Testament, but this one is more straightforward and is not burdened by an overabundance of small print with endless detailed analysis. It goes about the business in a workmanlike manner, plainly declares what it is

all about, and special chapters are given to special topics. The contents and structure of each book are presented, the sources analyzed and set forth, the Hebrew and Greek texts compared, and the Historical and Religious values clearly set out. There are full discussions of the Psalter, a useful chapter on the Wisdom Literature, A General Introduction to the Prophetic Literature with a specially informative and interesting chapter on the Forms of Hebrew Poetry.

A full bibliography for each book is supplied and a complete index. The student who wishes to know about the Old Testament will not neglect this volume.

JOHN PATERSON.
Drew University.

Two Elizabethan Puritan Diaries. By RICHARD ROGERS and SAMUEL WARD. Edited by M. M. KNAPPEN, Ph.D. Chicago: The American Society of Church History. \$3.

THIS short book of 150 pages presents fragments of the diaries of two Puritan leaders in the Church of England, Richard Rogers (1551-1618) and Samuel Ward (1571-1643). Doctor Knappen, the editor, is assistant professor of history in the University of Chicago. He contributes a description and history of the Diaries, an essay on "The Puritan Character as Seen in the Diaries," and a short biographical sketch of each of the diarists. His work is very informing and is marked by careful scholarship and painstaking research.

The Diaries have an especial interest to a student of the Puritan movement in England and America, as they furnish a picture of the background out of which stepped the founders of New England. These worthies of the Diaries were men

of education and standing, both graduates of Cambridge University and of the College of John Milton. After graduation they gave their lives to the teaching and preaching of religion. The Diaries for the most part are not a record of events but a record of inner struggle and aspiration. Rogers dwelt in one of the beauty spots of England but he has no word for the beauties of nature. Both of these men lived through one of the most interesting and momentous periods of history, yet neither has any word for all that was stirring their nation and the world. They were occupied with spiritual affairs: their search for God, their difficulties and temptations, their ecclesiastical oppositions, of which they had many. Ward's entries are mostly brief, dealing with his shortcomings: "My late rising in the morning to sanctify the Sabaoth. My negligence all that day, and idleness in performing the duties of the Sabaoth. My want in not meditating sufficiently on the creatures, as also in prayer. My by-talk in the bed of other matters than are meet to be talked of on the Sabaoth." Rogers writes more at length and goes into more detail, especially about his troubles. Yet he too is much given to introspection: "Myne hart hath been much occupied in thincking of the uncertaintie of our life and the momentary britleness of thinges below. I finde my selfe at great libertie by this meanes, when I finde a sensible contempt of this worlde and joyfull expectation of departure from hence. And the contrarie is an estat full of uncomfortableness and anguish." This he writes at the age of 36. Their single-hearted aim is to gain the conscious presence of God and to live wholly for his favor.

To our modern mood, do these seem pictures of two narrow introverts, self-

ishly seeking their own salvation? Perhaps so, but their hunger after God, their relentless seeking after him, their whole-hearted devotion, jolt one's self-satisfaction. In a noisy age, carried hither and yon by ephemeral interests, deafened by the din of the radio, blinded by the glitter of the cinema, dulled by the bartering of the market place, too many have no time for the practice of the presence of God, nor any conception of it, this great treasure for which these ancient worthies sold all that they had. They sought something which moved the world and molded the centuries.

HOWARD DEAN FRENCH.

Scarsdale, N. Y.

The Commonplace Prodigal. By ALAN KNIGHT CHALMERS. New York: Henry Holt and Company. \$1.75.

In this little book Doctor Chalmers of Broadway Tabernacle has given us a modern classic of mysticism.

It is classic in the simplicity of the language and the homeliness of the illustrations. It belongs on the same shelf with *Pilgrim's Progress*. It will be as readable ten years or a hundred hence as it is in the year of its issue.

It is modern, not only in the pungency of illustrative material drawn from the life of this moment in history, but especially in its characteristic preoccupation. Doctor Chalmers is not concerned for the saving of individual souls, and that only. He would help individuals get right with God for the sake of the Kingdom. He has the social vision, and a noble impatience with our common failure as Christians to live as Christians should, transforming the social scene by the vital and creative novelty of God-attuned character. He is a proponent of the Social Gospel; but, with a soundness

often lacking in the more extravagant advocates who seem to believe in salvation by sociology, he perceives that a righteous social order must begin with righteous men and women one by one.

The mysticism which the author expounds is in key with the great tradition of the Catholic faith, so that he can quote Augustine, Thomas à Kempis, and even Ignatius Loyola, as well as Browning and a host of lesser seers and poets, without sacrificing the trenchant contemporaneity of his tone. He reiterates that God is not to be found through intellectual proofs, but must be approached through a series of levels of intimate understanding. It is a heartening thought to any who may be discouraged about the current prospects of theism, to consider that a busy city pastor in a liberal church has found for himself, and knows how to communicate to others, so full and satisfying a faith-knowledge of the Eternal by this ancient path of all the saints.

The ostensible theme of the book is prayer as a way of escape from the tragic futility of commonplace living. Its actual theme is of course God, the object of prayer. The major thesis is that prayer is not a way of getting God's attention for ourselves, but of turning our attention to Him. It is not a technique for effecting a favorable adjustment on his part toward us, but a process of adjusting ourselves to God. The author has a number of unusual and attractive suggestions to make as to aids for achieving this beatific realization.

The one point at which many of us will be inclined to dissent is in the matter of Doctor Chalmers' scorn for prayers of petition. He believes that we ought not to ask God for things. His conviction is inspired and in some measure doubtless justified by the sorry spectacle

of men to whom prayer is little more than a gift-bringing fetish, and of men who talk so much about themselves when they pray that they find no time for listening to God. Yet in so vehement and sweeping a criticism of petition there is a departure from the simplicity of Jesus' example and the practice of the most Godlike in his following through the centuries. There is at least a hint of the sophistication of the Hindu's attitude toward impassive Brahm. It is not necessary to interpret petition as wheedling to change God's mind. It can as well be explained in terms of declared receptiveness so that he shall be free of barriers on our side to do His will. As long as the childlike is closest to the godlike, Christians will go on asking God for things, and rightly, as Jesus did in Gethsemane—though always with the same proviso.

But this is a minor flaw in a great book which makes a signal and stirring contribution to the literature of devotion in our time. It is a good book to read, and ponder, and read again. It does help to make God real to the reader's understanding.

RUSSELL HENRY STAFFORD.
Old South Church in Boston.

"Concerning the Bible." By CONRAD SKINNER. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.50.

THIS author, writing his Preface, modestly hopes that he is supplying what he believes is still a need: one more book about the Old Testament. We believe that he is right, and that he has produced the book.

Intelligent Christians are curious about the Old Testament, having a hungry suspicion that there is living interest in it, if one knew how to arrange one's reading of it. The author of this

book renders that service brilliantly, effectively, interestingly.

Mr. Skinner at home in his school must be a teacher of abounding vitality and much personal charm. His writing style suggests mental energy; and suffusing the pages is the genial mood of one who holds the pupil, the reader, at the heart of his interest. If he is not a scholar, in the sense of being one who digs a well, he is perhaps the man who sets up the pump and makes it work without a squeak, bringing the well-water to thirsty lips. We thank the pump-man.

Three books in one, so the author hopes! It's a large hope, but—again we agree. Nay, more; we make it five in one, and admit extreme condensation, which also is a service. Here are five: Ottley, Kent, Corning, Paterson Smyth, Jenks. Or, here are another five: Sanders, Fowler, Eiselen, Hunting, Badé or Hill. History? How it unrolls in this convincing development. Literature? Tangled, mass on mass, it falls apart, gets into order by type and style and meaning. Revelation? It shines through the human scene, speaks through the prophets, the inspired heroes of their own day. Scholarship? We are made grateful for the labors of the high intellects who have set forth the unfolding service of the Hebrew people to religion.

This is an excellent study book for high schools and colleges.

If we were to lose a shelf of books on the Old Testament, we might still manage to wiggle along somehow with this admirable compendium, this Many-in-One, beside the Book, to order and interpret it.

LEON KURTZ WILLMAN.

First Methodist Episcopal Church,
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.

A Natural Approach to Philosophy.

By LEWIS G. ROHRBAUGH. New York: Noble and Noble. \$2.50.

THIS business of writing an introductory text in philosophy is not as simple a task as it may appear. How can the universe and the thoughts of men about it covering centuries of time, be boiled down to the publisher's standard of some five hundred pages? It cannot be done. No one single text, accordingly, is satisfactory. A writer has to make his choice: either skim over the whole scene with the most casual references, select some phases of the subject and do them well, propagandize one's pet philosophy, give to the subject a contemporary twist or serve it up in terms of historical movements and men, give biographies and the ideas of a few of the ace-philosophers, or, patch together quotations from the sources with the minimum amount of critical and constructive effort; each way has its apparent defects.

Professor Rohrbaugh has chosen to attempt to cover the whole field. He has sought to tie the subject up with the natural sciences, hence: "a natural approach." Professor Patrick's classic text is taken as model both in the matter of organization of material and in the attempt to cover the ground without too much intrusion of personal interpretations. Rohrbaugh studied under Patrick at Iowa.

Personally, I prefer the method of soft-pedaling the writer's own views which Rohrbaugh seems to have adopted. "Not philosophy, but to philosophize," is the underlying motto. I am not so sure, however, that the attempt to cover the whole field in such small compass is laudatory. Boiling down consists in boiling away. Spots of unintelligibility are bound to appear. I am not so sure that he has succeeded throughout in contact-

ing the beginner. In his first chapter, for example, occurs the unhappy choice of crowding in a quotation from the philosophically obscure Santayana, references to the highly complicated "Republic" and to controverted Platonic passages plus Greek foot-notes, references to Dewey, Descartes, Galileo and Kant without the necessary enlightening background. Naturally in a text of this sort there will be found certain statements with which one would find himself at heated variance. The author's notion of religion is cribbed, surprisingly so, since he already has two books to his credit on the general subject of religion. My impression is that he has checked the source materials of the natural sciences much more carefully than those from the theological side.

All in all, I believe this book will serve its worthy purpose. It reflects credit upon its author.

VERGILIUS FERM.

The College of Wooster.

The Unknown God. By ALFRED NOYES. New York: Sheed & Ward. \$2.50.

ONE has not read much of this book before he begins to wonder with an approaching yawn why so much importance is attached to the outmoded names of Spencer, Huxley, Haeckel and the other agnostics of the mid-nineteenth century. Presently it is perceived that the book is quite autobiographical and, because the author has walked the highroad of the progress of thought during the past fifty years, it well describes the changing attitudes of that period. These agnostics were the masters of the youthful Noyes. He outgrows them to reach a clear exultant faith which makes the book appear to be misnamed.

The famous author is revealed as having covered a far-stretching range of reading. He hesitates not to enter into combat with the most authoritative names. He believes that Darwin in his non-recognition of the Supernatural, which he identifies with the Uncaused, will inevitably fall below Copernicus and Newton and other first-rank figures among the pioneers of science. Noyes notes what other discerning thinkers have observed, that agnostics postulate a mystery which is their God, an indefinite consciousness that can be apprehended if not comprehended, which he calls the ultimate Paradox. Properly he calls attention to misrepresentation of thinkers like Hume and Darwin by those who have popularized partial quotations from their writings while ignoring their positive statements. He reminds us that Darwin and other pathmaking scientists were not so much opposed by militant religionists as by orthodox scientists, such as Owen in the case of Darwin, whose older views these religionists upheld. Penetratingly, he points out that when skeptics succeed in banishing the Christian explanation of the ills of the world, they have done nothing to remove these ills, but only the interpretation that makes them tolerable.

The crowning portion of the book is the argument for the divinity of Christ to be found in the language which was used by Jesus. "The values of his utterances, subject to the coldest standards of literary criticism, are not human. The voice of the Eternal is in them, before whom even the suns and universes dissolve like a shadow, and all the ages of time are but a moment." The poet came to a triumphant faith in the deep days of his need upon the unexpected death of a much-beloved wife and he takes the highest and most convincing

utterance of Jesus to be—"I am the Resurrection and the Life."

Quotations from the author's poetry are distinctively attractive. His prose is beautiful throughout. One is not required to accept the theology upheld to be moved by statements like these:

"No hope was ever so forlorn as that which rang through the agnostic night, when the clouds went over the face of the God-abandoned Image of God on Calvary, crying 'Eloi! Eloi! Lama Sabacthani?'"

"The embodied Christ himself was the first sacrament, and his crucifixion was the first elevation of the Host."

One more quotation seems to this reviewer to be surpassingly beautiful:

"The modern world was not alive to the tremendous Reality that encompassed it. . . ."

"Like spoiled children, we did not appreciate customary gifts, even though they were bestowed on us by stranger powers than were dreamed of in the Arabian Nights. The fruits of Aladdin's orchard were only precious stones. Ours were alive and we took them for granted. If it had been ordained that Spring should visit us with her leaves and flowers for only one short week in a thousand years, the world would wait for her approaching loveliness as it has never waited for emperor or king. We should look upon her opening buds as though the heavens were indeed up-breaking through the earth. Millions would be profoundly moved then as hitherto only the few have been moved—by the miracle of beauty. We should walk in wonder and awe—religious awe—through our fields and woods; and an apple-bough in blossom would seem to us, then, the amazing spiritual revelation it really is, an exquisite earthly form, a shining hiero-

glyph, issuing from an absolute Mystery and organized in an intelligible pattern, to express and symbolize for finite minds the perfect Beauty of that eternal world where all "these flowers as in their causes sleep."

JOHN W. LANGDALE.

Book Editor of the
Methodist Episcopal Church.

That Strange Man Upon His Cross.

By RICHARD ROBERTS. New York:
The Abingdon Press. \$1.25.

DR. RICHARD ROBERTS, in his latest book, has moved me more profoundly than I have ever been since I read, in France during the war, Dr. Reaveley Glover's *Jesus of History*.

It is a plain story simply told—yet with the consummate skill of an artist. Doctor Roberts is seeking to bring us back to the reality of the gospel message and he is amazingly successful in his task.

He commences with the thesis that religion is reasonable, but that it cannot be shut up within the narrow confines of reason. The Cross is not to be explained on the basis of reason. Its secret is to be found, not in rationality but personality. The writer goes on to point out that wherever Jesus Christ has been emphasized and given that consideration which is his due, there has always been a quickening in the life of the community. The early Christian church was "captured not by a program, but by a Person," and that we must look for the secret of Jesus in what he *was*, rather than in what he taught.

Nevertheless, Jesus cannot be ignored as a teacher. The modernist charge that he lived in an age so far away from ours in its habits and ideals as to invalidate his teaching, cannot be sustained. The sins of society in his day—nationalism,

unemployment, bribery, sensationalism, force—were just as rampant then as now. Doctor Roberts does invaluable service in recalling to our minds that the great problems of life are psychological and spiritual—and not economic or secular. The relevancy of the teaching of Jesus to the present age is insisted on, and not too strongly.

Yet Jesus was more than a teacher. And later on in his ministry we find the teacher merging with the man of action. But that which motivated his action was service: an unusual motive in those days, and one which, even in our own day, is preached more than it is practiced. "In my kingdom," he says, "the rule is not promotion, but demotion: you do not go up—you come down; yet, by a blessed paradox, you do go up when you come down." These were the principles on which he built his manifesto to his times: politically, by service and sacrifice—not selfish and sordid gain; socially, by proclaiming that society was held together not by compulsion, but by love; "ethically, by declaring the ultimate ground of all true and fruitful human relationships—that a man should put himself in the second place." By these principles alone would the kingdom of God come. It was as a Man of Action, by carrying out these principles in his daily walk and conversation, that he brought himself to the final phase of his earthly career.

In his chapter on "The Crucified," Doctor Roberts rises to "the height of his great argument." It should be read and re-read by all those who would seek to rediscover for themselves the perennial magnetism of Calvary. He points out that the forces which crucified Jesus in the first century—political, social, economic, individual—are still as operative in the twentieth; still crucifying the Son of God afresh, and putting him to an

open shame. Dr. A. M. Fairbairn has said, "Calvary is an epitome of the world." And Doctor Roberts points out that the surest way to understand our day is to understand that of Jesus; that the only solution to the problems of our time is that men of the twentieth century should be willing to become for our generation what Jesus was for his, namely, a solitary sufferer mutely testifying against the "vested interests in church and state"; willing to stand alone, if need be, against "cunning and inexpediency, ignorance and prejudice, hate, cruelty, and indifference—all the things that through the ages have degraded and enslaved and violated the spirit of man."

We cannot too enthusiastically commend this book to those who wish for a season to meditate upon the unseen things which are eternal.

GEOFFREY WARDLE STAFFORD.

University Temple,
Seattle, Washington.

The Sceptical Approach to Religion.

By PAUL ELMER MORE. New
Shelburne Essays. Volume II.
Princeton University Press. London:
Humphrey Milford. Oxford
University Press. \$2.50.

A CLEAR and serene intelligence confronts the reader in all of the writings of Dr. Paul Elmer More. A mind essentially Greek in its temper and texture is a refreshing experience in a world where sharp clarity of thought is so rare, and precise definition so unusual. Our libraries have all too many books which prescribe "get-rich-quick" methods for the mind and quite ignore that severe and grim discipline without which thoughts never rise to thought. Between old men whom senility has made sentimental and young men who have substituted expansive emotion for critical

intelligence we must find our difficult way. Too much of our "re-thinking" consists of judgment based upon undisciplined altruism, rather than appraisal in the light of principles validated by centuries of civilized experience. In the midst of contemporary invertebrate mentality, it is good to contemplate the clear and masterful and disciplined mind of Paul Elmer More. The eleven volumes of the Shelburne Essays are something like a literary Bible to some of our ablest young men. The six volumes of the Greek Tradition have conferred a high distinction upon American scholarship. *The Demon of the Absolute* brilliantly opened the campaign of the second series of the Shelburne Essays. And now *The Sceptical Approach to Religion* carries this adventure of the mind a stage farther. The man who accepts uncritically all the "rubber-stamp watchwords" and "clichés" of the mind which characterize our period and who does not want his complacency to be disturbed ought with the utmost care to avoid this book. No age loves the critic who brings to light its unanalyzed assumptions and sets forth their curious inadequacy. No age loves the man who pierces through the lure of phrases which hide its favorite fallacies. All this Doctor More has been doing for years. But never has his mind been more sure-footed than in the volume now before us. Never has his urbanity made itself a more fascinating vehicle of corrosive criticism. The very thought of being critically sceptical of an uncritical scepticism fills the discerning reader with happy expectation. "The question I would raise," says Doctor More, "is whether their (the sceptics) doubts do not in most cases spring rather from unexamined assumptions than from a true spirit of inquiry, and whether a thoroughgoing use of rea-

son would not lead to a position more hospitable to the dogmas of religion than the equally dogmatic tenets of rationalism so called." (Page 1.) The volume is full of close and clear reasoning illuminated by reference to subtle processes of Greek dialectic, deepened by a study of the Hebrew interpretation of life and religion and coming to a climax of energy in the discussion of pivotal aspects of modern philosophy. Doctor More appears in full battle array when he discusses those systems of hard necessity which would rob life of all true significance. He subjects scepticism to subtle analysis. By a sure and clear process of reasoning he reaches the possibility of a soundly buttressed faith in the Incarnation. Beyond even this insight he sees enlarging vistas: "Somehow love, even the divine love, can effect its ultimate purpose only by paying the price of self-surrender and voluntary suffering." (Page 166.) "And sometimes I have presumed to ask whether—the Incarnation, the descent of the word into this harassed realm of mortality, was the great adventure of God, spurred by the hope, if the phrase be not blasphemous, of reaching and redeeming his creatures fallen almost into despair." (Page 194.) In one way or another most of the problems which distress our baffled and confused age come in for discussion at the level of their emerging importance in this masterful book.

LYNN HAROLD HOUGH.

Drew University.

Semitic and Hamitic Origins. By
GEORGE A. BARTON. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
\$4.00.

THIS is a truly comprehensive study and the book is certainly not "milk for babes." It is the fruit of lifelong re-

search and Professor Barton is not afraid to indicate many changes of viewpoint that have been forced upon him since he wrote his *Sketch of Semitic Origin* thirty years ago. More light from many quarters has fallen on this intriguing study of origins, and, while one may not feel that the last word has been spoken, what the author has written will command attention, if not complete assent. Doctor Barton displays an amazing erudition and is at home in every nook and cranny of the ancient East.

Though the author has changed his mind on quite a few important points he still holds to his early thesis that North Africa is the cradle land of the Hamites and that the Semites proceed from them. He tends, however, to diverge considerably from W. Robertson Smith, his earlier guide, in his account of social origins: perhaps with good reason, for things are never as clean cut and isolated as Robertson Smith would have us believe. Life is always broader than any interpretation of it and our theories seldom do full justice to the complexity and persistence of social usages and organization. The author is mindful of this and recognizes that very often he is moving in the realm of opinion rather than of sure knowledge.

Interesting, indeed, is his view in regard to totemism wherein he takes a position opposed to Robertson Smith and holds the latter's interpretation of apparent totemistic phenomena "not justified." He suggests, further, a new derivation of the tetra grammaton, and there may be as much in its favor as for some others that have been suggested. He derives it from the Arabic and gives to the epithet the meaning "he who comes to love passionately"; thus Yahweh would be originally a god of life and fertility. Further he accepts the view that there was a dual settlement of the Hebrews in

Palestine, one by the Habiri (from the south) in 1375-1360 B. C. and another about 1200 B. C., when the Rachel tribes came up from captivity in Egypt and entered by the East. This resolves some difficulties but leaves an unresolved remainder.

It is not possible to do more than refer thus briefly to the many interesting questions raised by the author, but perhaps sufficient indication has been given that this is a work of great value.

The work is completely indexed and accompanied by two comparative tables of grammatical forms.

JOHN PATERSON.

Drew University.

God Does Guide Us. By W. E. SANGSTER. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.00.

THIS new and timely contribution to devotional literature will be widely welcomed. The Oxford Group has stimulated discussion as to the possibilities of divine guidance, it being a principle of the Group that its members should seek such guidance every day and be able to witness to it as a fact in their life and work. That detailed directions as to a Christian career may be secured if right methods are employed has been challenged in certain quarters, even by those who believe in an over-ruling Providence and the efficacy of prayer; hence the positive affirmation embodied in the title of Mr. Sangster's book.

The author is one of the younger ministers of the Methodist Church of England and, from his pulpit at Scarborough, preaches to a large congregation of eager souls. This book reveals his power as a clear, well-balanced and forceful interpreter of Christian truth. Although he does not write as a member of the Oxford Group, he evidently understands its

principles and methods, and while most appreciative in the main, he does not hesitate to take up matters which have occasioned criticism and to present friendly suggestions by way of warning.

The wealth of material contained in this book is distributed in fourteen short, racy chapters, under four main divisions—"God is not dumb that he should speak no more," "In diverse manners," "Perplexed, but not in despair," and "Teach me Thy way, O Lord, and lead me in a plain path." Every important phase of guidance, including the more difficult problems involved, is given frank and thorough consideration, and all in such a spiritually-minded, Bible-loving, Christ-honoring, prayer-engaging manner as to bring a real blessing to the reader and serve as a sane and practical manual to all who wish to know and follow the divine leadership.

J. ROSS STEVENSON.

Princeton Theological Seminary.

Christian Missions and a New World Culture. By ARCHIBALD G. BAKER. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company. \$2.00.

THE missionary enterprise has a well-authenticated vocabulary of its own: boards, societies, missions, stations, catechumens, catechists, converts, baptisms, colporteurs, devotion, delimitation, comity, and so forth. May these and all such terms be put into the background and missions be discussed in a vocabulary involving chiefly such terms as these: behavior complexes, biological heredity, centers of reference, disintegration, reintegration, conditioning, response patterns, culture complexes, ideational world, incorporation process, cross-fertilization, selection, reorientation, sanctions, stimulus-response circuits, satisfactions and ends? That is what is done

in this volume, and herein lies its novelty in part. The really new thing is that we are given a completely new approach to missionary science and technique—the sociological-psychological.

The argument may be summarized thus: Our world is fast becoming a unit—"planetary." The close juxtaposition of all its parts makes inevitable the cross-fertilization of its cultures. Among the elements of world culture is religion, as variously expressed in worship, ideas, forms, sanctions and practice, among all nations. Among these religions is the Christian faith. The clash of these cultural systems is rapidly breaking down, disintegrating, the old culture-patterns. New ones must be set up, around new centers of references, as the old ones are proven inadequate for the present strain. The materials used will include those from the old patterns, such as still can be adapted and used. The new forms may be regarded as a syncretism, or as assimilation, but the new will always differ more or less from any one of the old patterns. In religion—in Christianity it has been, and always will be true. Thus we account for the various religious types. This should not only be recognized, but welcomed. In the process of re-integration Jesus becomes an important center of reference. The Christian is certain that he is the most important of all centers—hence, the World Christian Mission. It becomes at once inevitable and urgent.

Such a view affords a philosophy. There can be no absolutes—there are probabilities high enough to base one's life upon and therefore great enough to challenge, to "motivate" devotion to missions, if they be of such a type. A technique is also suggested, which involves moving real headquarters to the actual area where the work is being car-

ried on. Here there will be complete co-operation without discrimination between "nationals" and "foreigners." Moreover, there will be mutual studies and tasks undertaken with all men of good-will, of whatever religion. Both conversions (obtained by consent and not by urging) and deeply penetrating leavening will take place, naturally. Thus will be achieved the true aim of Christian Missions: "The development of personality to its highest possibilities, the building of a more perfect form of society, and the enhancing of the values of life as these find expression in a world-culture."

Here is a book at once formidable and fruitful. It makes the claim that it avoids theological discussions. That is not wholly possible. The book is not easily read. It is possibly a little over-written. But in any case it is one of the most important missionary books of the year, and one which cannot be overlooked by those who seek to chart the new way from what is breaking down to that which we all seek to build anew.

W. D. SCHERMERHORN.

Garrett Biblical Institute.

Beyond Conscience. By T. V. SMITH.
New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company. \$3.00.

HERE is a book full of ideas and well worth reading. It was evidently written with joyous abandon; scholarship, insight, and wit have gone into its making.

But we may as well let the cat out of the bag. The title of the book is calculated to strike cold chills up and down the spine of the moralist. What is there beyond conscience? An area in which all morality vanishes, all distinctions between better and worse are wiped out, and conscienceless vice prevails? Hardly.

What then? Well, beyond conscience lies something that saves the day, but we mustn't call it conscience.

The fact is that Professor Smith is playing a trick on his readers. When he talks of conscience, he means the intuitive judgments and emotions which spring up in most of us in a moral situation; his "conscience" is what I have called, in *Moral Laws* (p. 111), the spontaneous or uncritical conscience. Most of Smith's book deals with the "implementation" of this conscience. "Implementation" is a very impressive word for "validation of the truth claim of conscience"—procuring obedience to it, securing results through it, proving its claim to be true. The bulk of the book is a cavalry charge through the ranks of theology, idealism, sociology, metaphysics, and logic, with the purpose of showing that all the attempts of all these first-class powers fail utterly at the task of implementation. It would naturally be hard for the noblest efforts to implement our spontaneous conscience. It does not merit implementation so much as critical and reflective supplementation, which often means rejection. Smith's victory, save for details here and there, is complete and a nice time is had by all.

Unfortunately the serious problem of ethics—the problem of what lies beyond "conscience," what a wise, critical, rational conscience would be—comes off with but little attention, although Smith sees the need of "the recapture of the unity of consciousness and conscience."

Smith refers to this reviewer as an idealist who holds that "we cannot know anything until we know everything." This is a very loose conception of my idealistic logic. While it is true that we cannot completely understand and prove any proposition until we

"know everything," Smith overlooks the possibility that many facts and propositions may be true, whatever else is true, even though the proof of this possibility is incomplete.

The bluntness and insight of Smith's religiously skeptical mind are shown by his remarks about humanism and theism. "The theological humanists are right, but in being right are either destroying or degrading religion; whereas the theists are wrong, but in being wrong are perpetuating and glorifying religion." Such writing makes one think.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN.
Boston University.

Christianity Tested. By OSCAR MACMILLAN BUCK. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.00.

HERE is another appraisal of Christian missions—a discerning, searching appraisal. But it is far more than that. It is a most stimulating and enlightening study of spiritual forces that are at work in the world. And it is offered by one whose antecedents, outlook, and deep personal interest make him a fraternal, although a critical and fearless, observer of Christian missions. Few men are so well qualified as Doctor Buck for such an appraisal.

No review of *Christianity Tested* which must be limited to a few hundred words, will suffice to convey a fair impression of the value of the book. It opens many windows in many directions, and the views presented will lessen complacency regarding Christian missions. They would certainly produce pessimism if the author could not see spiritual forces at work in the world and did not believe in the ultimate triumph of the Eternal Christ.

Doctor Buck makes it alarmingly clear that Christianity is being tested

to-day, and in the realm of Christian missions in particular. Nationalism, fascism, communism, industrialism, and modern irreligion are giving Asia its ideas and its ideals, "while Christianity is being forced to the edges by a rush of these great movements of the day." Yet "the missionary enterprise has not awakened to the magnitude or significance of this change." . . . "The needs of Asia will have to be seen in a new light by the missionary enterprise, if Asians are to co-operate with us, or to tolerate us in their lands." That is a part of the author's thesis, which his arguments fully justify.

The chapters on "Barriers" will be startling to those who are not awake to the difficulties that have been created by our ecclesiasticism, formal creeds, traditions, and attitudes. How often we have practically ignored the customs, ideas, and culture of oriental peoples and have thought we were advancing the kingdom of heaven very largely by a reproduction in the Orient of our own practices, systems, and institutions. "The religions of the west—Judaism, Christianity, Islam—have been as exclusive and intolerant of other faiths as the religions of southern and eastern Asia have been inclusive and tolerant of one another."

Doctor Buck is not satisfied to indicate barriers alone. He points out "A Road for the Christ in Asia." It would do a world of good if the Christian forces of America could read this book and give their mission boards freedom (encouragement also to such as may need it) to recast their plans and policies quickly with a view to helping the Christian forces of Asia make a new highway for Christ, while a similar effort is attempted in the West.

The book is all the more valuable

because it "is really an autobiography in the rethinking of missions by one who was born into the older missions and brought up within them, who knew and loved and defended them, and then in two recent trips within a decade saw them inadequate to the new Asia which is shaping itself daily before our eyes."

JAMES H. FRANKLIN.

President of
Crozer Theological Seminary.

The Chinese, Their History and Culture. By KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$7.50.

THE attempt to picture and interpret the great stores of Chinese tradition and culture to the English-reading public is a task stupendous, yet rewarding; anyone at all acquainted with the rich and voluminous nature of Chinese literature and culture can sense the immensity of the task, anyone appreciative of the achievements and significance of China in world history can acknowledge the value of such a study. Professor Latourette, in these two volumes, seeks to gather up the long sweep of the centuries of Chinese history and the diverse, yet unified, cultural traditions into a fair, clear, illuminating and readable picture of the Chinese, and he has done it exceedingly well.

The two volumes can be read separately, for the division between them is quite clear. The first opens with a chapter on the geographical forces influencing China, and then continues with the history of the country from its earliest beginnings on the North China plain and in the Wei valley through the various dynasties up to the final monarchical decline under the Manchu rulers. The last three chapters deal with the significant changes which the penetration of

the West into Chinese civilization has wrought. An unusually clear and comprehensive story of the forces leading up to the present turbulent political and economic period in Chinese history, including a record of the Manchurian troubles and the advent of Russia and Japan into the affairs of North China, is incorporated; any one seeking a dispassionate account of the changes now taking place in China could well afford to read and reread these pages.

Emphasis upon political forces is acknowledged by the author in the introduction (rather apologetically, for an age in which the economic interpretation of history is so popular), but it may be said in defense of Professor Latourette that the domination of Chinese tradition by Confucian and neo-Confucian forces makes such an approach not unmerited. While the course of China's history may not break itself up into quite as easy divisions as the author chooses, the totalitarian politico-ethical culture of China demands adequate recognition of the part which dynastic hierarchy has played.

In the second volume the author deals with cross-sections of Chinese culture in contrast to the chronological unfolding of Chinese history in the first. By virtue of the manner in which the volumes are organized repetitions necessarily occur; however, these should not lead one to believe that much new material is not incorporated. The major aspects of Chinese culture are presented and the effect of the western world upon them interpreted. The chapters deal with the People, Government, Economic Life, Religion, Social Life, Art, Language, Literature and Education.

Professor Latourette sees a vast intertwining totalitarian culture which in large part accounts for the persistence of the same structure of society through so

many centuries. The basic organization can be found in the pre-Ch'in era and secures its intellectual and moral backing in Confucian thought. It was this ethico-religious tradition which secured political acceptance with the Ch'in and Han dynasties and, although the subsequent development was not uniform, made its lasting imprint on Chinese history through the Sui and T'ang dynasties. The Confucian pattern, while influenced by Taoist and Buddhist thought, has been dominant all through the long centuries of Chinese monarchy. The characteristics of Chinese religion which the author lists are eclecticism, tolerance, optimism, and ethical humanism, augmented by some superstition and by state control; Buddhism, which secured a strong foothold in the early centuries of the Christian era, was modified to meet the demands of Chinese culture. The political system of China survived because of the social-mindedness of its leaders, the acceptance of Confucian ethics, and the system of state education organized to continue that tradition. Economic considerations were prominent because of this-worldly ethics. The family, secret societies, guilds and organizations bore the imprint of a characteristic social quality of mind. Thus the picture of China becomes one of a unified (although none too simple) cultural heritage in which a dominant social spirit of mind was encouraged by political, ethical, and religious motives working in union.

The author points out the deep changes developing in Chinese civilization during the past century which have contributed to the chaotic present and which may occasion a dark future before the unifying abilities of the Chinese can achieve again a worthy civilization. The careful way in which Professor Latourette seeks to objectify his interpretation and the

reserved judgments which are characteristic throughout make these volumes deserving of the close and thorough study of anyone who seeks to know and understand the China of to-day.

PAUL RUSSELL ANDERSON.

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Religion and Revolution. By ADOLF KELLER. (The L. P. Stone lectures at Princeton Theological Seminary for 1933.) New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. \$2.00.

It should be said at once that to the average American reader the title of this book is decidedly misleading. But this unfortunate fact should not detract anything from the actual value of its content.

Did someone say the battle between "fundamentalism" and "modernism" in religion is a long since passé and settled affair? If so, let him read this book. The simple fact is that, as usual, theological movements and battles which dominate the religious scene in Europe, have as yet not taken noticeable foothold in the United States. But, also as usual, we shall find ourselves enmeshed in these same—presently largely, though not exclusively, European—issues by and by. Therefore, let no one pass up this volume just because it deals with the revolution going on in European religious circles and among their religious thinkers. For, whatever else may be said, it cannot be denied that the central issues of this book are concerned with *fundamental* and far-reaching differences of religious thought and outlook.

The central issue around which the current religious battle rages in Europe is the old issue of naturalism versus supernaturalism, of internal spirituality

versus external authoritarianism in religious interpretation. One might say that it is a question—almost—of man versus God; or so at least the issue is stated by Adolf Keller.

Much, of course, might be said about the authority with which the author speaks. But, frankly, we are not concerned with that, especially in view of the fact that everyone familiar with theological and religious affairs in Europe knows the name of Adolf Keller as a household word. It is the issue presented by the book itself which is the chief matter of concern.

And concerned every religious thinker (and preacher) who reads this book will most certainly be, regardless of the side of the religious revolution which he may intend to support.

It is easy enough to reduce the battle-cry raised by the author to a number of very simple propositions. He demands: Back to Luther and to the heart of the Protestant Reformation with its doctrine of "justification by faith" and by faith only! Back to the Bible and to its absolute unquestionable and rationally undebatable authority! Back to the Divine Revelation—never mind the human interpretation! Back to "the faith once for all delivered to the saints"—never mind the fact that it is the saints to whom it is delivered who have to do the understanding and living of that faith! Back to the faith which is neither man-made nor even merely God-directed, but which is both God-inspired and God-given!

I close with a word of personal prophecy. Whenever the major portion of the battleground of this "religious revolution" is transferred to this continent, it will split our largest denominations wide open. Moreover, it will be a rift which cannot and which, probably,

ought not to be healed. But—read the book.

PAUL ARTHUR SCHILPP.
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Protestant Church Music in America. By ARCHIBALD T. DAVISON. Boston: E. C. Schirmer Music Company. \$2.00.

MANY writers have covered the field of worship, but their consideration of music in worship has been incidental. It has remained for Dr. Archibald T. Davison to reveal to the Protestant churches of the United States the real quality and character of the music in their public worship, and to prescribe certain conditions for its improvement. The author of *Protestant Church Music in America* not only is a scholarly educator in the general field of music but is a leading church musician, choral conductor and editor. His long service as professor of music and conductor of the Glee Club at Harvard University has made him well known to church musicians and musical educators. This experience is the basis of the unsparing analysis contained in his preceding work, *Music Education in America*.

Doctor Davison begins by depicting the anomalous situation—musically—in our churches. Masters of worship do not understand that worship music should employ the very best resources at their command. Masters of music actually shrink from entering the service of the church because they know "that in practically every case to be in the pay of a Protestant congregation means subscription to a system which no musician of ideals could possibly tolerate." He sums up one of his cardinal beliefs in the statement that "service music should be not one whit less good than the best secular

music, but, like worship itself, the power and integrity of church music ought to be judged by the degree of its remoteness from the world."

Then follows a discussion of the prevailing attitudes of the three partners concerned, the ministers, the church musicians, and the laymen. The first are indicted for their lack of musical taste, the second for their willingness to compromise and the third for the paradox of their indifference to the music, while at the same time they seek to dictate the musical policies of the parish.

Standards of beauty in music, acquired through normal education and expression at each age, for youngsters at school, for secondary and college students, and more particularly, for musicians and for theological students, should control the planning and the selection of all the music used in corporate worship. Doctor Davison sketches the harm wrought by association, tradition and prejudice. The laws of association are brilliantly expounded, including the heritages from childhood and the impressions retained when music has been transplanted from its first secular use—usually vocal and often operatic.

The failures of our church music are clearly related by Doctor Davison to the chaotic conditions in the theory and practice of worship itself in Protestant churches. His own conception of worship music is based on his attitude toward worship. "The more worship points men away from earth and toward God, the greater is its power; and in the same way the more music shuns the every-day idiom of man's musical experience, the more efficient partner of worship it becomes. For music, like religion, is fundamentally a mystery" (p. 55).

There is a masterly analysis of the elements in music which affect its eligi-

bility for use in worship. Rhythm, melody, counterpoint and harmonic structure are treated; freedom from chromaticism and sparing use of dissonance are urged. Doctor Davison's inquiry now reaches the credo of the organist and choirmaster. Every educated choirmaster should ask himself—

1. Do I look upon my church position as a professional contract or as a privilege to service?

2. Do I regard church music from one of many utilitarian points of view, or have I some positive ideal?

3. Am I persuaded that to use any but the highest type of service music is destructive of my self-respect?

4. Am I acquainted with the literature of church music, or am I content with what publishers send me or with what I have always used?

5. Have I made an honest effort to induce the clergy and laity to give a hearing to my convictions, and to argue their validity through the witness of great music?

It must be added that the failure of the music in Protestant churches has been no greater than in the other parts of their worship. The formlessness of the average service, the disregard it often shows for the sequences of thought and feeling involved in corporate (group) worship, the positive blunders as regards taste and liturgical fitness—all these form a situation hostile to the employment of the noblest music. Each Protestant church has a definite responsibility for developing its own valid forms of worship.

Protestant Church Music in America carries a much needed and distinctive message to every minister and to every church musician. It will enable a vast number of churches to plan intelligently

for a renaissance of gothic music, through the development of existing resources and the mastery of the cultural, liturgical and devotional elements in valid worship, thus creating patterns of worship experience worthy of the best in music.

REGINALD L. McALL.

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Jesus and Human Personality. By

ALBERT EDWARD DAY. New
York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.00.

"We shall not have ideal personalities in any number until we have an ideal society. But neither shall we have an ideal society until we have ideal personalities." The order of these two statements indicates the emphasis of this book, in which Doctor Day publishes his Lyman Beecher Lectures at Yale. Long distinguished by prophetic insight and utterance, Doctor Day is concerned to emphasize the need of social reform. Indeed, he repeatedly goes out of his way to say that he heartily concurs and is resolved to participate in every valiant attempt now being made to create a social environment in which human personality will have a fair chance to grow and flower. He is even more concerned, however, to emphasize the need of an intimately personal ministry to the individual life, being convinced that this has too long been neglected by social evangelists and that in consequence numbers of hungry, tormented folk have gone away not only unfed but unregenerated and so incapable of playing any significant part in the exacting drama of social reconstruction.

Well, there is probably a more excellent way of proclaiming the gospel of Christ than either social or individual gospellers have yet discovered. Some-

day a man will appear in whose preaching there will be neither an exclusive emphasis (social gospel *or* personal evangelism) nor an alternation of emphasis (now social gospel and now personal evangelism), but rather a continuous proclamation and interpretation of the blessed fact that if you seek first the kingdom of God whatever you yourself need, in your private experience of life, will be added unto you. But this "more excellent way" is hard to master (has anyone yet mastered it?) and until it does become a known and familiar way for the homiletical mind to travel, we may well rejoice in an attempt as successful as that of Doctor Day's to supplement a one-sided presentation of the gospel.

Coming now to the content of these Lyman Beecher Lectures, one finds no end of rare insight and eloquently expressed conviction. "If the name of Jesus be taken to mean not a mere talisman whereby the gates of heaven may be opened but the symbol of all that Jesus said and did, his character and counsel, then it is not theology but life which declares that there is none other whereby the self can achieve its fullest possibilities in a balanced, sturdy, moral personality." Personally inspired by this conviction, Doctor Day proceeds to show how in Jesus, "his character and counsel," the "ever-striving self" can discover "how to deal wisely with appealing mental images, how to achieve an abiding self-respect, how to satisfy the deep, pervasive need for comradeship, how to solve the problem presented by moral failure," and so how to lay a foundation "for those further conquests which must be made if the self achieves fullness of personality." Doctor Day is easily at home in the field of psychiatry. He is even more at home in the New

Testament, with the ideas and outlook of the historical Jesus. And he has an intuitive knowledge of the human heart, supplemented by a long and enriching pastoral experience. The result is a study of *Jesus and Human Personality* that is at once illuminating and inspiring. A book for preachers, certainly; but no less for laymen—one of the most distinguished volumes of lectures in a long and distinguished series.

ERNEST FREMONT TITTLE.

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The Gospel of the Hellenists. By B. W. BACON. New York: Henry Holt & Company. \$4.00.

It is in every way fitting that Doctor Bacon's crowning contribution to all his studies for the better understanding of the New Testament should be a volume on the Fourth Gospel, styled by him *The Gospel of the Hellenists*. Since the day he gave to the world of scholarship his learned volume on the *Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate* to the closing days of his busy life his interest in the Gospel of John the Elder was supreme. By his sane critical acumen and spiritual gnosis he did as much as any man in this country to interpret the spiritual values of the Johannine Gospel and Epistles.

The volume contains five sections. The first considers general questions: the churches in Asia, the real John, the authorship and language of the Gospel, its materials and structure. The second is devoted to the examination of more special matters: the prologue, the pre-Galilæan and the post-Galilæan ministries and the problem of the appendix. In part three there is, as in Doctor Bacon's *Studies in Matthew*, a new translation of the entire Gospel. While following most closely the American Re-

vised Version, the author has retained full freedom to interpret "the tone and sense of the Greek text." Passages displaced by the redactor have been restored to their original place in the Evangelist's work. Here are the first five verses of the Prologue, which he calls a *Hymn in Three Strophes*.

In the beginning was the Logos.
And the Logos was inherent in God.
And the Logos was in nature divine.

The same was in the beginning with
God.

All things came to being through him;
Without him nothing received existence.

Through him the creation was infused with life,
And the life was the guiding light of men.

The light shineth in the darkness;
But the darkness overcame it not.

In Professor Bacon's original typescript, the first verse read "In the beginning was Thought. Thought belonged to God. Thought was in nature divine." This was later changed into "In the beginning was Soul. Soul was inherent in God. Soul was in nature divine." The editor—not wisely we think—has retained the untranslatable Logos because of the uncertainty in the mind of the translator. Though Doctor Bacon found it extremely difficult to find an English equivalent for the Greek Logos, he had little hesitation as to what he considered to be the meaning of the term as used in the hymn. In the body of the volume (pp. 321 and 347) he has given his interpretation of the Logos. "The elder has in mind the divine source of the redemptive message. It is 'soul' in God which seeks fellowship with 'soul' in man. God's method of conveying the

divine life was to incarnate its soul and source in the eternal Logos letting his own 'soul' (if one may use the term) take a human form." The fourth section may possibly be to many the most valuable because of its discussions of such all-important themes as the Christology of the Gospel, the words and works of Christ, salvation by faith, and eternal life. The last section contains many valuable appended notes on the Gospel and the Epistles, the Gospel and Ephesians, Johannine topography, and dramatic personæ.

Especially interesting is the clearness and definiteness by which the personality of John the Elder is etched in the volume. Doctor Bacon regarded him as a converted Jew, born about 69 A. D., and early brought under the influence of Polycarp, the Bishop of Smyrna. While living in Ephesus this convert to Christianity became painfully aware that a pseudo-Christianity was being preached which nullified the life and death of Christ. To meet this dangerous challenge to the Christian faith he composed his great Gospel and the three Epistles. For this task he was in every way eminently qualified. As a Palestinian he was acquainted with the traditions of the life of Jesus as gathered together in Mark and Luke. Residence in Judea gave him first-hand knowledge of the topography of the country. Being a Hellenistic Christian he had access to certain gospel traditions not represented in the Marcan and Lucan Gospels. In his use of all these traditions he was essentially a child of his age, showing little signs of what we call historical criticism as when, for instance, he wove into the Cana story fragments of a pagan legend because of their symbolic value. This elder, too, is the heir of great souls like Paul and Apollos, men who sought to interpret the

meaning of Christ for their age by spiritualizing many of the elements in the Gospel. It is the elder's unique unrivalled spiritual gnosis based on a profound spiritual change that enabled him to give spiritual meaning and world-wide significance to "the spectacle of a Galilæan peasant impelled by devotion to his people's ideal of the kingdom of God sustained by an unconquerable faith in a Father in heaven and becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." This great Christian interprets God as revealed in Christ in terms of light, love and life. His pen gave to the world three of the most illuminating sentences ever written: "God is love"; "God is light, in whom there is no darkness at all"; "God is Spirit, and they who worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth." His way of interpreting Christ may be "an ancient one," but it is only as Christian theologians to-day build on the great foundation stones laid by this Ephesian saint and thinker that they can furnish an adequate resting-place for the restless mind of this age.

Doctor Kraeling has accomplished his editorial task exceedingly well, but is it not unpardonable that so important a volume should be published without any indices?

J. NEWTON DAVIES.

Drew University.

The Challenge to Liberty. By HERBERT HOOVER. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$1.75.

WHETHER we agree with the views of Mr. Hoover or not, there must be in every honest heart a sincere esteem for his admirable character disciplined in the fine Quaker tradition; for his broad humanity swift in its response to human suffering; for his unruffled equanimity in defeat; and for the honorable

restraint which has withheld any criticism of his successor (from whom he so widely differs on every question of public policy) that might be attributed to the resentment of defeat.

His utterances in *The Challenge to Liberty*, which is a broad discussion of the relation of our newer policies of recovery to the older ideals of American liberty, will only deepen our admiration; for there is not a line here written that betrays either partisan prejudice or personal pique. The whole tone of the discussion maintains that detached manner, free from self-exploitation, free even from self-consciousness, which has been Mr. Hoover's marked characteristic, a characteristic that ill-fitted him for the rough and tumble of partisan political strife. Our American public, perhaps too widely influenced by the manner of Hollywood "stars," demands of all its political favorites the most intimate self-revelations. We resent reserve as though it were guilty concealment, or a denial of one of our "inalienable rights," the right to ransack every nook and cranny of a public man's life. Mr. Hoover has never offered himself for such pillage and consequently is not the object of that "human interest" which is regarded as so essential by all who would gain public favor at any cost, and so attractive by all whose curiosity is an appetite that runs far beyond their powers of intellectual digestion.

Mr. Hoover charges that the whole recovery program of the present administration involves a complete reversal of the philosophy of government and society which underlies the Constitution and has presided over all our development since that document was drafted. This philosophy he calls the "American System." It is compounded of certain "inalienable rights" which are the individual's inde-

feasible possession against any governmental invasion whatsoever, and certain ideals of life which grew out of the stress of redeeming a continent to the uses of civilization, courage, initiative, aspirations for a better standard of living, as well as spiritual health and growth. Fundamental to all this "System" is economic freedom. For "other freedoms cannot be maintained if economic be impaired—not alone because the most insidious mastery of men's lives is through economic domination, but the maximum possible economic freedom is the most nearly universal field for the release of the creative spirit of men." (P. 33.)

Mr. Hoover is an undiscouraged Liberal, for he holds that the maintenance of these liberties, together with a care for the suffering unemployed, is sufficient to bring us through the depression to a full recovery. It may be permitted to those who remember that we went into the depression in the full possession of all those liberties and under the guidance of the "American System," to doubt that the philosophy which plunged us into the gulf can be wholly trusted to bring us out.

It is of course easy for Mr. Hoover, starting with his conception of the "American System," to arrive at the conclusion that every step of the recovery program now being tried is a departure from our ancient ideals and an infringement of our liberties. The increase of the powers of the Executive by the emergency legislation of the last Congress; the multiplied bureaus that certainly do interfere with individual action; the managed currency and credit, a prerogative long assumed by a few financiers; the limiting of agricultural production; and the control of foreign trade, all offer fertile fields for the

charge that we have departed from the old landmarks of American freedom as conceived by pioneer farmers and traders in a vast unsettled continent.

It would be easy to show that every extension of power into the realm of individual freedom of which Mr. Hoover complains is but a continuance of trends that began in the first days of our governmental existence, some even earlier, and have proceeded with greater or less rapidity through the years. The Executive has steadily outgrown the original limits of its power; bureaus have multiplied; new areas of governmental activity have been developed, and the end is not yet.

The real questions are not, Have we invaded individual freedom? Have we disturbed the ancient balance between the Executive and Legislative branches of our government? Have we multiplied Bureaus? But rather, Has our invasion of individual freedom promoted the general welfare? or, has it failed? Has the empowerment of the Executive made our government better able or less able to "secure the blessings of liberty"? Have the numerous bureaus helped, or hindered recovery?

These questions do not come within the scope of Mr. Hoover's discussion. He gives no consideration to the adaptability of the various measures to the ends proposed. He gives no thought to the wisdom of the ends proposed. Will they promote recovery of economic vigor collectively? Are some adapted to further recovery, some to hinder? These matters he completely ignores except for the statement that we were well on our way to recovery in the summer of 1932 together with the rest of the world. "Ours was the only country in which there was subsequent hesitation in the forward movement. The election by its determi-

nation of an abrupt change in national policies naturally brought a break in the march of confidence and recovery." (P. 170.)

As Mr. Hoover contends, the essential rights of the individual must be jealously guarded. But those rights, in spite of Mr. Hoover's assertion of their absolute character, are subject to limitation for the common good. There could be no organized society otherwise. In emergencies, such as war or insurrection or epidemics, they may be seriously narrowed, even denied outright. When the emergency passes they ought to be restored. This is an emergency greater than war. The life of all is at stake in our struggle against economic chaos.

But "emergency" powers must be adequate to the emergency. They are necessarily greater than those employed during routine days of existence. Our courts have always recognized this. There ought to be close scrutiny of all such procedure lest we damage more interests than we aid.

None the less there must be vigorous action, wisely directed, to insure our recovery. We cannot merely wait for happy individual initiative, or world recovery which may or may not carry us up with it. The Constitution must not be interpreted as a mere document of restraint. It is a document empowering a nation with all powers necessary to its existence, as John Marshall long ago asserted in his vigorous decisions. The "American System" is one that encourages all action vital to success and prosperity. Neither the Constitution nor the "System" are opiates to inhibit needed action in an emergency. They are stimulants to an undiscouraged and brave people who will not supinely suffer defeat.

Mr. Hoover has contributed a valu-

able and stirring discussion of historic American liberties and their vast accomplishments. He has not faced squarely the clamorous exigency which we must meet.

EDMUND JAMES KULP.

Grand Avenue Temple,
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Makers of Christianity from Jesus to Charlemagne. By SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE. New York: Henry Holt and Company. \$2.00.

I HAVE been re-reading, in recent months, biographies of most of the leaders dealt with in this popular "biographical approach" as found in Farrar's *Lives of the Fathers*, Smith and Wace's *Dictionary of Biography*, the various more critical lives of Jesus and certain portions of the numerous patristic texts, ante-Nicene, Nicene and post-Nicene. I fully recognize the necessity of a reverent, rigid adherence to the historical critical method. The tendency to deify, to surround the great religious leaders with miracles, to give credence to fiction, to take tradition to be history—all these must ever be kept in mind as we try to set down what was probably the actual person, fact, or event. Doctor Case, to the superficial observer, seems in this instance, as in his other work, *Jesus—A New Biography*, to exercise such precautions. But as a matter of fact, and especially in connection with Jesus, he approaches the writing of Christian history with certain dogmatic biases which render the final result very inaccurate and therefore non-historical.

In part, his biases are: Jesus was merely "a prophetic religious reformer," nothing more. The Christianity of history, in its redemptive, revealing, reconciling, reforming aspects, would never have been and would not now be, if this

assumption were true. The lives of all that follow in this book under review would have been worse than mediocre had Jesus been merely a man. Historically, every one of them were what they were for Christianity because they believed that in Jesus they found God as their divine Lord and Redeemer. This is not a dogmatic statement on my part. This is the cold historical fact.

Doctor Case, judging by the title of this book and by his biography of Jesus in particular, has joined that spiritually bankrupt and historically inaccurate group of present-day representatives of the old-time positivists known now as humanists. Any cursory reading of the latest and best in religion and theology will convince the historian that, in these latter days as in every instance in the entire history of Christianity, a merely human Jesus and a merely humanistic Christianity are figments of the imagination contrary to fact and sterile in their value. Christianity is not the product of men merely. Essentially, and when set forth accurately by the historian, it is of God. Men experience or discover it and, in varying degrees of accuracy, help God to make it manifest among men. Again, let me remind you, this is not merely my viewpoint or my bias. This is the historical attitude of all those whom Professor Case portrays.

A third bias of the author, one which logically follows the first two, is the evident total rejection of all miracles, including the resurrection. We all know that miracles no longer have an apologetic value. We may go so far as to brand certain of the recorded miracles as having never happened, since they are, so far as we can see, quite bizarre and they serve no moral or Christian purpose. But to reject them all renders the narratives historically quite valueless,

and is quite contrary to the best findings of science—in short, such rejection is a species of dogmatism unworthy of the historian. Too often those who take this dogmatic stand do not believe in, nor have they ever experienced, the great miracle of personal redemption in and through Jesus.

Doctor Case is very inconsistent in many instances in his evaluation of source materials. He makes no use of the fourth Gospel. But he uses many less worthy documents in creating the biographies of certain of the fathers. The very same documents which furnish his source materials for the lives of the fathers are totally ignored in what they say with regard to Jesus. Plainly this is not the attitude of a historian, but of a dogmatist. In dealing with Paul he arbitrarily defines Clement's "western limit" as "Rome." Accuracy would require that "Rome" be inserted in brackets, not in parentheses, since "Rome" is

Professor Case's idea, not the idea of Clement necessarily.

Professor Case seems to hold that the history of Christianity consists in the mere chronicle of strictly personal items in connection with the leaders. The classic histories of science, philosophy, education, etc., would be almost without value if they were written in such a fashion. Why treat Christianity in such an inadequate and unfair manner? The history of no leader is correctly written without giving adequate treatment to the products of his mind and spirit and to his subsequent influence. This is especially true of Jesus.

As your reviewer, I have no desire to set forth any so-called orthodox view. I am condemning the major premises of this book from the angle of a more accurate critical historical method in writing history.

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Bookish Brevities

DR. RICHARD ROBERTS, author of *That Strange Man Upon His Cross* and *The Preacher as Man of Letters*, has been elected Moderator of the United Church of Canada.

Sherwood Eddy, in his new book *A Pilgrimage of Ideas*, holds that the five greatest living personalities are Gandhi, C. F. Andrews, Amy Carmichael, V. S. Azariah and Toyohiko Kagawa. He thinks of Woodrow Wilson and John R. Mott as the greatest Americans he has met.

Dr. F. W. Boreham, author of twenty-eight widely-circulated books, recently conducted a mission at the Pirie Street Church, Adelaide, Australia, of which the late Dr. Henry Howard was the minister for twenty years.

As measured by the demand in the New York Public Library, books on psychology are overtaking books on economics. In the main library two thirds of the circulation is in non-fiction. Maugham's *Of Human Bondage* is the book most often called for. Fifty-two copies are in constant circulation.

Ellery Sedgwick, for twenty-eight years editor of the *Atlantic Monthly*, estimates that not six novels of worth have been written in the United States in the past one hundred years and that American writing ability lies more in the fields of history and biography.

The famous educator, George Her-

bert Betts, wrote to his publishers three days before his death—"I have been concerned over the tendency to make a religion out of sociology, education and what not, omitting almost altogether any explicit religious emphasis having to do with Deity and other central concepts of Christianity. I wonder if the solution is not to be found in the direction of our modest little effort, namely, the interpretation of religion as a vital factor in everyday life in the social order of today."

Professor John Baillie is described in the *Christian World* of London as a religious teacher for the age. "Modern in temper, keenly sensitive to the legitimacy of many modern claims, he yet preserves an essential fidelity to the core of what Christians have commonly held; he is, in a word, that rare thing, a real growing point of the historic Christian faith."

Henry Seidel Canby, who has the highest entitlement to speak, declares that the younger American writers of the past decade have no standards, no faith, no certainties. This, after the war and the depression, he holds, is natural, but they have no faculty of resting upon an inner confidence in their own existence as a soul and mind, alive, reflective, philosophical against fate, and capable of pleasure in being and thinking in despite of circumstances. They have a fierce passion for experience, but naturally no joy in life. They write like sensitive typewriters operated by forces outside themselves.

Five thousand individuals answered a questionnaire, listing ninety-four free-time activities, which was sent out by the National Recreation Association. The ten diversions receiving the largest number of votes are: reading newspapers and magazines, 3,977; listening to radio, 3,955; attending movies, 3,670; visiting or entertaining others, 3,445; reading books of fiction, 3,408; automobile riding, 3,246; swimming, 2,976; reading non-fiction, 2,847; conversation, 2,735.

In India through the ages there have been Ashrams where a teacher and his disciples live out together the truth that they have found to prepare themselves for the further truth which they seek. Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi have their Ashrams and Stanley Jones has one in beautiful Sat Tal among the foothills of the Himalayas. Two of the mottoes on the walls of the meeting house are, "Leave behind all race and clan distinctions, ye that enter here." "Here we enter into a fellowship, sometimes we will agree to differ, always we will resolve to love and unite to serve." All take an equal share in every kind of work and on Friday mornings "Brother Stanley" is a sweeper.

In his travels through Russia and China Doctor Jones has been deeply stirred by the spread of Communism. He is writing a book on "The Christian Alternative." As Christians, he holds, we must stand between the growing rift of Fascism on the one side and Communism on the other, and offer a program and a power better than and beyond each. This we must do or fail Christ and mankind.

In commenting upon the criticism of Reinhold Niebuhr on his article, "The

Christian Cult of Violence," in the Summer Number of *RELIGION IN LIFE*, Jerome Davis disagrees that there is "no moral distinction between violent and non-violent coercion." There is too much confusion, he argues, in comparing a strike with war. To continue to work when exploitation is aggravated is sometimes unethical and unchristian. A strike can be in harmony with the spirit of Christ, although it usually is not because laboring men are just as frail and fallible as the rest of mankind. Furthermore, strikes are often educative not only to the employers but to the public.

It is much harder to harmonize with Christian love any war with its machine guns and poison gas for mass murder. It is no criteria that in both strikes and war, children suffer. So they do when parents volunteer for foreign mission service, but such suffering is imperative when the way of love must be followed.

The task of the Christian is to follow the truth as he sees it, using the highest insights which he is able to receive. He must ever struggle against yielding either to the God of vengeance or of hypocrisy. The great test is, what are we doing with our lives for God and for man? Our money, our time and our religion must be transmuted into helping men to see God, to secure more social justice and to experience more of good-will in action. Abstract theoretical discussions about violence or non-violence are of little value unless they change lives and group behavior patterns.

William L. Stidger has published a book of his verses under the title, *I Saw God Wash the World*. Mr. Edwin Markham speaks of them as having the facility and felicity of poetic expression. He finds in their swinging and ringing

lines a message of cheer and courage to help us to carry on when life grows dark.

Many of the poems show a fine sensitivity to the moods of nature.

My Master was a man, who knew
The rush of rain, the drip of dew,
The gentle kiss of midnight air
Upon his face upraised in prayer.

His hair was washed by summer showers,
He bent to kiss the wayside flowers;
Old Jordan's shore was sacred sod
To Christ, the outdoor Son of God!

Your seeds blow into my garden, friend,
Whenever the wind is right;
They blow on wings of the wind by day
And they ride on the gales by night.

Your life is a garden of love, dear friend,
And planted with kindly deeds;
So ever and over the wall will blow,
Into my garden, your seeds.

The best of the poems is that which gives the name to this well-made little book.

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James Crosswell Perkins, who graduated from Princeton University in 1929 with highest honors in philosophy, is a Master of Theology from Oberlin, and who ministers to the Congregational Church of Regent, North Dakota, thinks that Professor Vergilius Ferm and Doctor Newton do not dispose of the issue between authoritarian preaching and the scientific spirit which they discussed in the Autumn Number of *RELIGION IN LIFE*.

He holds that every minister who desires to combine reverence for truth with reverence for personality and for the Giver of Life feels the dilemma acutely. He does not admit that the problem is only a symptom of an inner conflict and

thinks that any such consideration comes from dealing with it too abstractly. He found that the people in a coal mining camp in Southern Ohio, during a lawless strike, needed a religion which requires justice and brings comfort and peace; and that the people who are suffering from the drought in the Dakotas would listen to denunciations of the economic order but they need a comforting, energizing faith that will enable them to stand up under most distressing circumstances.

In his opinion, if authoritative preaching cannot be based upon doctrines of infallibility, it can and must be based upon a much more sure and solid footing, namely, the certainty of verified experiment. This can only be done through prayer and fasting, and Mr. Perkins is confident that the only sure basis of the religion of the future is a faith founded on the best tested values of past experience but subject to verification by present experiment.

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The article on Cromwell by Mr. Isaac Foot was secured by Dr. Lynn Harold Hough through Arthur Porritt, Editor of *The Christian World*, London.

Mr. Porritt writes that Isaac Foot is a native of Plymouth and is fifty-four years of age. He has five sons, three of whom had the distinction of the Presidency of the Union at Oxford or Cambridge. One son, Mr. Dingle Foot, sits in the House of Commons as Liberal M.P. for Dundee.

Mr. Foot has made Cromwell and Cromwellian times one of the passionate studies of his life. He holds that all that is best in modern England has been made possible by Cromwell. He has been accused, jocularly, of being totally incapable of making a speech in the House of Commons without quoting his

hero, Cromwell; and it is a fact that when he became Secretary of the Department of Mines in Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's National Government (from which he resigned as a protest against its tariff policy) he altered the name of the Ministry's office to Cromwell House. In the *Contemporary* of November, he criticizes Hilaire Belloc's new life of Cromwell as an addition to unwanted books.

Mr. Foot is a Methodist layman and lay preacher. He is credited with having said that "as a lay preacher I try to move my audience: when I speak in the House of Commons my audience moves itself." As a matter of fact Mr. Foot is always sure of a hearing in Parliament. His wide historical knowledge, his ingrained Liberalism and his palpable

sincerity have won him a place in the affection of the Mother of Parliaments.

By profession he is a lawyer. He sits in the British House of Commons as Liberal member for the Bodmin Division of Cornwall. He was a member of the Round Table Conference on India (1930-31), and is now serving on the Joint Select Committee which is preparing the report upon which the Bill for Indian self-government will be based.

Mr. Foot is a bibliophile, and has amassed an exceptionally fine library. For many years he has been making a collection of sonnets with a view to publishing an anthology of what he regards as the choicest in the English language. Recently he had the misfortune to lose the MS. embodying the collection.